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ABSTRACT 
 
The overarching goal of this investigation was to explore how individuals 
experience and respond to autobiographical memories that contradict their self-concept. 
A secondary goal was to explore two potential determinants of the experience and 
response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories: self-threat and narcissism.  
In Study 1, 291 participants were asked to recall a time when they challenged 
another person’s memory for a past event. They were then asked to describe why they 
challenged the other’s recollection, among other questions. Overall, the motives 
identified for challenging aligned to a considerable extent with the previously theorized 
functions of autobiographical remembering. As expected, instances in which participants 
admitted to challenging in order to preserve or protect their self-concept emerged. 
Significant differences were observed between these self-protective challenges and other 
types of challenges on several dissonance proxies, including negative emotional states, 
importance of convincing the other, motivation to present a positive self-image, and 
distress at disagreeing with the other. There was a tendency for women who identified 
self-protective motives to have higher narcissism scores. 
In Study 2, 221 participants were instructed to recall a high self-threat event (a 
time when they engaged in intimate partner violence) and a low self-threat event (a time 
when they acted in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding way towards a romantic 
partner or date) in a counterbalanced order, and thereafter rated measures designed to 
capture dissonance-reducing appraisals. As expected, the high self-threat event produced 
more dissonance, as indicated by higher ratings of shame, than the low self-threat event. 
Consistent with the initial prediction, participants reported lower belief in accuracy and 
  v 
indicated being more critical of their past selves than their current selves after the high 
self-threat event. Regarding narcissism, shame-prone women tended to be more critical 
of their past-selves than their current-selves. More nurturing and more dominant 
participants showed a similar pattern of criticizing past selves. More nurturing 
participants tended to show higher belief in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence after 
the high self-threat event than after the low self-threat event.  
Overall, experiencing and responding to self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories appeared to closely resemble cognitive dissonance processes. Dissonance 
activation and use of appraisals depended on perceptions of self-threat and narcissism; as 
self-threat increased, dissonance increased, and appraisal use increased. The findings 
have implications for the utility of cognitive dissonance processes in understanding the 
experience and responses to self-discrepant autobiographical memories. The findings also 
have clinical implications for the utility of appraisals in protecting the current self-
concept. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 This investigation seeks to understand how individuals experience and respond to 
autobiographical memories, recalled by the self and/or recounted by another, that 
contradict their current self-concept. The self-concept is here defined as a theory that an 
individual holds about himself or herself (Rosenberg, 1989). Autobiographical memories 
that are discrepant with the current self-concept are henceforth referred to as self-
discrepant autobiographical memories.  
The value of such an investigation rests in its potential to (a) arrive at a more 
nuanced understanding of how the self and autobiographical memories work together to 
protect and preserve one’s self-concept and to (b) inform our understanding and clinical 
interventions when autobiographical memories of self-discrepant acts exacerbate 
psychopathology and/or interfere with treatment (Pillemer, 2001; Rubin, Hoyle, & Boals, 
2014).  
Chapter 1 sets the theoretical and empirical stage for this program of study by 
focusing on cognitive dissonance theory and its integration into autobiographical memory 
theorizing. Building on this foundation, Chapter 2 focuses on autobiographical memory 
research as it applies to incompatible recollections of past events, some of which possibly 
involve dissonance. Chapter 3 focuses on dissonance-reduction strategies in the context 
of autobiographical memories of intimate partner violence.  
Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories & Cognitive Dissonance 
Not all autobiographical memories are discrepant with the self-concept; although 
there may be incompatible versions of a recalled past event, this incompatibility does not 
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necessarily violate or conflict with one’s self-concept. The focus of this investigation, 
however, is on a subset of autobiographical memories wherein the past event, as recalled 
by someone else (Study 1) or as recalled by the self (Study 2), does in fact violate or 
conflict with one’s self-concept. Based on Aronson’s revision of cognitive dissonance 
theory (1969, 1992) as well as autobiographical memory theorizing and research 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), it is the position of this manuscript that cognitive 
dissonance processes underlie the experience of self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories and the ensuing responses.  
Overview of cognitive dissonance theory. Festinger (1957) conceptualized 
dissonance as simultaneously holding two or more inconsistent cognitions, or cognitions 
and behaviours, which produce an aversive state of psychological discomfort that in turn 
motivates individuals to alter their cognitions/behaviours to reduce dissonance. Aronson 
(1969, 1992) revised the theory by suggesting that mere inconsistency does not 
necessarily produce dissonance. Rather, he argued that a certain kind of inconsistency, 
where one’s action(s) conflict with one’s self-concept, would produce the sharpest 
dissonance. He further elaborated on the role of the self-concept by arguing that 
individuals strive to “(a) maintain a consistent, stable, and predictable sense of self, (b) 
preserve a competent sense of self, and c) preserve a morally good sense of self” 
(Aronson, 1969, Aronson, 1992, p. 305). He proposed that a state of dissonance would 
arise when an individual has acted or is implied by someone else to have acted in a way 
that (a) is startling or “astonishing” to them (i.e., as opposed to consistent with whom 
they think they are), (b) makes them feels incompetent or foolish, and (c) makes them 
feel immoral, ashamed, or guilty. Otherwise stated, an implication that one is immoral, 
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incompetent, inconsistent, unstable, or unpredictable threatens one’s positive self-concept 
and therefore creates dissonance (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995).1  
Inherent in Aronson’s revision of cognitive dissonance theory is that individuals 
have a positive self-concept and that negative information is inconsistent with this self-
concept. Swann’s (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann & Read, 1981) self-
verification theory, on the other hand, proposes that the self-concept is not always 
positive. The theory predicts that when faced with negative information, an individual 
with a negative self-concept might not experience dissonance because this situation 
would presumably be consistent with their sense of self.  This investigation draws from 
Aronson’s rather than Swann’s revision because, given that the studies involve 
nonclinical samples, most of the participants are expected to have a positive self-concept.  
Festinger (1957) and Aronson (1969, 1992) both proposed that dissonance 
reduction could be accomplished in several ways, including changing the dissonant 
element(s), increasing the number of consonant element(s) (e.g., outweighing, affirming 
some other valued aspect of the self-concept), or reducing the importance of the dissonant 
element(s) (e.g., trivialization, rationalizing). 
Applications of cognitive dissonance theory in autobiographical memory 
theorizing. Cognitive dissonance theory has been incorporated into Conway’s (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) self-memory-system, one influential framework within 
autobiographical memory. The self-memory-system emphasizes the reciprocal 
relationship between the self and autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-
                                                        
1 Because self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1989), 
and similar theories can arguably be subsumed under the umbrella of dissonance theory 
(Aronson, 1992), they are not discussed here. 
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Pearce, 2000). Of relevance to this investigation, the self-memory-system is premised on 
the assumption that coherence between autobiographical memory and the self-concept 
provides stability and integration, which contributes to physical and psychological health. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) draw from Higgins’ (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & 
Strauman, 1986) self-discrepancy theory to underscore the need for coherence. According 
to Higgins’ theory, discrepancies in self-views produced problematic mood states, such 
as sadness and fear. 
Along similar lines, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce argue that a lack of coherence 
(e.g., dissonance) is thought to undermine important aspects of the self-concept, and 
exacerbate the emergence of psychological disorders, confabulations, and delusions. 
Given the pivotal role of coherence to one’s well-being, Conway (2005) and Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggested that when coherence is threatened, it can be re-
established by lowering the accessibility of memories that threaten or undermine this 
coherence or by substantially modifying or distorting coherence-threatening memories 
prior to accessing them.  
The self-memory-system contributes to this investigation in three important ways. 
First, it builds on Aronson’s revised cognitive dissonance theory by proposing that 
dissonance (or a lack of coherence) can arise from conflict between autobiographical 
memory retrieval and the current self-concept. Second, it highlights the importance of 
dissonance-reducing mechanisms to one’s physical and psychological health. Third, it 
proposes ways in which dissonance can be resolved (i.e., coherence can be re-
established) by modifying, distorting, or reinterpreting coherence-threatening 
autobiographical memories. 
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A more recent application of cognitive dissonance theory in an autobiographical 
memory context can be found in Rodriguez and Strange’s work (2015), who showed that, 
after writing a counter-attitudinal essay about tuition increase, participants reported not 
only being more supportive of tuition increase following the essay, but also that their pre-
essay attitudes had also been supportive of this idea. In other words, participants 
unwittingly modified aspects of their recollection of pre-essay attitudes to match their 
post-essay attitudes. 
Discussion of cognitive dissonance in an autobiographical memory context was 
also incorporated in Scoboria, Jackson, et al., (2014), and Scoboria, Boucher, et al., 
(2015) who proposed that cognitive dissonance could result from at least a temporary 
conflict between two or more salient sources of information about the occurrence, 
accuracy, and/or personal importance of a remembered event. These salient yet 
conflicting sources of information may involve internal cognitive processes, such as 
when one’s current self-concept is inconsistent with their memory for the event, or 
external social processes, such as when one receives information from someone else that 
undermines their current memory for a past event.  
Conclusion. Based on Aronson’s revision of dissonance theory (1969, 1992) as 
well as autobiographical memory theorizing and research (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), one can argue that cognitive dissonance processes underlie the experience of self-
discrepant autobiographical memories and the ensuing responses. It is possible to draw a 
parallel between the arousal of cognitive dissonance and ensuing responses to this 
dissonance, and the arousal of self-discrepancy within an autobiographical memory 
context and ensuing responses to it. This parallel holds to the extent that if dissonance 
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arises when an individual’s behaviour violates their self-concept as morally good, 
competent, and/or consistent/stable/predictable self (Aronson, 1969, 1992), then 
dissonance should also arise when aspects of an autobiographical memory, as recalled by 
someone else or as recalled by oneself, reflect a behaviour that violates one’s self-
concept. Consistent with the self-memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
such dissonance would threaten the coherence between autobiographical memory and the 
self-concept. In response, dissonance reduction strategies should theoretically become 
activated to re-establish coherence and preserve the self-concept.  
The parallel between cognitive dissonance and self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories also holds to the extent that, if dissonance, an aversive state of discomfort, can 
be alleviated by either changing the dissonant cognitions or behaviours, increasing the 
number of consonant cognitions or behaviours, or reducing the importance of the 
dissonant cognitions or behaviours (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Festinger, 1957), then 
dissonance produced as a result of exposure to self-discrepant autobiographical memories 
can also be alleviated through comparable processes that prioritize the cognition(s) 
contained within the self-concept over the recalled behaviour(s).  
Autobiographical Memory-Based Appraisals as Dissonance-Reducing Mechanisms 
In line with Festinger’s (1957) position that dissonance could be alleviated by 
trivializing the dissonant element, dissonance between the current self-concept and 
autobiographical memories may also be alleviated by trivializing aspects of that 
autobiographical memory (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Similarities have also been drawn between Festinger’s proposal of changing the dissonant 
element and the idea of reconstructing self-discrepant aspects of a conflicting 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 7 
 
 
autobiographical memory in a more self-serving manner (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In both instances, research has found that using these 
memory-based mechanisms, or appraisals as they will be referred to henceforth, has a 
comparable effect to dissonance-reducing mechanisms insofar as improving 
psychological and physical health (Snyder & Higgins, 1988), maintaining higher self-
esteem and well-being scores (Beike & Landoll, 2000), and lowering psychological 
maladjustment (e.g., depression, hostility, anxiety; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).  
Those autobiographical memory-based dissonance-reducing appraisals that have 
been partially empirically substantiated thus far can be roughly grouped into appraisals of 
importance and appraisals of veridicality. Appraisals of importance are hypothesized to 
reduce dissonance by re-evaluating either the importance of a past event (or aspects of it) 
or the importance of aspects of the self. Examples include devaluing a past-self 
(McFarland & Alvaro, 2000), claiming a feeling of subjective distance between past and 
present selves (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003), trivializing the utility of the 
dissonant memory (Greve & Wentura, 2010), minimizing or justifying the dissonant 
memory or aspects of it (Beike & Landoll, 2000), devaluing the dissonant memory by 
recalling other events more consistent with one’s current self-concept (Beike & Landoll, 
2000), and viewing the dissonant memory as closed or belonging to the past, with no 
bearing on the present (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman 1990; Beike & Crone, 2008; 
Beike & Landoll, 2000). 
Appraisals of veridicality are hypothesized to reduce dissonance by re-evaluating 
the attributions made about how much a past event is believed to have truly occurred 
(belief in occurrence) and/or how accurate its recall is (belief in accuracy; Scoboria et al., 
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2014). Examples include participant-reported higher accuracy ratings for pride-inducing 
memories relative to shame-inducing memories, presumably to bolster the self-concept 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) and participant-reported reduced belief in the 
occurrence of a past negative or traumatic event because its recall might be threatening or 
uncomfortable (Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015). To elaborate, Scoboria and 
colleagues (2015) found instances in which participants reporting lowered belief in 
occurrence when retrieving potentially intrusive trauma-related memories (e.g., “I pushed 
it from my mind”; “I did not want to believe that that happened.”). Echoing Festinger’s 
notion of increasing consonant elements, Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014) also proposed 
that devaluing new information and maintaining the original belief in occurrence can 
arguably diminish cognitive dissonance. Disputed memories are an example of instances 
when, faced with conflicting information, individuals maintain their original 
autobiographical belief and defend their version of a past event (Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 
2001). 
How does motivation influence appraisals? Festinger (1957) proposed that an 
aversive state of psychological discomfort motivates individuals to turn to dissonance-
reducing mechanisms. Aronson (1969, 1992) instead argued that it was the motive to 
preserve a moral, competent, and stable sense of self that drove the use of dissonance-
reducing mechanisms. Along those lines, the self-memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) proposes that the primary role of the working self is to maintain a coherent 
sense of identity by regulating the encoding, accessibility, and retrieval of memories. 
According to this framework, the motivation to achieve self-coherence facilitates the 
reconstruction of autobiographical memories that are consistent with one’s current self-
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concept. The framework further predicts that, when encountering dissonant and/or self-
threatening information, individuals alter, distort, reinterpret or even fabricate their 
memories so as to maintain their current self-concept. Failure to do so presumably results 
in delusions, confabulations, or other forms of psychosis (Conway, 2005).  
In contrast to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s emphasis on self-coherence, 
Sedikides and colleagues (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2004, 2009; 
Sedikides & Strube, 1995) have advanced self-protection and self-enhancement as 
motives that play a crucial role in memory appraisal. Reminiscent of Aronson’s work, 
both these motives are rooted in the assumption that individuals view themselves 
positively (e.g., competent, warm, moral, attractive, and lovable), and strive to maintain, 
protect, and/or enhance this positive self-concept (Sedikides & Green, 2004).  
The exact relation between self-enhancement and self-protection is the subject of 
many papers. Alicke and Sedikides (2009) propose that threat perception may help 
differentiate between the two. They contend that, similar to the parasympathetic nervous 
system, self-enhancement is activated by relatively minor disturbances or minor threats, 
and makes only slight adjustments. In contrast, similar to the sympathetic nervous 
system, self-protection is activated by larger disturbances, such as challenges or threats, 
and makes more radical adjustments. Self-protection should therefore be activated when 
self-discrepant autobiographical memories threaten the self-concept. This inference is 
compatible with Alicke and Sedikides’s suggestion that experiencing negative affect, a 
presumed sign of threat to the self, preferentially activates self-protection. 
In addition to threat perception, Alicke and Sedikides (2009) differentiate 
between the two motives in terms of effort; whereas self-enhancement requires only 
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minor effort to maintain the positivity of the self-concept, self-protection requires more 
considerable effort to counter or minimize the threat. Because of this, self-protective 
processes are more elaborate, more cognitively demanding, and more likely to involve 
self-deception than self-enhancement processes. In fact, self-protection is presumably 
expressed through various efforts at forgetting, avoidance of remembering, making 
excuses to deflect blame, misremembering unfavorable information about the self, or 
retreating from threatening situations, which are reminiscent of the appraisals presented 
earlier. Not surprisingly, the two motives relate in predictable ways to the self-serving 
bias; internalizing positive outcomes is more likely to involve self-enhancement, whereas 
externalizing negative outcomes (e.g., deflecting blame) is more likely to involve self-
protection.  
The predominance of self-protection versus self-coherence has also been debated. 
There are a handful of studies that illustrate the emergence of appraisals under conditions 
of discrepancy and/or self-threat, but the underlying motives are not fleshed out. When 
Baumeister et al. (1990) examined accounts involving interpersonal conflict, they found 
that narratives in which a participant had angered another person contained denial of any 
lasting negative consequences, justifications, excuses, and blaming of the victim. Such a 
stance was deemed indicative of self-protection, but self-coherence could not be ruled 
out.  
Other authors interpret their results in the context of self-coherence. For example, 
Beike and Landoll (2000) manipulated motivation levels by asking participants to recall 
either self-discrepant or self-consistent memories. Participants in the self-discrepant 
condition made more frequent use of justification, outweighing, and closure than 
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participants in the self-consistent condition. As to motive, however, they argued that self-
coherence was involved, while dedicating little attention to self-protection.   
A potential compromise between self-consistency and self-protection was 
suggested by McFarland and Alvaro (2000), who speculated that the two motives might 
work together. They experimentally manipulated self-threat by randomly assigning 
participants to describe either a severe or a mild negative event, and then instructing them 
to provide current and pre-event ratings on various personal characteristics (e.g., tolerant, 
mature). Even though random assignment would have ensured that pre-event ratings were 
comparable between the two randomly created groups, participants describing the more 
severe negative event were more critical of their pre-event selves than participants 
describing the mild negative event. This derision of past selves was interpreted as 
bolstering the illusion that the participant had grown and improved since the negative 
event, which contributed to feelings of self-worth. This illusion of improvement 
presumably alleviated the threat posed by recalling negative affective states. Crucial to 
the self-coherence and self-protection debate, the illusion of improvement was 
engendered by derogating the past, rather than the present attributes, presumably because 
past attributes are less salient and available, and therefore easier to devalue. Extending 
this argument further, it would appear that coherence with one’s current self-perception 
prevented the derogation of present attributes. Self-protection, however, required that the 
self be protected in some way, so the past was derogated instead. 
Along those same lines, Wilson and Ross (2003) asserted that individuals strive to 
maintain a coherent yet favorable self-concept. They further argued that individuals do 
not always value self-coherence; at times, they show a tendency to perceive improvement 
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or growth in themselves by deriding past selves, which is more aligned with the self-
enhancement and self-protective motives. 
Another factor to consider regarding motivation is the degree of threat. According 
to Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996), prioritizing one motivation over another may 
depend on the degree of threat to the self; self-relevant information that is somewhat 
discrepant should activate a self-coherence motive, whereas self-relevant information that 
is strongly discrepant should activate self-protection. They further add that the greatest 
threat to the self is typically experienced by individuals possessing an unstable or inflated 
self-concept, a pattern most typical among narcissists.  
Sedikides and Green (2004) attempted to experimentally disentangle self-
protection from self-coherence. They selected participants with a negative and a positive 
self-concept and randomly instructed them to consider trait-relevant behaviours (e.g., 
trustworthy) either while thinking of themselves or someone else. Participants’ recall of 
those behaviours was tested after a brief distractor task. The authors found that even 
participants with a negative self-concept (i.e., individuals who self-reported behaving in 
an untrustworthy or unkind manner in the past and expected to act similarly in the future) 
recalled fewer negative than positive behaviours when instructed to think of themselves. 
This inferior recall of self-threatening information, regardless of the valence of one’s 
self-concept, established the more dominant role of self-protection vis-à-vis self-
coherence in the context of memorial self-defense. This conclusion is, however, specific 
to one mechanism through which self-protection may operate: mnemic neglect (Sedikides 
& Green, 2000; 2004), which refers to shallower processing of self-threatening 
information, and consequently reflected in inferior recall. Other discrepancy reduction 
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strategies may operate under a predominantly different motive or circumstance.    
To summarize then, some individuals may prioritize self-protection, whereas 
others may prioritize self-coherence. These two motives do not necessarily contradict 
each other if the self-concept is inherently positive because both self-protection and self-
coherence would motivate the individual to maintain that positivity. An issue, however, 
arises when there is a negative or somewhat unfavorable self-concept, in which case it is 
not clear whether self-protection (and the related desire to protect oneself from negative 
evaluation) or self-coherence (and the related desire to maintain that negative self-
concept) will emerge as more dominant. The valence of the self-concept becomes 
relevant when considering that a current negative self-concept may be more aligned with 
a dysphoric or borderline presentation (Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2006; Jorgensen et al., 
2012), whereas a current positive self-concept may be more aligned with an adjusted 
presentation. Based on the arguments presented thus far, circumstances that create 
dissonance, and in particular self-threat, should predominantly activate self-protection.  
When do appraisals occur? Little is known about how we choose the manner in 
which we respond to self-discrepant autobiographical memories, although dissonance 
theory can make several relevant contributions in this regard. According to Festinger 
(1957), the magnitude of dissonance is partially contingent upon the importance of the 
elements involved; the more important, valued, or consequential the conflicting elements 
are, the higher that dissonance will be. Recognizing the role of individual differences, 
Aronson (1969, 1992) proposed that individuals differ in their tolerance of dissonance 
and in their preference for certain dissonance reduction strategies over others. Building 
on Festinger’s (1957) and Aronson’s work (1969, 1992), two constructs are discussed 
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below as potential determinants of responses to self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories: self-threat and narcissism. No distinction is being made as to whether these 
two constructs differentially impact the magnitude of dissonance or the selection of 
dissonance-reducing methods. It is likely that self-threat and narcissism are involved in 
both aspects to varying degrees.    
Conceptualizations of self-threat. Self-threat has been operationalized in various 
ways, including experiencing failure (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985), 
experiencing self-referent negative feelings (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000), such as shame 
(Aronson, 1992; Pinto-Gouveia & Matos; 2011) or fear (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and 
experiencing negative events (e.g., death, physical assault of self, proximity to a war 
zone, accident, injuries, illnesses, harassment, sexual assault; Wood & Conway, 2006). 
Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) defined self-threat as instances when “favorable 
views about oneself are questioned, contradicted, impugned, mocked, challenged, or 
otherwise put in jeopardy" (p. 8). As such, self-threat should emerge when the self-
concept is mocked, challenged, or criticized in some form. Baumeister’s 
conceptualization of self-threat is in line with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) view 
that certain memories, if accessed, are threatening to the current self because they 
“destabilize the goals of the working self and cast the whole system into turmoil” (p. 
282).  
Sedikides and colleagues (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Pinter, Green, Sedikides, 
& Gregg, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2000; 2004, 2009) advanced a self-threat model, 
mnemic neglect, which, reminiscent of Aronson’s revised dissonance theory (1969), 
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holds that when an individual’s positive2 self-concept is exposed to a certain kind of 
feedback, there is a momentary drop in self-esteem, which is uncomfortable and 
motivates the individual to reduce or alleviate the discomfort. According to Sedikides, the 
feedback produces dissonance if it (a) is negative or inconsistent with the self-concept, 
(b) is central to aspects of the self-concept (as opposed to peripheral), and (c) is indicative 
of a central trait (e.g., the trait of trustworthiness vis-à-vis the indicative behaviour of 
using a roommate’s toothpaste without permission. To the extent that that individual 
holds trustworthiness in high regard, the feedback involving stealing toothpaste is 
perceived as threatening). More recent iterations of Sedikides’ mnemic neglect model 
regard feedback as threatening if it (a) involves the self (is about oneself, not someone 
else), (b) it contains negative implications (entails criticism, not flattery), and (c) it 
pertains to central personality traits (traits deemed certain, descriptive, and important 
aspects of the self; Pinter, Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009).  
Relation of self-threat to dissonance and appraisals. In a large meta-analytic 
review, Campbell and Sedikides (1999) found that individuals appraise (or make self-
                                                        
2 Because Sedikides and colleagues (2000, 2004) assume that the self-concept is 
inherently positive, only negative behavioural feedback creates dissonance. Others 
concede that the self-concept may be negative (e.g., Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2006; 
Jorgensen et al., 2012), in which case, dissonance would arise when the behavioural 
feedback is unexpected and inconsistent, meaning in this case, positive (Aronson, 1969). 
In contrast to self-consistency proponents, self-enhancement and self-protection 
proponents predict that negative behavioural feedback is undesirable under any 
circumstance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2004, 2009; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1995). This investigation will not debate the merits of either side. Rather, I 
assume that most individuals have a positive self-concept, particularly in a nonclinical 
sample, and acknowledge that both self-consistency proponents and self-enhancement 
proponents make similar predictions as to how an individual with a positive self-concept 
reacts to negative behavioural feedback; he/she seeks to protect and/or preserve the 
positivity of the self-concept as someone moral, competent, and predictable (Aronson, 
1992; Sedikides & Green, 2004). 
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serving attributions, as they refer to them) to protect their self-concept. This process, they 
argued, depends on the level of threat to the self-concept; the greater the perceived self-
threat, the more self-serving and externalized, rather than internalized, the attributions 
become. In other words, appraisals become more external and possibly more removed 
from reality as the level of perceived self-threat grows. Applying Sedikides’ 
conceptualization of self-threat (Pinter, Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2011; Sedikides & 
Green, 2009), appraisals should be most apparent when the feedback is directed at the 
individual themselves (rather than it being about a third party), contains negative 
implications for that individual, and involves central personality traits of that individual.  
Given the functional similarity between dissonance-reducing appraisals and ego 
defenses, ego defenses become a useful lens through which to discuss and understand 
appraisals. Consistent with Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the notion that appraisal 
selection is contingent upon self-threat perception also emerges in the context of ego 
defenses, where it has been argued that the greater the self-threat, the more self-deceit is 
required to mitigate that threat, and ego defenses arise to facilitate this self-deceit and 
preserve the self-concept (Baumeister, 1986). According to Baumeister (1996) and Greve 
and Wentura, (2010), defenses requiring the most self-deceit involve an absolute 
rejection of threatening self-referent information, as is the case of “rejecting” or 
“avoidant” defenses. On the other hand, defenses requiring comparatively less self-deceit 
involve attempts at negotiating reality rather than an absolute rejection. It would therefore 
appear that ego defenses become more rejecting of reality and more removed from that 
reality when self-threat increases. In such cases, more self-deceit is required to preserve 
the current self-concept. Along those lines, it is possible that dissonance may increase 
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and/or appraisals may become increasingly more rejecting of reality as self-threat 
increases. 
A related yet slightly different perspective on ego defenses is offered by Vaillant 
(1994, 2011), who ranked ego defenses to reflect decreasing levels of psychopathology 
and increasing levels of personality maturation. According to Vaillant (1994, 2011), ego 
defenses could range from psychotic defenses involving denial and/or reality distortion 
(e.g., delusional projection, psychotic denial), to immature defenses (e.g., acting out, 
passive aggression, dissociation, projection), to neurotic defenses (e.g., rationalization, 
displacement), to mature defenses (e.g., sublimation, humour), the latter deemed 
beneficial to psychological health and well-being. Based on this hierarchy, the less 
mature someone’s personality is, the more likely they would be to select a psychotic or 
immature defense to preserve the self-concept.  
Cumulatively, the work presented in this section suggests that the magnitude of 
self-threat proportionally impacts the magnitude of dissonance and likely also influences 
appraisal selection––the response chosen to reduce dissonance. Echoing Vaillant’s 
hierarchy (1994, 2011), the role of personality maturation in dissonance arousal and 
appraisal selection has received some attention in the context of narcissism, and this will 
be explored in greater detail in the next section.  
Conceptualizations of narcissism. The interpersonal circumplex is widely used to 
conceptualize interpersonal behaviours and traits as existing along two orthogonal 
dimensions: dominance and nurturance (Wiggins, 1995). Dominance, alternatively 
referred to as status, power, worth, and self-esteem, is related to a deeply held belief that 
one is worthy of respect from significant others. Nurturance, alternatively referred to as 
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security, love, intimacy, affiliation, and integration, is related to the deeply held belief 
that one is a loved individual who can enter in intimate and lasting relationships with 
significant others. Because of its interpersonal components and its useful organization of 
traits along two orthogonal dimensions, the interpersonal circumplex represents a 
valuable, efficient, and theory-driven way in which to assess the presence of certain 
dispositional tendencies and estimate the intensity with which each disposition is 
expressed (Wiggins, 1995).  
Narcissism is of particular interest to this investigation because of its relationship 
to self-esteem and sensitivity to perceived self-threat (APA, 2012). Most theorists suggest 
that narcissistic traits range on a continuum from normal to pathological, with the 
pathological expression being more prevalent in a clinical sample and the normal 
expression being more prevalent in a nonclinical sample (Pincus et al., 2009). The normal 
expression of narcissism is widely viewed as adaptive and corresponds to greater 
assertiveness, agency, as well as having positive illusions towards the self while 
minimizing any information that reflects negatively on the self (Morf & Rhodewalt, 
2001). When mapped onto the circumplex, features of normal narcissism tended to 
cluster around the Domineering octant (Inventory of Interpersonal Problems; Pincus et 
al., 2009). The pathological expression of narcissism is widely viewed as maladaptive 
and corresponds to greater aggression, hostility, manipulation, deception, and is further 
characterized by a dominant and antagonistic interpersonal style, greater striving towards 
self-enhancement and greater resistance and reactivity to feedback that is inconsistent 
with the self-concept (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Pincus et al., 2009). When mapped onto 
the circumplex, the more pathological aspects of narcissism tend to cluster around the 
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Vindictive, Domineering, and Intrusive octants of the Inventory of Interpersonal 
Problems (Pincus et al., 2009).  
The more pathological aspects of narcissism have also been studied in terms of 
two distinct dimensions: grandiose narcissism, characterized by deceitfulness, envy, 
aggression, lack of empathy, and interpersonal exploitativeness, and vulnerable 
narcissism, characterized by distrust, hostility, negative emotions, social avoidance to 
cope with threats to the self, and interpersonal coldness (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010; 
Pincus et al., 2009). Whereas both dimensions overlap in their antagonistic interpersonal 
style, vulnerable narcissism appears to be more prevalent among individuals with 
problematic attachment styles, childhood abuse/neglect, and negative emotionality (e.g., 
shame, helplessness, emptiness, low self-esteem; Pincus et al., 2009).  
When mapped on the circumplex, vulnerable narcissism was most positively 
related to the Cold-Hearted and Aloof-Introverted Interpersonal Adjective Scales 
(Interpersonal Adjective Scales; Wiggins, 1995) octants (Miller et al., 2012), whereas 
grandiose narcissism was most positively related to the Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-
Calculating, and Cold-Hearted (Miller et al., 2012; Pincus et al., 2009) Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales octants. Using the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and the Inventory of 
Interpersonal Problems together, Miller and colleagues were able to further minimize the 
overlap between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism; they found that features of 
grandiose narcissism fell between the Assured-Dominant and the Arrogant-Calculating 
octants, whereas features of vulnerable narcissism fell along the Cold-Hearted octant.  
Relation of narcissism to dissonance and appraisals. According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2013), individuals with narcissistic traits possess an inflated yet 
fragile sense of self-esteem and react to perceived slights or criticism with rage, hostility, 
and/or aggression so as to protect the self (Baumeister et al., 1996; Campbell, Reeder, 
Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; Pincus et al., 2009). Not surprisingly, narcissists are more 
motivated to protect their self-esteem than non-narcissists (Campbell et al., 2009; Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 1993; Pincus et al., 2009; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). This protection may 
involve reappraising negative aspects of self, distorting disconfirming external 
information (in the case of grandiose narcissism; Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010), and 
memory distortion. Rhodewalt and Eddings (2002) found that, in response to being 
romantically rejected by a female confederate, highly narcissistic men recalled their 
dating history in more successful terms (e.g., they claimed to usually have a girlfriend, 
usually date more than one girlfriend), than they had originally reported. This biased 
recall was the opposite of the pattern observed among less narcissistic individuals, who 
recalled their dating history in less successful terms when rejected. Similarly, Campbell 
and colleagues (2000) found that narcissists demonstrated greater self-serving bias 
relative to non-narcissists.  
Taken together, narcissistic individuals, who are typically sensitive to self-esteem 
threats, may experience even more dissonance than less narcissistic individuals. They 
may also select appraisals differently from others, such as opting for mechanisms that 
absolutely reject reality rather than negotiate it, as discussed in the previous section.  
Narcissism and self-threat. Earlier iterations of the mnemic neglect model 
(Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004, 2009) underscored the importance of personality in 
proposing that feedback would be threatening and produce dissonance only when it 
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violates central personality traits. Despite the inherent importance of personality, 
however, Sedikides and Green do not propose specific personality dimensions that may 
be related to self-threat. 
A meta-analytic review on the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) 
found that several individual differences, such as locus of control or self-esteem, 
modulated experiences of self-threat, which in turn contributed to differences in self-
serving appraisals. Specifically, the authors found that individuals possessing an 
achievement orientation, high self-esteem, and an external locus of control, as well as 
narcissistic individuals, were more likely to feel threatened and thereafter manifested 
greater self-serving bias (i.e., appraisals) than their peers. In other words, those with a 
stable and positive self-concept as well as those with a fragile self-concept experienced 
greater self-threat and greater dissonance than their peers. 
Cumulatively, these studies suggest that self-threat is a multifaceted construct that 
is at least in part modulated by personality traits. In particular, individuals with 
narcissistic traits may experience the most self-threat and the greatest dissonance.  
Section conclusion. Dissonance arousal and appraisal-selection may in part be 
guided by self-threat and personality traits, such as narcissism. In the case of narcissism 
and self-threat, the two factors could combine as follows: a highly narcissistic individual 
is likely to perceive threat more intensely than a less narcissistic individual (APA, 2013; 
Baumeister et al., 1996; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002) and 
subsequently respond to this threat to a greater extent than a less narcissistic individual, 
such as by devaluing the importance of a self-discrepant autobiographical memory more 
than their peers.  
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Chapter 1 Summary 
Anchored in cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1969, 1992) 
and autobiographical memory research and theorizing (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), the overarching goal of this investigation was to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of how individuals experience and respond to past acts that are discrepant 
with their self-concept, with a focus on arguably protective appraisals of importance and 
appraisals of veridicality. Because dissonance arousal and appraisal selection are 
contingent on several factors, self-threat and narcissism will also be explored as a 
secondary focus. This research program was designed as two studies. Study 1 took an 
interpersonal focus by exploring why individuals challenge another’s recollection of a 
past event that is incompatible with theirs. Study 2 took an intrapersonal focus by 
exploring how individuals appraise an autobiographical event that is presumably shame 
inducing and arguably dissonant with their positive self-concept.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Introduction to Study 1 
Study 1 sought to explore why individuals challenge another’s recollection of an 
autobiographical memory that may be incompatible with their own recollection and in 
some cases, arguably dissonant with their self-concept. Those particular instances, where 
the recollection of past act(s) as recounted by another person violates one’s self-concept 
as moral, competent, and/or stable and predictable (Aronson, 1969, 1992; see Chapter 1 
for more detail), are referred to as self-discrepant autobiographical memories throughout 
this manuscript. Experiences of this kind of dissonance, where self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories are involved, are expected to be distinct from non-self-
discrepant autobiographical memories. 
Study 1 takes an interpersonal approach to answering how individuals experience 
and respond to possibly incompatible recollections and in particular, self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories. This approach was chosen because: (a) challenging another’s 
recollection of a past autobiographical memory arguably produces conditions under 
which cognitive dissonance and dissonance reduction mechanisms might emerge, (b) 
challenging another’s recollection of a past event seems to be common and should 
therefore be something that most individuals have prior experience with and can provide 
examples of, and (c) the current state of autobiographical memory research appears ripe 
for such a development. 
In the following sections, the groundwork laid by Hirst and colleagues (Cuc, 
Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Hirst & Echteroff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014), who have 
studied factors implicated in the social sharing of memories, is reviewed. This work is 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 24 
 
 
presented in order to better understand the interpersonal context and related reasons 
around the choice to challenge another person’s recollection. The second part of this 
review focuses on the contributions that the autobiographical memory literature makes to 
this investigation regarding potential reasons for challenging. The final part of this review 
focuses on self-discrepant autobiographical memories and related appraisals. The 
literature review is followed by the presentation of the study hypotheses and design, 
before finally turning to the results and discussion.  
The Social Context of Challenges 
A series of studies conducted by Hirst and colleagues have demonstrated that the 
very act of conversing can reshape memories such that subsequent memories become a 
blend of details encoded originally and conversations had between the initial encoding 
and subsequent acts of remembering (Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Hirst & 
Echteroff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014). In the course of an amiable conversation or a 
dispute, the speaker may intentionally or unintentionally offer new and/or misleading 
information, which could become incorporated into the listener’s memory (or both their 
memories, depending on the context) thus altering the memory content and potentially 
modifying how that memory is thereafter appraised. This is not an exhaustive explanation 
of how social sharing can alter memories; examples of other processes include memory 
appropriation whereby another’s memory is claimed as one’s own (Brown, Caderao, 
Fields, & Marsh, 2015), and selectively retelling certain details of a memory while 
omitting other details (Stone, Corman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst, 2012). These studies 
cumulatively demonstrate that memories can be revised within a social context, that 
revisions can be made in the course of challenges, as well as friendlier conversations, and 
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that such revisions are actually a frequent and normal part of individuals’ lives.  
Challenging another’s memory may be regarded as a form of social influence, and 
even, as some have discussed, an attempt at persuasion (Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015). 
In line with Nash and colleagues (2015), one could argue that examining instances in 
which an individual challenges another’s memory bridges the gap between the social and 
cognitive literatures by embedding aspects of persuasion into memory appraisals. Such 
attempts add to a small but steadily accumulating line of research that seeks to examine 
the effects of socially targeting (and arguably persuading against) belief in occurrence 
(e.g., Scoboria et al., 2014; see next section for a more detailed treatment of this 
argument). 
Challenges could theoretically be subject to the same social dynamics as would be 
involved in other forms of social communication. Based on Hirst and Echteroff’s review 
(2012), the extent to which one individual can influence another’s memory depends on 
several variables, including perceptions of expertise, perceptions of power, and 
personality characteristics. For example, perceiving the speaker as an expert or as more 
dominant can heighten the impact the speaker has on altering a socially remembered but 
unshared (as in, not being held by all conversational participants) memory (Brown, 
Coman, & Hirst, 2009; Cuc et al., 2006). As another example, Wright, London, and 
Waechter (2010) demonstrated that listeners who are fearful of negative evaluation are 
more susceptible to conforming to a speaker’s account. Similarly, a dominant speaker 
may have a substantial impact on others’ memories. Cuc and colleagues (2006) asked 
participants to study and recall stories first individually (i.e., pre-group), then in-group, 
and then individually again (i.e., post-group). They found that post-group accounts 
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contained a substantial number of details found in the pre-group account of the dominant 
speaker (i.e., a participant that spoke the most and dominated the in-group discussion). 
This scenario has a more adversarial analog in the false confessions literature, where a 
police interrogator, perceived as having the greater power, can persuade an innocent 
individual through implicit or explicit promises, threats, and/or implications of harsh 
treatment to comply with accusations and even to believe that they have committed a 
crime (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).  
Taken together, these studies suggest that challenging of memories can occur in 
various contexts, including social remembering of jointly experienced memories (i.e., 
reminiscing), persuasion, and disputes. Research in this area is starting to recognize the 
influence of social dynamics, such as the dominance of certain speakers (Cuc et al., 2006) 
in how and why memorial challenges unfold. The present investigation builds on this 
foundation by considering the various social dynamics involved in challenging, such as 
aspects of personality (e.g., trait dominance, narcissism). 
Challenges within the Autobiographical Memory Literature 
 In this next section, several areas of autobiographical memory literature are 
reviewed for the purpose of informing predictions about reasons for challenging 
another’s recollection. To this end, only lines of autobiographical memory inquiry that 
approximate or closely parallel social challenges are presented.  
Social influence and remembering. Although not explicitly formulated in terms 
of a challenge, instances in which social input contradicts one’s memory have already 
been investigated within the autobiographical memory literature. Sometimes, a lack of 
memory is challenged (e.g., false memory studies or false confessions), and other times, 
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the occurrence of and/or details within an existing memory are challenged (e.g., 
misinformation, nonbelieved memories, contested memories). Examples of challenges 
are found in literatures on memory suggestions for entire events that are delivered via 
hypnosis (Sheehan, Statham, & Jamieson, 1991) or dream interpretation (Mazzoni, 
Lombardo, Malvagia, & Loftus, 1999). Other instances of challenges involve the use of 
more cognitively based techniques, like enhancing the plausibility of suggestions 
(Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001) to increase the belief that a past event in fact occurred 
even if it cannot be recalled (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). To illustrate, Scoboria, Wysman, 
and Otgaar (2012) challenged participants’ recollection and attributions about whether 
certain childhood events genuinely occurred by providing them with “assurances” from 
their parents that such events did in fact happen. They found that the manipulation (i.e., 
confirmatory evidence from a trustworthy source, the parents) led to higher ratings of 
belief in occurrence—a belief that the event truly occurred to the self (Scoboria et al., 
2012).  
The finding that credible suggestions are effective at increasing the belief in the 
occurrence of a false autobiographical event dovetails nicely with prior findings that the 
perceived expertise and therefore trustworthiness of the speaker increases the likelihood 
that the information they deliver will be accepted by the listener and integrated into the 
listener’s subsequent recalls (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). This work, alongside Cuc et al.’s 
(2006) finding regarding the influence of a speaker’s dominance, implies that 
dispositional qualities may be another reason for challenging others’ memories. For 
instance, it is conceivable that the speaker’s own confidence in their memory ability may 
be a reason to challenge someone else’s (e.g., “I challenge your recollection because I am 
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confident that I am right” or “I am sure of my memory and things did not happen the way 
you describe them”). Alternatively, they could be challenging because the challenger 
views himself/herself as someone who is dominant in interpersonal contexts. 
Nonbelieved memories. Another line of inquiry that explores the experience of 
having a current, vivid memory challenged by another person is the literature on 
nonbelieved memories. Nonbelieved memories involve the vivid recollection of an 
autobiographical event despite reduced or relinquished belief that the event genuinely 
occurred to the self (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Otgaar, Scoboria & Mazzoni, 
2014). More generally, nonbelieved memories tend to originate when a currently vivid 
autobiographical memory is contradicted by novel evidence. Such evidence is often, but 
not exclusively, provided in a social context. Most relevant to this investigation, 
nonbelieved memories may originate from someone disputing or challenging the 
occurrence of a past event (e.g., stating that the event did not occur, that the event was 
impossible) and/or its accuracy (e.g., that the event happened differently). In turn, such 
challenges contribute to reducing or even relinquishing belief that the event occurred to 
the self, despite the continued presence of vivid recollection (Scoboria et al., 2015). 
Several of the reasons for reducing or relinquishing autobiographical belief originally 
reported in Scoboria et al. (2015) may also emerge in the present investigation. For 
example, the challenger may dispute the other’s memory by suggesting that an alternative 
source affected memory (e.g., “your memory came from a dream”), or the challenger 
might dispute the other’s memory by appealing to assumptions about general memory 
ability at a young age (e.g., “you were a child! Your imagination was running wild 
then”). Furthermore, appealing to these meta-memory beliefs and/or suggesting alternate 
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attributions could arguably be used with the underlying intent of trivializing the validity 
of the other’s recollection. 
Disputed memories. The methodology employed by Sheen and colleagues 
(2001), in which disputed memories are contested in real time, arguably offers the closest 
analogy to date of instances when an individual challenges another’s version of events. In 
those instances, two individuals agree on most of the details regarding what happened, 
but disagree on who the protagonist is. In the course of this disagreement, both sides try 
to defend their belief that a past event occurred to them (e.g., two girls arguing over 
which of them was sent home from school for wearing a skirt that was too short; Ikier, 
Tekcan, Gulgoz, & Kuntay, 2003; Sheen et al., 2001). Sheen’s work suggests that 
individuals may be motivated to challenge in order to preserve ownership of a past event 
they view as belonging to them.  
Another relevant finding emerging out of the disputed memories literature is 
perceived importance, which is regarded as an appraisal that is made about an event in 
the current investigation. Sheen and colleagues (2001) speculated that the higher 
importance ratings associated with the disputed memories in their study (relative to 
shared-but-not-disputed memories) could have been attributable to the participant’s 
attempts at convincing themselves, the other twin/sibling, or the interviewer that the 
disputed memory was indeed theirs. In contrast, the methodology employed by Ikier and 
colleagues (2003), where sets of twins or siblings were interviewed separately and were 
instructed to provide disputed memories, personal memories, and memories that were 
clearly experienced by the other twin/sibling, did not produce higher ratings of perceived 
importance. Imagery ratings were also inconsistent across the two studies; the Sheen 
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study reported higher imagery ratings (hearing, seeing, etc.) but not Ikier and colleagues 
(2003), who reported lower imagery ratings for disputed memories as compared with 
personal memories. These inconsistent finding might be reconciled as follows. First, the 
Sheen et al. (2001) methodology could arguably have mimicked the dynamics of social 
challenges to a greater extent than the Ikier et al. methodology. These circumstances 
might have led to heightened attempts at defending one’s memory, which could have 
produced higher perceived importance ratings and higher imagery ratings. Second, 
because the equivalence of the comparison memories between the two studies could not 
be established (i.e., shared-but-not-disputed memories vs. personal memories and 
memories of others), it is plausible that some disputed memories hold greater importance 
than others. As further evidence of this argument, Sheen and colleagues (2006) found that 
childhood memories of achievement and misfortune were more likely to be appropriated, 
whereas childhood memories of wrongdoing were more likely to be disowned. The self-
serving motives apparent in these disputed memories imply that a desire to protect 
oneself from being perceived in a negative light is an important consideration in choosing 
to challenge another’s memory. 
Borrowed memories. Borrowed memories involve intentionally or 
unintentionally appropriating past events or details of past events from others and telling 
them as our own (Brown et al., 2015). Such memories are relevant to this investigation 
because Brown and colleagues (2015) found that intentionally borrowing others’ personal 
memories was most frequently motivated by a desire to enhance oneself (e.g., “I find the 
story engaging and interesting, and would love it to be a part of my life”). This desire 
appeared to reflect a self-enhancement motive consistent with the self-serving pattern 
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observed in the disputed memories literature. In relation to the current investigation, self-
enhancement may be another reason to challenge another’s version of events.  
Memory verification. Closely related to the work on nonbelieved memories is 
the small literature on memory verification, which has shown that individuals report that 
they would rely on others (e.g., parents, siblings) as well as nonsocial external evidence 
(e.g., photographs, videos, receipts) to validate the occurrence of a past event (Nash & 
Takarangi, 2011; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014). In Wade et al. (2014), participants were 
asked to describe how they would verify a vivid autobiographical memory if someone 
else told them that the event “never happened.” Results showed that in these hypothetical 
challenging scenarios, participants tended to consider both cost (i.e., money, time, 
energy, effort, labor, and aggravation) and reliability (i.e., indisputable, trustworthy, and 
accurate information) in choosing strategies like asking a family member or searching for 
physical evidence to verify their autobiographical memories. It was further concluded 
that participants sought social input (e.g., asking family members, friends) because they 
regarded it as providing an optimal balance between reliability and cost to access. In a 
more recent publication, Wade, Nash, Garry and Adelman (2017) showed that 
participants consistently prioritized cheap-and-easy (i.e., minimal cost, effort, time, and 
money) over reliable strategies for verifying autobiographical events. Of relevance to this 
investigation, the work of Wade, Nash and colleagues demonstrates that challenges may 
occur because individuals may wish to verify details about an autobiographical memory. 
Similarly, individuals may also challenge to assist someone else with verifying or 
confirming details about a shared past event (i.e., Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001, 2006).  
Functions of autobiographical remembering. That individuals may challenge 
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another’s recollection to verify their own recollection is also echoed in Pillemer’s work. 
Pillemer (1992) argued that sharing autobiographical memories serves a social function 
in facilitating the development, maintenance, and strengthening of interpersonal 
interactions. This notion has also been discussed by others who found that sharing past 
personal events served to connect with others (Webster, 2003), elicit or provide empathy 
from others (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck, 2003), teach, inform, and reminisce (Webster, 
2003). This social function is also reflected in Fivush’s (2012) work on parental 
reminiscing; in these instances, parents, through what could be construed as challenges, 
help their children scaffold and make sense of their narratives. Similar motives involving 
helping someone else make sense of their narrative, teaching, informing, providing 
support, entertaining, and/or reminiscing may also emerge in the present investigation. 
Pillemer (2003) also viewed autobiographical remembering as serving a directive 
function whereby recalling past events assists with describing problems, solving 
problems, making plans, and generally guiding future behaviours. As an example, he 
proposed that memories of traumatic events could serve a directive function in reminding 
the individual about which situations are safe and which ones must be avoided (Pillemer, 
2003). A note of caution here that this example is not meant to imply any blame towards 
the victim of a traumatic event. Rather, Pillemer appears to discuss more general operant 
conditioning processes whereby situations that have caused pain in the past are avoided, 
and memories of such painful events may assist with this very avoidance.  
In a more recent study, Biondolillo and Pillemer (2015) demonstrated that 
recalling a specific exercise episode produced higher subsequent exercise activity. It is 
therefore possible that challenges examined in this investigation could also be motivated 
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by similarly instrumental functions – describe problems, solve problems, motivate 
change, and/or ensure that certain outcomes occur in lieu of others. 
According to Pillemer (2001) and later Conway (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), Bluck, and colleagues (Bluck, 2003; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; 
Wilson & Ross, 2003), autobiographical remembering also serves a self function, 
meaning that past autobiographical memories are retrieved to help maintain and 
consolidate a sense of identity over time, a sense of “I.” In other words, memories are 
recalled that are coherent with one’s self-concept and that offer a sense of continuity of 
self over time. When recalled memories are not coherent with the self-concept, they risk 
creating instability and psychological discomfort (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
which, in line with Aronson’s (1969, 1992) revision of cognitive theory, would produce 
an impetus to reduce the discomfort. In the context of challenges, shared memories may 
be recounted that create dissonance for the individual because aspects of the recollection 
may conflict with their self-concept. It is therefore conceivable that one may challenge 
another’s recollection of a shared past event to preserve the self-concept as a moral, 
competent, stable, and predictable individual (Aronson, 1969, 1992).  
Section conclusion. The literature reviewed in this section suggests several 
reasons for an individual choosing to challenge another’s recollection of a past shared 
event including self motives (e.g., dispositional qualities, belief in superiority of one’s 
own memory or the inferiority of the other’s memory, preserve memory ownership, self-
enhance), social motives (e.g., teach, inform, provide support, entertain, reminisce), and 
directive motives (e.g., solve problems, plan). More central to this investigation, one 
reason to challenge could also be to preserve the self-concept as a moral, competent, 
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stable, and predictable individual (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). 
Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories and Cognitive Dissonance 
 Beyond exploring why individuals challenge another’s recollection of a past 
shared event, the current study sought to examine challenges in response to self-
discrepant autobiographical memories. A key assumption of this study is that self-
discrepant autobiographical memories and responses to them unfold in the same manner 
as cognitive dissonance processes. This assumption is made on the basis of Aronson’s 
(1969, 1992) revised cognitive dissonance theory and Conway’s self-memory-system 
(2000). I draw on Swann’s (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann & Read, 1981) 
self-verification theory to argue that dissonant information provided by another 
individual can also conflict with one’s self-concept and cause dissonance.  
Aronson’s (1969, 1992) revision of cognitive dissonance theory predicts that 
dissonance arises when an individual’s behaviour violates their own self-concept as a 
moral, competent, stable, and predictable individual. Dissonance-reduction then centers 
on preserving or re-establishing the self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and 
predictable. Conway’s self-memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) further 
emphasizes the value of having a self-concept that is supported by one’s autobiographical 
memories. This notion of coherence between one’s self-concept and one’s 
autobiographical memories suggests that if autobiographical memories conflict with the 
current self-concept, they could create processes similar to dissonance. Beike and Landoll 
(2000) advanced a similar argument when proposing that the unpleasant autobiographical 
memories they asked participants to recall were comparable to the dissonant element in 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 35 
 
 
cognitive dissonance terms. 
Other theories arguably contained within the larger umbrella of cognitive 
dissonance theory, like self-verification theory (Swann & Read, 1981), have also 
expanded on how dissonance may occur and how it can be reduced, especially when the 
dissonant information comes from another individual, which is the case in Study 1. 
According to Swann and his colleagues (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann & 
Read, 1981), dissonance may be resolved by (a) confronting the person providing the 
dissonant feedback with a view to correcting their mistaken impression, (b) ignoring and 
forgetting the dissonant information, or (c) avoiding the source of dissonant information 
altogether. I build on these theories by arguing that autobiographical memories, as 
recalled by another individual, could conflict with one’s self-concept as moral, 
competent, and/or stable and predictable, and elicit dissonance, which is then resolved by 
confronting, ignoring, or avoiding. This argument is consistent with Scoboria, Boucher, 
and Mazzoni, (2015), who similarly proposed that cognitive dissonance might result from 
social processes, such as when one receives information from someone else that 
undermines their current memory for a past event.  
Aspects of cognitive dissonance theory, as conceptualized by Aronson (1969, 
1992) and contextualized within autobiographical memory theorizing by Conway 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), have been applied to a handful of 
empirical investigations elaborated upon in the next section. For ease of presentation, 
these findings are grouped into appraisals of importance, wherein the dissonance-
reducing strategies involve re-evaluating the importance of the memory (or aspects of it) 
or the importance of past self, and appraisals of veridicality, wherein the dissonance-
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reducing strategies involve re-evaluating the belief in the occurrence and/or accuracy of 
an autobiographical memory.  
Appraisals of importance. Reappraisals of the importance of events may serve to 
reduce dissonance by re-evaluating and devaluing the importance of a past event (or 
aspects of it) or the importance of aspects of the self. In a series of experiments, Beike 
and Landoll (2000) asked undergraduate male and female participants to recall 
autobiographical memories that were either pleasant (indicative of strength and 
independence) or unpleasant (indicative of weakness and dependence). They then asked 
participants to compare the chosen autobiographical memory to the present lifetime 
period in order to draw attention to any discrepancies with the participant’s current sense 
of self. Finally, they directed participants to engage in various dissonance-reducing 
strategies, such as making causal attributions about the autobiographical memory in 
question (i.e., how much of the autobiographical memory was caused by themselves and 
how much of it was caused by other external factors), and rate the degree of perceived 
closure achieved on the autobiographical memory in question. Beike and Landoll found 
that participants who recalled unpleasant and arguably self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories were more likely to reappraise the event as closed or to justify its occurrence 
than participants who recalled pleasant autobiographical memories. In other words, 
compared to memories indicative of strength and independence, participants responded to 
the retrieval of memories indicative of weakness and dependence by reappraising them. 
Beike and Landoll did not report any gender differences, although their samples were 
composed primarily of female undergraduates. 
Comparable findings emerged from Sheen and colleagues (2006), who found that 
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childhood memories of achievement and misfortune were more likely to be appropriated, 
whereas childhood memories of wrongdoing were more likely to be disowned.  
A similar intention to distance the self from unpleasant autobiographical 
memories, possibly because they cast a negative perception of the self, also emerged 
from the work of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), who asked undergraduates 
(unspecified gender composition) to provide both perpetrator and victim autobiographical 
memories about angering someone else or being angered by someone else, respectively. 
The authors found that perpetrator-autobiographical memories tended to contain denial of 
any lasting negative consequences, justifications as to why their actions may have been 
reasonable or even legitimate, mitigating circumstances, partially or entirely blaming the 
victim, and claims that the incident was impulsive, could not be helped, or was 
uncharacteristic of them and had little to do with the present. In contrast, victim-
autobiographical memories tended to contain references to lasting negative consequences, 
long-term relationship damage, enduring anger, and self-blame.  
As another example of reappraising event importance, McFarland and Alvaro 
(2000) randomly assigned male and female undergraduates to describe either a severe or 
a mild negative autobiographical memory, and then instructed them to provide current 
and pre-event ratings on various dispositional attributes (e.g., tolerant, mature). Even 
though random assignment would have ensured that pre-event ratings were comparable 
between the two groups, participants describing the more severe autobiographical 
memory were more critical of their pre-event selves (e.g., rated themselves as less 
tolerant, less mature) than participants describing the mild negative autobiographical 
memory. According to McFarland and Alvaro, and consistent with cognitive dissonance 
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theory, recalling a severe autobiographical memory likely created distress; this distress 
was reduced by belittling past selves, which in turn bolstered the illusion of personal 
growth (e.g., “I was less mature back then but I am much more mature now”). The 
manipulation was repeated with participants asked to visualize and describe either a 
pleasant autobiographical memory or a negative and unpleasant autobiographical 
memory (an event that lowered your self-esteem and made you feel bad about yourself). 
The authors again found that participants who had described a negative and unpleasant 
autobiographical memory demonstrated more belittling or were more critical towards 
their past selves than those who had described a pleasant autobiographical memory. 
McFarland and Alvaro do not investigate or report on any gender differences in their 
sample.  
Ross and Wilson (2002) built on the findings of McFarland and Alvaro (2000) by 
investigating individuals’ subjective sense of distance—a feeling of subjective temporal 
distance from an event regardless of how long ago it actually occurred. The authors 
concluded that participants self-identifying as socially unsuccessful during the last year 
of high school tended to feel subjectively more distant from their high school self than 
participants self-identifying as socially successful. They replicated these findings in a 
second study, where they found that male and female undergraduate students reported 
subjectively feeling more distant from embarrassing autobiographical memories (e.g., 
events where you said or did something foolish) than proud autobiographical memories 
(e.g., special achievement or kind act). In addition to subjective temporal distance, there 
was also a change in the single-item rating of personal importance; participants rated 
proud autobiographical memories as more important to them than embarrassing 
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autobiographical memories, a finding also echoed in D’Argembeau and Van der Linden’s 
(2008) study. Ross and Wilson (2002) further observed that, although past 
autobiographical memories were overall rated as less important, ratings of importance 
showed steeper decline for embarrassing autobiographical memories than for proud 
autobiographical memories, possibly because proud autobiographical memories were 
viewed as having relatively longer impact. Ross and Wilson did not find any gender 
differences in their study. 
This brief literature review demonstrates that reappraising the importance of an 
event may involve, among other things, devaluing an autobiographical memory by 
claiming that it is closed (no longer connected to the present), it is less important, or that 
it feels more temporally distant. Alternatively, the reappraisal process may take the form 
of belittling or devaluing aspects of a past self. Consequently, reappraisals of importance 
were expected to emerge through lower self-reported ratings of event importance.  
Appraisals of veridicality. Appraisals of veridicality are hypothesized to reduce 
dissonance by re-evaluating the attributions made about how much a past event is 
believed to have truly occurred (belief in occurrence) and/or how accurate its recall is 
(belief in accuracy; Scoboria et al., 2014). Although not initially conceptualized as post-
hoc memory appraisals, belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy can arguably function 
to reduce dissonance.  
That belief in occurrence may be altered to reduce dissonance and protect the self 
from discomfort was first discussed in Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014). It was elaborated 
by Scoboria and colleagues (2015), who documented instances in which participants 
reported successful altering of belief in occurrence when potentially intrusive trauma-
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related memories were involved. In other words, unwanted or dissonant autobiographical 
memories may be accompanied by comparatively lower belief in occurrence ratings as a 
way to resolve or reduce dissonance.  
Self-reported changes in belief that the event is real may also serve to reduce 
dissonance. D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) asked male and female community 
volunteers to recall both shame- and pride-inducing autobiographical memories and then 
had them rate their memories on various phenomenological characteristics. The authors 
found that shame-inducing autobiographical memories were rated as less coherent, 
contained fewer sensory details, and produced less of a sense of re-experiencing than 
pride-inducing autobiographical memories. Relevant to this investigation, shame-
inducing autobiographical memories received a lower rating on “I believe the event in my 
memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or 
fabricated anything that did not occur” than pride-inducing autobiographical memories. 
The item used by D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, however, has been criticized 
because it arguably refers to multiple concepts and tends to cross-load with belief in 
occurrence, accuracy, and recollection (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). The authors 
did not find any effect for gender or interaction involving gender. 
Taken together, it would appear that wanted or consonant memories are 
accompanied by higher belief in accuracy and occurrence ratings, whereas unwanted or 
dissonant memories are accompanied by lower belief in accuracy and occurrence ratings. 
Extending this conclusion to the present investigation, it was expected that 
autobiographical memories that were unwanted or dissonant would be accompanied by 
lower ratings of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy, whereas autobiographical 
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memories that were wanted or consonant would be accompanied by higher ratings of 
belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy.  
Objectives and Hypothesis 
The objectives of this study were to (a) explore why individuals challenge 
another’s recollection of a past event that is incompatible with their recollection and, at 
times discrepant with their self-concept, (b) establish that challenges involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories are different from other challenges, and (c) explore 
the role of narcissistic features.  
To meet the first objective, participants’ self-reports about why they challenged 
another’s memory were collected and used in conjunction with prior work to devise a 
coding frame. A number of motives for challenging were expected to emerge, including 
self-motives, social motives, and directive motives. Instances of self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories, where the motive to challenge revolves around protecting or 
preserving a current self-concept, were also expected to emerge.  
In their meta-analysis, Campbell and Sedikides (1999) showed that higher levels 
of self-threat produced more extreme appraisals. It stands to reason then that higher self-
threat would result in higher dissonance. Due to the relatively novel and exploratory 
nature of this study, however, it is difficult to reliably disentangle dissonance from self-
threat. As Festinger (1957) and Aronson (1969, 1992) have argued, even the presence of 
dissonance itself is not easily observed but rather deduced from the presence of 
dissonance-reduction strategies. I therefore will not attempt to distinguish between 
dissonance and self-threat; rather, I will assume based on Aronson’s and Conway’s work 
that self-threat and dissonance are inherently present whenever self-protective motives 
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emerge. I expected challenges stemming from self-discrepant autobiographical memories, 
in which there is arguably self-threat, dissonance and self-protection motives, to be 
different from challenges stemming from simply incompatible autobiographical 
memories. Relative to challenges not involving self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories, challenges involving self-discrepant autobiographical memories were 
expected to:  
2.1. Contain proportionally more negative emotional states, a prediction in line 
with the conceptualization of self-threat as self-referent negative emotions with negative 
implications for the self (Aronson, 1969, 1992; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Sedikides & 
Green, 2009), such as shame (Pinto-Gouveia & Matos, 2011; Aronson, 1992) or fear 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  
2.2. Have higher ratings on the question “during the challenge, how important 
was it for you to convince the other person that you were right?” This question was asked 
to gauge the extent to which the challenge involved elements central or important to the 
self that would be expected to arouse dissonance. This prediction is in line with the 
mnemic neglect model (see General Introduction chapter; Sedikides & Green, 2009), 
Festinger’s (1957) view that the magnitude of dissonance is contingent upon the 
importance, value, and consequence of the elements involved, and Aronson’s revision of 
cognitive dissonance theory (1969, 1992). 
2.3. Have higher ratings on the question “during the challenge, how motivated 
were you to present a positive image of yourself?” This prediction is in line with 
Aronson’s view that dissonance is most powerful and most upsetting when actions 
contradict one’s positive self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and predictable 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 43 
 
 
(Aronson, 1969, 1992). When participants respond to this question with higher ratings, it 
might suggest that the response from the other person threatened the participant’s positive 
self-concept.  
2.4. Have higher ratings on the question “At the time, how much did it bother you 
that you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” and higher ratings on the 
question “Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the 
other person said or did?” Both questions are arguably proxies for dissonance and 
should show higher ratings whenever dissonance is present.  
2.5. Have greater confidence in self-reported judgments of memorial occurrence 
and accuracy, arguably a way of increasing the number of consonant elements. This 
prediction is aligned with Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni’s (2015) view that 
autobiographical memories central to the self-concept may be more resistant to changes 
in belief than autobiographical memories more peripheral to the self-concept. 
2.6. Have lower ratings of event importance. As noted earlier, one way to lower 
dissonance would be to reappraise the importance of an event (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Lind, 2008; Ross & Wilson, 2002). If one assumes that centrality is an indicator of 
importance, then mean Centrality of Event Scale ratings would be expected to be lower 
whenever self-discrepant autobiographical memories are present. 
Regarding the third objective, the autobiographical memory literature on this 
aspect is scant as no prior work has investigated autobiographical memories in the 
context of disposition and/or interpersonal dynamics. In light of research examining 
narcissism, rejection, and the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Rhodewalt 
& Eddings, 2002; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998), it was expected that individuals scoring 
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higher on narcissistic traits would be disproportionally represented among self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories. 
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
 The original dataset consisted of 330 participants recruited online. Of those, 299 
indicated that the challenged event was an autobiographical memory, 29 indicated not 
being present when the challenged event originally occurred, and two did not answer. On 
review of the responses, these two participants were deemed to have been present when 
the event occurred and therefore had an autobiographical memory. Of the 301, 10 cases 
were excluded because no specific memory was offered (n = 4), the participant wrote 
about distinctively different events in response to the questions (n = 1), the challenge was 
not initiated by the participant (n = 1), the participant wrote about a disagreement that 
was not based on a memory (n = 1), and the participant admitted in their answers to 
having no memory of the challenged event (n = 3). The remaining 291 participants 
passed two embedded validity checks. Median time-to-completion was 23 m 9 s, with the 
fastest taking a little over nine minutes. No cases were excluded based on time-to-
completion because of a slow and steady increase in times that was suggestive of normal 
within-subject variance.  
The final sample of 291 consisted of 155 men and 136 women, and had a mean 
age of 33.24 (Mdn = 30, SD = 10.54, range 18– 66). The majority of participants self-
identified as White (n = 214, 75.1%), followed by Black (n = 22, 7.7%), East Asian (n = 
15, 5.3%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 6, 2.1%), South Asian (n = 3, 1.1%), Native (n = 2, 
0.7%), Middle Eastern (n = 1, 0.3%), and Multiracial (n = 22, 7.6%). Six participants did 
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not report their ethnicity. Highest level of education achieved was Doctorate degree (n = 
2, 0.7%), followed by Professional degree (n = 3, 1.0%), Master’s degree (n = 22, 7.6%), 
Bachelor’s degree (n = 116, 40.3%), community college (n = 80, 27.8%), high 
school/GED (n = 64, 22.2%), and elementary school (n = 1, 0.3%).  Three participants 
did not report their highest level of education. 
In order to protect participant anonymity, geographic location tracking was 
deactivated on Fluid surveys. Prior studies using Mechanical Turk in Dr. Scoboria’s lab, 
however, have indicated that the majority of participants come from North America. 
Participants whose Mechanical Turk account was affiliated with India were excluded 
from this study because of the large proportion of these individuals not comprehending 
similar tasks in prior projects conducted in Dr. Scoboria’s lab. 
Measures (see Appendix E for a complete list) 
Qualitative questions and ratings about the challenged event. Participants 
answered several open-ended questions about the nature of the challenge they initiated 
(see Appendix E), including how they challenged the other’s memory and why they chose 
to challenge. Of relevance to this study, participants were also asked to rate the following 
questions: “during the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other 
person that you were right?” (1 = not at all important; 10 = very important); “during the 
challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of yourself” (1 = not at all 
motivated to present a positive image of myself; 10 = very motivated to present a positive 
image of myself); “at the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what 
the other person said or did?” (1 = it did not bother me at all; 10 = it bothered me very 
much); and “currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the 
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other person said or did? (1 = not at all; 10 = very much). 
Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1995): The Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales is a self-report measure that assesses interpersonal traits based on the circumplex 
model of personality, which posits that interpersonal traits can be located along two 
principal orthogonal dimensions: Dominance (which ranges from submissive to dominant 
and controlling) and Nurturance (which ranges from cold and hostile to warm and 
friendly). Participants are instructed to rate a list of 64 adjectives (e.g., “timid”) on an 8-
point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 8 = extremely likely) based on how accurately 
each adjective describes them. There are eight adjectives that contribute to each of the 
eight octants: Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, Cold-Hearted, Aloof-
Introverted, Unassured-Submissive, Unassuming-Ingenuous, Warm-Agreeable, and 
Gregarious-Extraverted. Octant scores for each participant are computed by averaging 
across the eight adjective scores contributing to that particular octant. A Dominance score 
and a Nurturance score can also be computed for each participant based on their octant z 
scores and weights specified in the scoring manual (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Wiggins, 1995). In 
the present study, the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and in particular the Assured-
Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-Hearted octants were used to gauge 
narcissistic traits (Miller et al., 2012; Wiggins, 1995).  
Measures of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy. The three items used in 
Scoboria, Jackson, et al. (2014) were also used here to assess belief in the occurrence of 
events (i.e., autobiographical belief that the event truly occurred to the self). Two of the 
times are scored on a 7-point scale, whereas the third item is scored on an 8-point scale. 
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The three items are averaged (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014), with higher scores 
indicative of stronger autobiographical belief. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha 
value for belief in occurrence was .83. 
Belief in accuracy, which broadly refers to attributions made about the degree to 
which the contents of a current mental representation correspond to the details that in fact 
occurred in the past, were captured by using three items from Scoboria, Talarico, and 
Pascal (2015). These items assess confidence in the accuracy of the memory, proportion 
of memory that is accurate, and doubts as to the accuracy of the memory on 7-point 
scales. The items are averaged, and higher scores are indicative of greater confidence in 
the accuracy of one’s own memory. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha value for 
belief in accuracy was .84. Measures of belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence were 
used to capture participant’s appraisals of the veridicality of remembered events. 
Centrality of Event Scale, 7 item version (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). The 
Centrality of Event Scale is a self-report instrument that measures the extent to which a 
past event is appraised as central to a person’s life story and identity. Participants are 
asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) statements 
about the subjective impact of a past event (e.g., “This event has colored the way I think 
and feel about other experiences”). The 7-item version of Centrality of Event Scale has a 
.96 correlation with the 20-item version of the scale, and has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .92 in Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; alpha of .93 in the 
current study). The Centrality of Event Scale score is obtained by averaging across the 
seven items, with higher scores indicative of greater importance attributions. In the 
current study, Centrality of Event Scale was used in the post-hoc analysis as a potential 
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indicator of importance. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited online via Mechanical Turk, a service of Amazon.com 
(see Appendix A for a brief description of Mechanical Turk). The advertisement, visible 
to all Turk workers whose address was not in India, asked for participants to take part in a 
survey about challenging another person’s memory (see Appendix C for the recruitment 
advertisement). Participant eligibility was determined through a two-step process. In step 
one, Turk workers accessed a screening website where they provide their Turk ID. Only 
Turk workers who had not already completed a similar study in Dr. Scoboria’s lab were 
eligible to continue and referred to the study survey. Potential participants were deemed 
eligible if they answered “yes” to “Have you ever challenged another person’s memory 
for a past event (e.g., disagreed with their memory, told them something about their 
memory was wrong)?” See Appendix D for the eligibility screen. 
Those who consented were instructed to “Select a time that you challenged 
another person’s memory for a past event (e.g., disagreed with their memory, told them 
something about their memory was wrong). Select a time in which you initiated/started 
the challenge to the other person’s memory.” Participants answered open-ended 
questions about the challenge itself and then completed a series of questionnaires, 
including the Interpersonal Adjective Scale, measures of Belief in Occurrence, Belief in 
Accuracy, Centrality of Event Scale, and demographic information. The study took 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. Participants were compensated $2.50 (USD) as a 
token of appreciation. The study received clearance from the University of Windsor 
Research Ethics Board. 
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Analytical Approach 
This investigation used a mixed methods approach that contained both qualitative 
and quantitative steps. A qualitative approach was selected because it was well suited to 
the overarching research goal, which was to explore and reliably describe an aspect of a 
relatively new line of inquiry, in this case exploring reasons for challenging 
autobiographical memories. It was also selected because it affords participants greater 
freedom to reflect on their lived experiences, rather than limit them by imposing a set of 
answers to choose from (Biggerstaff, 2012). A quantitative approach was chosen to 
supplement the qualitative analysis by further exploring the themes that emerged from the 
qualitative work.  
Given the study objective of creating a coding system that can be reliably coded 
by independent observers and imported into subsequent studies, qualitative content 
analysis was selected over other approaches like grounded theory (Cho & Lee, 2014; 
Schreier, 2012, 2014). Qualitative content analysis is a method for systematically 
describing the meaning of qualitative material by assigning parts of the material to 
categories and subcategories (Schreier, 2014). In addition to its better fit with the nature 
of the current material and the scope of the current study, qualitative content analysis 
allows greater flexibility in combining deductive and inductive approaches and allows the 
processing of a larger quantity of data (Cho & Lee, 2014; Schreier, 2012, 2014).  
In light of the richness of experiences under investigation, quantitative methods 
were also included in order to complement and strengthen findings emerging from the 
qualitative work. To this end, an explanatory mixed-design (Schwab & Syed, 2015) was 
implemented by initially employing qualitative methods to identify and describe motives 
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for challenging another’s recollection, and then using quantitative methods to provide 
greater depth to the motives emerging from the qualitative work. 
Development and Validation of the Coding Scheme 
Despite lacking the more established procedures of some other qualitative 
methods, several overlapping steps have been proposed for conducting qualitative content 
analysis (Cho & Lee, 2014; Mayring, 2014; Schreier, 2012;). The procedures used in this 
study and the steps outlined below follow the guidelines proposed by Schreier (2012, 
2014) and Mayring (2014). 
Step 1: Building a coding frame. The following steps for building a coding 
frame, although presented in a linear fashion, are not necessarily linear in practice. 
Rather, the process is iterative and dynamic, with several cycles between the substeps 
described in this section. Ongoing meetings with the research supervisor were held 
throughout those cycles to inform the building of the coding frame. The coding frame 
took about one year and a half to develop.  
1.1 Selecting the material. The primary objective of this study was to answer the 
question: Why do individuals challenge another person’s memory? Participants’ 
responses to the question, “Why did you challenge the other person’s memory” were 
prioritized in building the coding frame. Participants’ complete responses to the question 
“How did you challenge the other’s memory” served as context. It was possible to code 
some parts of the “how” responses as motives, provided that the coded part was 
contained, discussed, or hinted at while answering “why.” This rule was implemented in 
order to strike a balance between comprehensively coding motives (exhaustiveness 
requirement, Schreier, 2014), staying as close as possible to what the participant 
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identified as motivating their challenge, and being mindful of the difference between 
“how” the challenge was carried and “why” it was carried out.  
1.2 Structuring and generating. Following an initial reading of all participants’ 
responses to “why” they challenged, a list of potential categories was generated 
deductively to help structure thinking around the coding frame. In the course of a second 
reading, participants’ responses were segmented into units of analysis using the thematic 
criterion. The thematic criterion consists of looking for topic changes such that one unit 
of analysis corresponds roughly to one proposition (i.e., a logical statement that is 
paraphrased, meaning it is independent of any embellishing or repetitive words; Mayring, 
2014), or in this case, one reason for challenging. After all participant responses to “why” 
were segmented and paraphrased in this manner, a strategy of successive summarizing 
was adopted in order to organize and summarize similar segments, which were thereafter 
turned into categories and subcategories.  
Following this more deductive generation of categories and subcategories, prior 
theory and related coding manuals (e.g., Pasupathi, Lucas, & Coombs, 2002; Scoboria, 
Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015) were consulted to inform the generation of any additional 
(sub)categories. The “why” responses were reviewed again after this inductive step in 
order to search for any relevant concepts that had not been detected before, and if needed, 
new categories and subcategories were created to cover them. The categories and 
subcategories developed by Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni, (2015) were also adopted 
at this stage and revised to account for the change in type of event (from nonbelieved 
memories to challenging another’s memory) and the perspective of the participant in 
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relation to the challenged event3. This mixed approach to generating codes was 
implemented in order to reach saturation and ensure that the codes generated captured all 
the relevant material (Schreier, 2014).  
1.3 Defining categories. At this stage, category and subcategory labels were 
defined. In addition to a definition, each subcategory also consisted of indicators (i.e., 
coding aids) and typical positive examples. In practice, this step was an iterative process 
whereby definitions were continually refined to optimally capture the nature of the 
subcategory and aim for mutual exclusiveness of codes such that one unit of analysis 
always received only one subcategory code within a certain category (Schreier, 2012). Of 
note, however, mutual exclusiveness proved particularly difficult to achieve within the 
Self-focused motives category where there was frequent overlap between two 
subcategories, Correcting views of me and Defending the self. 
1.4 Revising and expanding. At this stage, the structure of the coding frame was 
examined, and definitions were expanded or amended where needed. In cases of overlap, 
such as the same unit receiving more than one subcategory code within the same 
category, subcategories were collapsed, or other indicators were added to help 
differentiate among subcategories where possible. Decision rules were added to improve 
the exclusivity of subcategory codes although, again, this was not always possible.  
Step 2: Piloting phase. Piloting of the coding frame was done in stages in order 
to manage the complexity and cognitive load of the codes, and to ensure that distinct 
categories were coded independently. The primary investigator and one research assistant 
each coded 30 consecutive cases using a portion of the coding frame. They then met to 
                                                        
3 Whereas Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) coded the perspective of the 
challenged individual, the current study coded the perspective of the challenger.    
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discuss the coding process, assess consistency of codes, and when needed, amend the 
coding frame in terms of definitions, indicators, decision rules, etc. This process was 
repeated several times until the entire coding frame had been pilot tested. A second pilot 
phase was conducted with a second research assistant using a similar procedure but 
following a different order of coding and using an entirely different set of cases for 
calibration.  
Step 3: The main analysis phase. Participants’ responses to “why” they had 
challenged were coded by two research assistants using the finalized coding frame. As 
during the piloting, the final coding was completed in stages. Please see Table 1 and 
Table 2 for a summary of the codes developed and Table 3 for a description and related 
examples. On average, each participant provided three reasons for challenging the other’s 
memory. The coding manual is included in Appendix J.  
Reliability of the Coding Scheme 
In order to determine the inter-rater reliability of categories and subcategories 
adapted from Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015), one research assistant, who served 
as the primary coder, coded the entire dataset. The principal investigator coded 20% of 
the dataset (i.e., 70 randomly drawn cases from 330; Syed & Nelson, 2015) in each 
category. Only the primary coder’s codes were used in the final analysis. The inter-rater 
reliability statistics for those categories and subcategories are reported in Table 1.  
 In order to determine the inter-rater reliability of categories and subcategories 
generated exclusively for this study, two research assistants coded the entire dataset. Any 
discrepancies in coding were resolved by having the principal investigator consult the 
assistants’ coding notes (Schreier, 2012); if one research assistant had identified a 
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particular code and that code was supported by their notes, that code was kept in the final 
dataset. The inter-rater reliability statistics for those categories and subcategories are 
reported in Table 2. 
Three indices of interrater reliability are reported in Tables 1 and 2: Percentage 
agreement, Cohen’s kappa, and delta (Martin Andres & Femia Marzo, 2004). Cohen’s 
kappa is reported because of its wide use. According to Syed and Nelson (2015), 
however, the kappa index performs poorly in cases of highly skewed marginal 
distributions, as is the case in the present study. When this occurs, it has been 
recommended that the kappa statistic be presented alongside delta (Syed & Nelson, 
2015). Of note, relatively equal marginal distributions tend to produce comparable kappa 
and delta values (Syed & Nelson, 2015). The kappa and delta values were calculated 
using the Delta 4.1.4 software (Andres & Marzo, 2004).  
For interpretation purposes, kappa values between .40 and .60 indicate fair 
agreement, kappa values between .60 and .75 indicate good agreement, and kappa over 
.75 indicate excellent agreement (Fleiss, 1981). Although the Fleiss guidelines are widely 
referenced, they are not the only kappa interpretation guidelines (Viera & Garrett, 2005). 
As suggested by Syed and Nelson (2015), lower kappa values are acceptable in cases of 
uneven marginal distribution. Interpretation guidelines for delta are not currently 
available. The recommendation is to consider higher delta values as demonstrating 
greater interrater reliability and to interpret those values alongside kappa statistics (Syed 
& Nelson, 2015). 
Overall, with a few exceptions, the reliability coefficients provided in Table 1 and 
Table 2 were deemed acceptable. For the purposes of describing the reasons for 
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challenging, each category and subcategory was consulted for consistency across 
reliability indices and frequency of endorsement, and a judgment was made as to whether 
to retain or drop that category (see Tables 1 and 2). Categories and subcategories were 
dropped if (a) frequency of code was 0, (b) kappa and delta indices could not be 
computed, or (c) kappa fell below .40.  
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Table 1 
 
Interrater Reliability Statistics for Categories and Subcategories Adopted from Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni (2015) 
 
Category Subcategory Rate of 
endorsement % 
(/291) 
% Agreement a Kappa b Delta b Decision 
A. General meta-
memory beliefs 
A1. General beliefs regarding memory & age 2.75% (8) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain 
A1a. Comparative statements 0.69% (2) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain 
A1b. Absolute statements 2.06% (6) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain 
A2. General beliefs regarding memory ability 6.18% (18) 96.88% 0.73 .90 Retain 
A2a. Comparative statement 1.72% (5) 98.44% 0.66 .93 Retain 
A2b. Absolute statement 4.81% (14) 98.44% 0.79 .93 Retain 
A3. General beliefs regarding memory 
integrity 
51.20% (149) 84.38% 0.68 .67 Retain 
B. Internal features B1. Internal features/memory characteristics 7.22% (21) 93.75% 0.47 .84 Retain  
C. External evidence C1. External evidence present 2.41% (7) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain  
C2. Lack of external evidence 0.69% (2) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain 
D. Alternate 
attributions 
D1. Alternate attribution - internal 3.09% (9) 96.88% 0.23 .90 Drop 
D1a. Imagination/ confabulation/ 
exaggeration/ simplification/ fantasy/ 
daydream 
3.09% (9) 96.88% 0.23 .90 Drop 
D1b. Dream/ nightmare 0.00% (0) 100.00% n/a n/a Drop 
D2. Alternate attribution – External 0.00% (0) 98.44% 0.32 .93 Drop 
D3. Other alternate attribution 3.44 % (10) 92.19% 0.12 .84 Drop 
E. Plausibility  E1. Subjective plausibility 2.06% (6) 98.41% 0.66 .93 Retain 
F. Belief in 
occurrence 
F1. The event did not occur 20.96% (61) 92.06% 0.58 .84 Retain  
F2. The event could not occur 0.34% (1) 100.00% n/a n/a Drop 
F3. The event is unlikely to have occurred 1.72% (5) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain  
F4. Lack of corroboration from another 
person/persons/third-party 
7.90% (23) 100.00% 1.00 .96 Retain 
F5. The Event was not witnessed 0.68% (2) 100.00% n/a n/a Drop 
G. Belief in accuracy G1. The event happened differently  62.89% (183) 82.54% 0.59 .65 Retain 
Note. a All interrater statistics are based on the principal investigator coding 20% of the dataset for each category.  
b Kappa and Delta statistics could not be computed if neither the primary rater nor the principal investigator marked a code as present among the 
cases coded by both of them. 
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Table 2 
 
Interrater Reliability Statistics for Categories and Subcategories Emerging From This Study  
 
Category Subcategory Rate of 
endorsement % 
(/291) a 
% Agreement Kappa b Delta b Decision 
H. Prosocial 
motives 
H1. Seeking confirmation 2.75% (8) 98.63% .66 .96 Retain 
H2. Providing emotional support 3.44% (10) 97.59% .45 .94 Retain 
H3. Passing on knowledge/ information 9.28% (27) 96.56% .72 .92 Retain 
H4. Reminiscing  3.78% (11) 96.56% .57 .93 Retain 
H5. Relationship maintenance 1.72% (5) 98.63% .49 .96 Retain  
H5a. Relationship maintenance through 
manipulation/deception 
1.03% (3) 99.66% .80 .98 Retain 
H5b. Relationship maintenance through other means 0.68% (2) 98.97% .00 .97 Drop 
I. Internal 
models of 
self and 
others  
I1. Dispositional view of other 10.65% (31) 92.44% .52 .85 Retain 
I2. Situational view of other 16.84% (49) 85.57% .29 .76 Drop 
I3. Discrepant view of other 4.47% (13) 96.22% .57 .92 Retain  
I3a. Discrepant view of 3rd party other 4.47% (13) 97.25% .62 .94 Retain 
13b. Discrepant view of challenged other 0.00% (0) 98.28% .00 .96 Drop 
I4. Dispositional view of self 9.62% (28) 91.41% .43 .83 Retain 
I5. Changing view of self 2.41% (7) 97.59% .52 .94 Retain 
I5a. Deviate from own dispositional tendencies this one 
time. 
1.37% (4) 98.97% .66 .97 Retain 
I5b. Deviate from own disposition tendencies from now 
on 
0.00% (0) 100.00% N/a N/a Drop 
I6. Consistent view of self over time 2.75% (8) 97.59% .45 .95 Retain 
J. Self-
focused 
motives 
J1. Correcting the event interpretation 7.90% (23) 94.50% .47 .89 Retain 
J2. Correcting views of me 8.59% (25) 95.88% .68 .92 Retain 
J3. Personal need to correct this event 16.49% (48) 89.35% .53 .79 Retain 
J4. Seeking validation 6.19% (18) 95.88% .52 .92 Retain 
J5. Seeking recognition 4.47% (13) 97.25% .54 .95 Retain 
J6. Managing anticipated outcomes to the self  10.31% (30) 92.10% .40 .85 Retain 
J7. Defending the self 6.87% (20) 93.81% .41 .88 Retain 
J8. Social mischief 2.75% (8) 98.97% .80 .97 Retain 
J9. Social comparison 1.37% (4) 99.31% .75 .98 Retain 
K. Emotions K1. Emotional states 26.46% (77) 76.98% .46 .64 Drop in favour of k1a 
K1a. Negative emotional states 20.27% (59) 86.60% .61 .79 Retain 
K1b. Positive emotional states 6.53% (19) 89.35% .24 .81 Drop 
K1c. Neutral emotional states 0.00% (0) 100.00% N/a N/a Drop 
Note. a Rate of endorsement after reconciling codes from both raters 
B Kappa and Delta statistics could not be computed if neither the primary rater nor the principal investigator marked a code as present among the cases coded by both of 
them. 
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Study 1 Results 
Qualitative Content Analysis  
Research Question 1: Themes characterized by self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories and themes not characterized by self-discrepant autobiographical memories 
were anticipated to emerge. The presence of themes involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories was expected to be apparent by the emergence of self-
protective motives in the coding framework. 
Reasons for challenging another individual’s version of a past event. This 
section includes a brief description of the categories and subcategories that emerged from 
the coding. Category and subcategory definitions and prototypical examples for each 
subcategory can also be found in Table 3. Categories A through G were adapted from 
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015). Categories H through K emerged from this 
study. 
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Table 3 
Retained Motives Reported For Choosing To Challenge 
Motives For Challenging Definition  Example 
CATEGORY A: GENERAL META-MEMORY BELIEFS = The challenge is based on the participant’s assumption(s) regarding how memory 
generally works, which is in turn used to bolster the validity of one’s own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account.  
A1. General beliefs regarding memory 
& age 
Age influences memory such that memories cannot be 
formed when one is very young, memory impairment is 
common in old age, etc. 
“[I challenged because] I was concerned with her 
memory as she is getting quite old.” 
A2. General beliefs regarding memory 
ability 
Some people are better than others at recalling the past 
(e.g., I rarely forget, he has a horrible memory). 
“[I challenged because] I have very, very good 
memory so I clearly know she said it.”   
A3. General beliefs regarding memory 
integrity 
Memory quality, origin, and/or structure operate 
differently (e.g., memories can be reconstructed, can be 
false, borrowed, exaggerated). 
“I challenged because the order in which things 
took place along with the outcomes from this event 
were being misconstrued by false recollection.” 
CATEGORY B: INTERNAL FEATURES = The challenge is based on the participant’s mental representation for the shared event, which is in turn 
used to bolster the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account. 
B1. Internal features/memory 
characteristics 
The quality of the participant’s mental representation is 
vivid, strong, clear, has something compelling about it, 
etc. 
“[I challenged] because it was so clear in my 
memory what he said” 
CATEGORY C: EXTERNAL EVIDENCE = The challenge is based on the presence or absence of external evidence, which is in turn used to bolster 
the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account.. 
C1. External evidence present The participant possesses external evidence.  “[I challenged because] I had evidence to the 
contrary, an email” 
C2. Lack of external evidence The participant relies on the absence of external evidence. “[I challenged because…] if he had rode the 
merry-go-round, there would have been pictures 
because I had my camera all ready to take them.” 
CATEGORY E: PLAUSIBILITY = The challenge is based on the participant’s view that the challenged memory is implausible or impossible to have 
occurred in reality. 
E1. Subjective plausibility The event could not have occurred (e.g., it is impossible, 
implausible, or illogical) based on personal knowledge, 
preference, feelings, and/or opinions. 
“[I challenged] because I thought the thing she 
said happened was absurd. I don't even think we 
have the same blood type, plus she lives out of the 
country!” 
CATEGORY F: BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE = The challenge is based on the participant’s view that the challenged memory did not actually occur in 
reality. 
F1. The Event did not occur The event did not occur.  “[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this 
never happened” 
F3. The Event is unlikely to have 
occurred 
The event could have occurred but it is unlikely (e.g., it is 
implausible). 
“I was fairly certain that I did not say what she 
said that I did.” 
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F4. Lack of corroboration from 
another person/persons/third-party 
Others cannot confirm the occurrence of the event. “[I challenged him] because I thought it was 
ridiculous that he could not remember.” 
CATEGORY G: BELIEF IN ACCURACY = The challenge is based on the participant’s perceived accuracy of the recalled memory, which is in turn 
used to bolster the validity of their own account or undermine the validity of the other’s account. 
G1. The Event happened differently Feature(s) of the event are inaccurate, wrong, or happened 
differently (e.g., happened to another party, happened to 
the challenger) 
“I challenged his memory because his recollection 
of the event was not exactly how it had unfolded in 
reality,” 
CATEGORY H: PROSOCIAL MOTIVES = The challenge is based on the participant’s desire to develop, maintain, and/or nurture closeness in social 
relationships. 
H1. Seeking confirmation Seek out, verify, or confirm details about a past event 
and/or negotiate a shared interpretation of a past event. 
“I challenged her memory because I thought it was 
different from mine and I figured between the two 
of us we could iron out the parts that were 
incorrect on both sides.” 
H2. Providing emotional support Offer empathy and emotional support.  “I challenged this person's memory because I 
wanted to instill confidence in them so that they 
would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them 
to see the events that happened as positive rather 
than negative” 
H3. Passing on 
knowledge/information 
Pass on valuable life lessons or information. “I did so partly because I wanted to inform her of 
[a childhood disease] she actually had that she 
believes she never had”.  
H4. Reminiscing  Indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past event. “[I challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To 
take us back to a happy time.” 
H5. Relationship maintenance  Rebuild, develop, or maintain a relationship with another 
person.  
 
“[I challenged because] I have hopes of re-creating 
our friendship. I want it to be like it was before.” 
CATEGORY I: INTERNAL MODELS OF SELF AND OTHERS = The challenge is based on the participant’s internal models of self and/or others. 
I1. Dispositional view of other The other’s disposition undermines their credibility. “[I challenged because] she had a way of 
embellishing trifling things to make them sound 
worse than they really are.” 
I3. Discrepant view of other The participant’s view of a third party person is 
incompatible with the other’s view of that same person. 
“[I challenged because] she created a memory in 
her mind that was not fair to our mother” 
I4. Dispositional view of self The participant wishes to reaffirm their own dispositional 
tendencies and habits as the kind of person who speaks up, 
challenges, needs to be right, etc. 
“[I challenged] because I don't like to be 
misunderstood, but most importantly I don't like 
being lied on.”  
I5. Changing view of self The participant wishes to depart from own dispositional 
tendencies and habits. 
“[I challenged because] on that day I got tired of 
playing along and not wanting to rock the boat 
with her.” 
I6. Consistent view of self over time The participant’s internal models of “past self” and 
“present self” are incompatible.  
“[I challenged because] my husband claimed I had 
said something that I didn't. I tried to tell him I 
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would never say something of the sort and told 
him why I wouldn't have” 
CATEGORY J: SELF-FOCUSED MOTIVES = The challenge is based on the participant’s desire to consolidate, preserve, protect, and/or enhance a 
sense of “I” and “who I am”. 
J1. Correcting the event interpretation Correct, clear up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a 
past event. 
“[I challenged because] I wanted to make it very 
clear that I didn't mention the drinking and 
cheating to call [my mother] stupid or a whore. I 
wanted to make it clear that I was just worried 
about her behavior.” 
J2. Correcting views of me Correct an unfavourable view and/or establish a 
favourable view. 
“[I challenged because] it bothered me that she 
thought of me as a heavy drinker when I was 
younger.” 
J3. Personal need to correct this event A subjective desire for a past event to be recalled 
accurately.  
“[I challenged because] I couldn’t justify letting 
her continue to believe that my hair was long just 
for the sake of some laughs” 
J4. Seeking validation Elicit empathy from the other, ask them to take 
responsibility, and/or have them validate a past 
experience. 
“[I challenged because] her version was so far off 
that it functioned as a violent denial of the pain we 
children had experienced at various points in our 
childhoods” 
J5. Seeking recognition Attain recognition/acknowledgement for one’s role in 
something deemed positive, valuable, or helpful. 
[“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not 
[give me] credit for playing a part in his eventual 
marriage.”  
J6. Managing anticipated outcomes to 
the self  
Prevent a negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation 
from occurring or ensure that a positive, favourable, or 
wanted situation does occur. 
“I challenged it because I wanted to go on that 
rollercoaster with my dad. This was the bargain I 
had been promised, not the ice cream!”  
J7. Defending the self Protect oneself in response to an actual or anticipated 
physical and/or emotional threat to the self. 
“[I challenged because] I was defending myself” 
“I challenged this particular memory because it is 
one of the most painful experiences that I have 
ever had to endure” 
 
J8. Social mischief Pursue thrill or amusement at the expense of the other 
(e.g., through teasing, pranks) 
“[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun 
challenging my sister's memory because she prides 
herself in her memory” 
J9. Social comparison Show superiority in an area relative to another individual. “[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I 
knew more than him” 
CATEGORY K: EMOTIONS = The challenge is based on the participant’s experience of certain emotional state(s). 
K1a. Negative emotional states Experiencing a particular negative emotional state (e.g., 
anger, pain, shame). 
“[I challenged because] I had all this pent up 
frustration and anger even years later” 
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Category A: General meta-memory beliefs (A). This category captures challenges 
driven by participants’ assumption(s) of how memory generally works, such as memory 
declines with age, or memory can be false, or reconstructed. This category was divided 
into three subcategories. The first subcategory (A1) involved beliefs regarding memory 
and age (e.g., “Considering my cousin was two-and-a-half at the time, I doubt she could 
actually remember that far back”). This A1 subcategory was further divided into two 
subcategories. The first subcategory (A1a) included instances where the challenger 
compared the age of the challenged party to their own as part of the challenge (e.g., “I 
challenged his memory because I was older than him and I know the event didn't 
happen.”). The second subcategory (A1b) included instances where the challenger made 
statements about the relation between memory and age but did not evoke comparative 
statements about theirs and the challenged other’s respective ages (e.g., [I challenged 
because] I was concerned with her memory as she is getting quite old”). 
The second subcategory (A2) involved beliefs about memory ability (e.g., “[I 
challenged because] I have very, very good memory so I clearly know she said it.”). This 
was further divided into two subcategories. The first subcategory (A2a) was comprised of 
statements that compared the challenger’s memory to the memory ability of the 
challenged party (e.g., “I challenged because I have a pretty good memory and rarely 
forget things. So I was sure she had forgotten because she always does”). The second 
subcategory (A2b) was comprised of statements that commented on memory ability 
without a comparison (e.g., “I challenged because my memory is excellent”).  
The third subcategory (A3) within the general-meta-memory beliefs category 
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involved beliefs about memory integrity (i.e., memories can be borrowed, memories can 
be false, memories can be exaggerated; “I challenged because the order in which things 
took place along with the outcomes from this event were being misconstrued by false 
recollection.”). Across the subcategories, participants appeared to use general meta-
memory beliefs to increase the validity of their own version and/or undermine the 
validity of the other’s version. 
Category B: Internal features (B). Internal features (B1) refer to the quality of the 
participant’s mental representation, which could be vivid, strong, clear, or have 
something compelling about it. This category was intended to capture challenges driven 
by the quality of participants’ mental representation of the challenged event. For 
example, participants stated, “I challenged because I remember the event so clearly” or “I 
challenged because it was so clear in my memory what he said.” As was the case for 
General meta-memory beliefs, Internal features also appeared to have been used to 
evaluate the validity of the participants’ version.  
Category C: External evidence (C). This category was used to capture challenges 
driven by the presence or absence of external evidence. External evidence in this case 
referred to anything that was concrete and/or tangible, such as photos, receipts, or emails. 
This category was divided into two subcategories. The first subcategory (C1) involved 
participants challenging because they were in possession of external evidence that 
supported their version and/or undermined the validity of the others’ (e.g., “[I challenged 
because] I had evidence to the contrary, an email”). The second subcategory (C2) 
involved participants challenging because of the conspicuous absence of external 
evidence, which supported their version and/or undermined the validity of the others’ 
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(e.g., “[I challenged because] if he had rode the merry-go-round, there would have been 
pictures because I had my camera all ready to take them.”). 
Category D: Alternate attributions (D). Alternate attributions refer to internal or 
external sources that affect an event-specific memory or parts of it. This category was 
used to capture challenges driven by participants’ views that an alternate source is 
interfering with the other’s version to the point of being confused with reality. This 
category was divided into three categories. The first subcategory (D1) involved 
challenges motivated by belief or knowledge that the other’s version resulted from or was 
influenced by an alternate internal source. This subcategory was further divided into two 
subcategories. The first subcategory (D1a) involved challenges motivated by participants’ 
knowledge or belief that the others’ version resulted from or was influenced by 
imagination, fantasy, etc. (e.g., “[because] what he said was a complete fabrication.” The 
second subcategory (D1b) involved challenges motivated by participants’ knowledge or 
belief that the others’ version resulted from or was influenced by dreams and/or 
nightmares. The subcategory D1 was dropped because it was not coded reliably. 
The second subcategory (D2) under the Alternate attributions category involved 
challenges motivated by participants’ belief or knowledge that the others’ version 
resulted from or was influenced by external sources, such as movies, TV shows, or 
books. Because it was not reliably coded, this subcategory was also dropped.  
The third subcategory (D3) under Alternate attributions involved challenges 
motivated by participants’ belief or knowledge that the others’ version resulted from or 
was influenced by other alternate sources, such as substance use, medication, and/or 
mental health (e.g. “I challenged my friend’s memory because they have a mental illness 
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that impairs their perception of reality and memory”). This subcategory was dropped 
because it emerged as unreliable.  
Category E: Plausibility (E). Plausibility refers to an assessment of whether an 
event could have actually occurred based on one’s knowledge of the world. Plausibility 
differs from belief in occurrence in its assessment of whether something could have 
happened rather than whether something did happen. This category (E1) was used to 
capture challenges driven by participants’ view that the challenged event was impossible, 
implausible, or illogical to have occurred based on personal feelings, tastes, or opinions 
(e.g., [I challenged] because I thought the thing she said happened was absurd.”]. Like 
the categories before, Plausibility also appeared to have been used to undermine the 
validity of the others’ version.  
Category F: Belief in occurrence (F). Unlike plausibility, belief in occurrence 
refers to an assessment of whether a past event actually occurred. This category was used 
to capture challenges driven by participants’ doubts about the actual occurrence of the 
challenged event. This category was originally divided into five categories, but only three 
subcategories were reliably coded and retained to describe the dataset. The first 
subcategory (F1) involved participants’ belief that the challenged event did not occur 
(e.g., ““[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this never happened”). The second 
subcategory (F3) involved participants’ belief that the challenged event was unlikely to 
have occurred (“I was fairly certain that I did not say what she said that I did.” or “My 
brother said our parents were overly mean and almost abusive to us as children …[I 
challenged because] I had no memory of most of the incidents, and I didn't think they had 
happened…”). The third and final subcategory (F4) involved participants’ belief that the 
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challenged event lacked corroboration from another person or a third party other (“[I 
challenged because] he didn't remember the experience”).  
Category G: Belief in accuracy. This category encompassed challenges driven by 
participants’ knowledge or belief that the others’ version is inaccurate, wrong, or 
happened differently. It encompassed beliefs that the challenged event occurred at a 
different time, different place, involved different objects, occurred over a different length 
of time, etc. Examples include, “[I challenged because] her perception of how many 
cigarettes she had was wrong. My mother claimed that I stole a large portion of cigarettes 
from her. I immediately let know that I only took one and she insisted that there were 
many missing,” and “[I challenged because] she was clearly wrong [when stating that she 
got the doll in the blue dress and I got the doll in the green dress]. I remember because we 
each got the doll with the dress that matched our eye color.” 
Category H: Prosocial motives (H). This category was created upon observing 
that some challenges were more benign and helpful than others, and because some 
individuals reported feeling helped by others who challenged their memories in another 
study (Barcic, 2015; Wysman, 2016). The Prosocial motives category captures challenges 
driven by participants’ desire to develop, maintain, and/or nurture closeness in social 
relationships. Challenges prompted by Prosocial motives tended to (a) consist primarily 
of an external, social focus, (b) be accompanied by participants’ explicit expression of 
helpful and/or positive intention, and (c) be focused primarily on another person, rather 
than the challenger.  
Inspired by the work of Alea and Bluck (2003), Bluck et al., (2005), Webster 
(2003), and Pasupathi et al., (2002), the Prosocial motives category was divided into five 
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subcategories. The first subcategory (H1) involved challenges driven by a desire to seek 
out, verify, or confirm details about a past event (e.g., “[I challenged because] I was 
unsure about my recollection of the event and wanted to see if I was just being crazy).” In 
a minority of cases there was a sense of collaboration and co-construction as the two 
parties attempted to negotiate a shared interpretation of the challenged event (e.g., “I 
challenged her memory because I thought it was different from mine and I figured 
between the two of us we could iron out the parts that were incorrect on both sides.”). 
The second subcategory (H2) involved challenges driven by a desire to provide 
emotional support, care, understanding, and/or empathy. Those instances had a quasi-
therapeutic tone as participants used the challenge to instill confidence, show care, or 
alleviate distress (e.g., “I challenged this person's memory because I wanted to instill 
confidence in them so that they would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them to see 
the events that happened as positive rather than negative”). 
The third subcategory (H3) involved challenges driven by a desire to pass on 
valuable knowledge and/or information (e.g., “[I challenged because] I thought it was 
important for my mother to realize that the reason my dad was making more money was 
because his boss wasn’t managing the company correctly”). The fourth subcategory (H4) 
involved challenges driven by a desire to indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past 
event. These challenges invoked more positive emotions and used more neutral and/or 
positive labels to refer to the challenge, such as “conversation” or “reminiscing” (e.g., “[I 
challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To take us back to a happy time.”]. 
The fifth and last subcategory (H5) involved challenges driven by a desire to 
rebuild, develop, or maintain relationships. Although this subcategory was originally 
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divided into two additional subcategories, only relationship maintenance through 
manipulation and/or deception (H5a) emerged as the more reliable subcategory. In this 
subcategory, challenges involved instances of lying, deceiving or blaming in the hopes of 
rebuilding or maintaining relationships. For example, one participant stated,  
“I had a best friend in high school. We were so close and did everything together, 
and then I started making bad choices in my life. She stopped talking to me, 
saying that she didn't want to associate herself with someone that made these 
choices. When she and I started talking again a few weeks ago, she said to me "I 
don't even remember why we stopped talking." I told her that she must have just 
been too busy, because I didn't do anything wrong and she was the one who chose 
to drift away. I knew that I was the one who caused problems, but if she forgot, 
there was no point in saying it. [I challenged because] I have hopes of re-creating 
our friendship. I felt like it would be better to completely start over than start 
again on the wrong foot. If she didn't remember, it was for the better. Maybe it 
was meant to be that way.” 
Category I: Internal models of self and others. Inspired by the psychodynamic 
construct of internal working models, this category was created to capture challenges 
driven by participants’ internal model(s) of themselves, the challenged party, and/or a 
third party. These internal models involve qualities, values, characteristics, personality 
traits, typical behaviours and preferences that individuals hold in relation to others and 
themselves. This category was originally divided into six subcategories, but only five 
subcategories emerged as reliable and were retained to describe the dataset.  
The first subcategory (I1) involved challenges driven by participants’ 
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dispositional view of the other as someone of dubious credibility. For example, “[I 
challenged because] she had a way of embellishing trifling things to make them sound 
worse than they really are” or “I challenged because he is a liar and is constantly full of 
shit regarding his stories and memories.” 
 The second subcategory (I3) was comprised of challenges driven by a 
disagreement between how the participant and the challenged other view a third person 
(I3a) or how they view the challenged other (I3b). Subcategory I3b was deemed 
unreliable and therefore not retained to describe the dataset. Given the better reliability 
found with I3a, this was the sole subcategory retained under I3. Frequently, challenges 
coded under I3a involved participants standing up for or protecting a third party. For 
example, “[I challenged because] I didn't think it was right for her to continue to blame 
her sister for things [her sister] is not at fault” or “[I challenged because] she created a 
memory in her mind that was not fair to our mother.” 
 The third subcategory (I4) involved challenges driven by participants’ 
dispositional view of themselves. Through the challenge, participants appeared to 
reaffirm their own dispositional tendencies as the type of person who speaks up, 
challenges, needs to be right, etc. (e.g., “[I challenged] because] I can’t stand when 
something is incorrect. Besides that, I always feel the need to be right” or “[I challenged 
because I generally don’t like to back down when I think I’m right.” 
 The fourth subcategory (I5) involved challenges driven by participants’ changing 
view of themselves. In these instances, participants’ appeared motivated by a desire to 
deviate or break away from their dispositional tendencies and habits. Although this 
subcategory was originally divided further into two subcategories, only subcategory I5a 
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was retained due to its more reliable coding. Examples of subcategory I5a include, “[I 
challenged because] on that day I got tired of playing along and not wanting to rock the 
boat with her” or “Usually I just go along with her. This time however, I didn't feel like 
just sitting back and allow her to inaccurately recall a past event. In a way, I felt like I 
was standing up for myself by holding her accountable.” 
 The fifth and last subcategory (I6) involved challenges driven by participants’ 
belief that aspects of the challenged event were inconsistent with whom they perceived 
themselves to be at the time of the challenge. Inherent in those challenges was an 
assumption of continuity and consistency between past-self and current-self. For 
example, participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wouldn't have gotten rid of those 
[belongings] myself because they had sentimental value to me” or “[I challenged 
because] my husband claimed I had said something that I didn't. I tried to tell him I 
would never say something of the sort and told him why I wouldn't have”].  
Category J: Self-focused motives. This category was created to capture challenges 
resulting from participants’ desire to consolidate, preserve, protect, and/or enhance a 
sense of “I” and “who I am.” Challenges prompted by self-focused motives tended to (a) 
consist primarily of an internal, self-focus, and (b) were focused primarily on the self, 
rather than or in addition to the other(s). This category was divided into nine 
subcategories.  
The first subcategory (J1) involved challenges driven by a desire to correct, clear 
up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a past event. For example, one participant 
stated,  
“When I was little I used to cherish this rabbit and hugged and slept with it every 
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night. My sister thought I just outgrew the rabbit when I stopped caring about it, 
but I told her she was the one who made me stopped caring about the rabbit. I 
told her that she told me a scary story about stuffed animals coming to life and 
killing their owners, and that I got scared and locked my rabbit in the closet. My 
sister said she did not remember telling that scary story at all, and the look on her 
face was one of denial. [I challenged because] I wanted to correct my sister that I 
didn’t outgrow the rabbit.”  
The second subcategory (J2) involved challenges driven by a desire to correct an 
unfavourable self-presentation and/or establish a favourable self-presentation. In all these 
instances, participants believed that the others’ impression of them was inaccurate and 
reflected poorly on them. In particular, concerns around being perceived as possessing 
undesirable qualities, like ignorance, violence, or deceit, were observed. For example, 
participants stated “[I challenged because] it bothered me that she thought of me as a 
heavy drinker when I was younger” or “[I challenged because] I didn't want people 
thinking me and my brother fight MMA style over stupid things.” 
The third subcategory (J3) involved challenges driven by a personal need for a 
past event to be recalled accurately. In all these instances, participants acknowledged 
their own need for accuracy through statements like “I wanted to set the record straight.” 
Such challenges also made clear that recalling accurately the challenged event accurately 
primarily benefited the participant. Examples included, “[I challenged because] but I 
couldn't justify letting her continue to believe that my hair was long just for the sake of 
some laughs” and “[I challenged because] I wanted to make sure the story that I was 
listening to was accurate.”  
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The fourth subcategory (J4) involved challenges driven by a desire to elicit an 
acknowledgment and/or taking of responsibility regarding the challenged event, as well 
as elicit understanding regarding the emotional consequences of the challenged event. A 
number of these challenges involved past traumas or distressing memories (e.g., “[I 
challenged because] her version was so far off that it functioned as a violent denial of the 
pain we children had experienced at various points in our childhoods” or “I challenged 
his memory of it because I just wanted him to admit the truth.” 
The fifth subcategory (J5) involved challenges driven by a desire to be recognized 
or acknowledged for one’s role in something deemed positive, valuable, or helpful (e.g., 
[“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not [give me] credit for playing a part in 
his eventual marriage.”) 
The sixth subcategory (J6) involved challenges driven by a desire to prevent a 
negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation from occurring or to ensure that a positive, 
favourable, or wanted situation did occur. Examples included, “I challenged because I 
wanted to go on that rollercoaster with my dad. This was the bargain I had been 
promised, not the ice cream!” and “[I challenged because] I wanted her to keep her 
promise to me to do something for me... I wanted her to fulfill her promise.” 
The seventh subcategory (J7) involved challenges driven by a desire to protect 
oneself in response to actual or anticipated physical and/or emotional threat. In other 
words, participants challenged in self-defense, and in fact most instances coded under this 
subcategory included an explicit acknowledgement of this self-defense motive (e.g., “[I 
challenged because] I was defending myself”). 
The eighth subcategory (J8) involved challenges driven by the pursuit of thrill or 
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amusement at the expense of the other (e.g., through teasing, pranks). For example, 
participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun challenging my 
sister's” or “[Even though he actually returned the money owed to me 2 weeks ago, I 
challenged him about not returning the money because] I wanted to see if I could do it.”  
The ninth and last subcategory (J9) involved challenges driven by a desire to 
show superiority or dominance in a certain area relative to another individual. For 
example, participants stated, “[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I knew 
more than him, about the house that we lived in” or “[I challenged because] I suppose 
there was a part of me that felt superior in knowing something that she didn't.” 
Of the nine subcategories within the Self-focused motives category, challenges 
coded under Correcting views of me (J2) and Defending the self (J7) both arguably 
captured self-protective motives arising as a result of dissonant information recounted by 
another individual. To illustrate, one participant described the challenge as follows:  
“My wife was recounting to a mutual friend about a time when we were in the city 
and a kid shoved her from behind for no reason. I grabbed him and punched him 
hard in the shoulder before he ran off, but in the story my wife said I cuffed him 
on the cheek. I told her she had it wrong, probably because her back was turned, 
or she was in shock.”  
In response to why they challenged, the participant wrote, 
“Because the memory didn't happen the way she said it, and it made me look a 
little more violent than I had been.”  
As another example, one participant described the challenge as follows:  
“My mother claimed recently that I went out drinking a lot with my friends and 
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that it had become a bad habit when I was younger and that she was glad I 
straightened up my act.  I challenged her to remember how many times she 
thought I went out drinking? Because I knew for sure I would only go out on 
Friday nights, and not even every Friday of the month.  I discussed and said if I 
went drinking a lot as she claimed, that maybe three days out of a month max 
certainly does not qualify as a lot. We discussed the topic and she in the end 
agreed she must have perceived it much worse than it was because I was her son 
and she was worried. ”  
When asked about why they challenged, the participant explained,  
“Because what was said was untrue and it bothered me that [my mother] thought 
of me as a heavy drinker when I was younger.”  
In both instances, participant’s self-concept as “not violent” and “not a heavy 
drinker” respectivey was at odds with the other’s recounting of a past event. In order to 
protect or preserve the self-concept as “not violent” and “not a heavy drinker,” and 
correct the others’ impression of them, the participant confronted the source of dissonant 
information, as would be expected from cognitive dissonance theory.   
Although the other subcategories within Self-focused motives category may have 
also included challenges driven by wanting to defend or preserve the self-concept, 
articulation of this motive was not as fleshed out as it was in subcategories J2 and J7. In 
fact, the coding of subcategories J2 and J7 overlapped greatly and as such, I collapsed 
them into one Self-protective index (used in the quantitative analyses below), rather than 
treat them separately.  
Category K: Emotions. This category was created to capture challenges stemming 
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from participants’ experience of certain emotional state(s). Although originally divided 
into three subcategories, only the Negative emotional states subcategory (K1a) emerged 
as a reliable subcategory and was retained to describe the dataset. This subcategory 
consisted of challenges driven by participants experiencing intense and distressing 
negative emotional states, such as pain, anger, or anxiety. For example, a participant 
stated, “I challenged because it is one of the most painful experiences that I have ever had 
to endure” or “[I challenged because] I was trying to be honest about what happened in 
the past and come clean about something that I had felt guilt over when I was younger.” 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
All quantitative analyses were conducted using SPSS 23. Prior to any statistical 
analyses, data were checked against corresponding statistical assumptions; only 
violations and corrections are reported in the appropriate sections below. Whenever 
possible, bootstrapping with 5000 samples was used to calculate statistics of interest. In 
light of the relatively novel and exploratory nature of this study, the alpha level was set at 
.05. 
Missing data. A missing values analysis revealed a relatively low amount of 
missing data (i.e., 2.4% or lower per variable) but the missing items did not appear to be 
distributed randomly (Little’s MCAR test χ2(6633) = 7005.06, p = .001). Further analysis 
revealed that only the Interpersonal Adjective Scales data produced a significant Little 
MCAR test (Little’s MCAR test χ2(4341) = 4629.51, p = .001), but not the other variables 
(Little’s MCAR test χ2(299) = 246.40, p = .988).  
Mean Belief in Occurrence and mean Belief in Accuracy were computed with the 
data available; no replacement values were used. This was deemed appropriate given the 
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low amount of data missing (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001) and the fact that these are both 
average-based rather than summative indices.   
Missing values on the Interpersonal Adjective Scales were handled based on the 
recommendations from the manual (Wiggins, 1995), which are based on normed data.  
Specifically, a participant profile was deemed valid if at least six of the eight octant 
adjectives were present and fewer than five items were missing in the entire Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales. Based on these criteria, four cases were excluded from the total of 291 
whenever Interpersonal Adjective Scales variables were used in the analyses. 
Incidentally, those four cases were also the only ones that had more than 5% (but less 
than 10%) of their data missing because of their incomplete Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales. A series of Mann Whitney U tests between the cases retained and the cases 
excluded did not reveal any significant differences on any of the variables of interest.  
Given the significant Little MCAR finding, Expectation Maximization was used 
to impute the missing values on the retained Interpersonal Adjective Scales cases (n = 
287). Analyses were conducted both with the imputed data and without, with very similar 
results. The imputed Interpersonal Adjective Scales data, however, was retained because 
of the MCAR finding.  
Hypothesis 2.1. To test the hypothesis that relative to challenges not involving 
self-discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would be more likely to include negative emotional states, a 
Self-protective index was computed by using subcategories “Correcting views of me” 
(J2) and “Defending the self” (J7) from the qualitative coding. If either or both codes 
were present in a challenge, that challenge was coded as containing a Self-protective 
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motive and given a dummy code of 1 (n = 38). If neither was present in a challenge, that 
challenge was coded as not containing a Self-protective motive and given a dummy code 
of 0 (n = 253). I used the Self-protective index in testing hypotheses 2.2 to 2.6 as well. To 
index negative emotional states, subcategory “Negative Emotional States” (K1a) was 
used from the qualitative coding. Consistent with the hypothesis, a chi-square analysis 
revealed that challenges containing Self-protective motives included proportionally more 
negative emotional states than challenges not containing Self-protective motives, 2 (291) 
= 5.25, p = .030 (two-tailed), d = .27. 
Hypothesis 2.2. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the question “during the 
challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other person that you were 
right?” 
 Participants’ responses to “during the challenge, how important was it for you to 
convince the other person that you were right?” had an overall mean of 7.82 (Mdn = 8; 
SD = 2.40, range 1–10) and acceptable skewness and kurtosis, with no values exceeding 
+/–3SD. The same Self-protective index computed to test hypothesis 2.1 was also used 
here. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings on the question reached 
8.11 (SD = 2.15; n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean 
ratings on this same question reached 7.78 (SD = 2.43; n = 250). Contrary to the 
hypothesis, a t test comparing mean ratings between the two groups did not reach 
statistical significance, mean difference = 0.33 95% CI [–0.44; 1.08], t (286) = .789, p = 
.431, d = .14.  
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Given the unbalanced groups in the t test above, a second comparison was set up. 
The “Prosocial motives” category that emerged out of the qualitative coding and the Self-
protective index created in hypothesis 2.1 were used to create a dummy coded variable 
that contrasted self-protective and prosocial motives. The Prosocial motives category was 
chosen because, unlike the Self-protective index, which consisted of challenges with an 
internal, self focus and centered more on the self rather than or in addition to the other, 
the Prosocial motives category consisted of challenges with an external, social focus and 
centered more on a specific person other than or in addition to the self. The dummy 
coding was set up as follows: If the challenge contained a Self-protective index code, it 
was dummy coded as 1. If the challenge contained a Prosocial motives category code, it 
was dummy coded as 0. Only non-overlapping cases were used, meaning that four cases 
that contained both codes were excluded. I used the Self-protective vs. Prosocial-motives 
index in testing hypotheses 2.3 to 2.6 as well. 
When a Self-protective-but-not-a-Prosocial code was present, mean ratings 
reached 8.12 (SD = 2.25, n = 33), whereas when a Prosocial-but-not-a-Self-protective 
code was present, mean ratings reached 6.81 (SD = 2.76, n = 52). Consistent with the 
hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings between the two groups revealed a statistically 
significant mean difference of 1.31 [0.26; 2.39], with ratings within the Self-protective 
group being significantly higher than ratings in the Prosocial motives group, t (83) = 
2.29, bootstrapped p = .020, d = .52.  
Hypothesis 2.3. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the question “during the 
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challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of yourself?” 
Participants’ responses to “during the challenge, how motivated were you to 
present a positive image of yourself?” had an overall mean of 6.30 (Mdn = 6.50; SD = 
2.85, range 1–10) and acceptable skewness and kurtosis, with no values exceeding +/-
3SD. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings were 7.76 (SD = 2.39; n = 
38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean ratings were 6.08 (SD = 
2.86; n = 251). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing the two groups revealed 
a significant difference in ratings of 1.69 [0.82; 2.52], t (287) = 3.46, bootstrapped p < 
.001, d = .60. Because the Levene’s test was significant, a Mann-Whitney U test was set 
up, which, consistent with the hypothesis, also demonstrated significant difference in 
ratings between the two groups, U = 3123.50, Z = 3.46, p (two-tailed) < .001. 
Given the disparity in n between the two groups, another comparison was set up 
using the dummy coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable created in 
hypothesis 2.2. When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings reached 7.73 
(SD = 2.35, n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, mean ratings reached 
6.21 (SD = 2.59, n = 52). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings 
between the two groups yielded a statistically significant mean difference of 1.52 [0.44; 
2.55], with significantly higher ratings in the self protective group than the prosocial 
group, t (83) = 2.73, bootstrapped p = .007, d = .62. 
Hypothesis 2.4. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would have higher ratings on the questions “at the time, how 
much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” and 
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“currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other 
person said or did?” 
Participants’ responses to “at the time, how much did it bother you that you 
disagreed with what the other person said or did?” had an overall mean of 5.04 (Mdn = 
5.00; SD = 3.30, range 1–10), acceptable skewness and kurtosis, and no values exceeding 
+/-3SD. The same Self-protective index computed in hypothesis 2.1 was also used here. 
When Self-protective motives were present, mean ratings were 6.24 (SD = 3.19; n = 38), 
whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean ratings were 4.85 (SD = 3.29; n 
= 250). Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing the two groups was statistically 
significant, mean difference = 1.39 [0.29; 2.48], t (286) = 2.43, bootstrapped p = .014, d = 
.43. 
Given the disparity in n, another comparison was conducted using the dummy 
coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable created in hypothesis 2.2. When 
Self-protective motives were present, ratings reached 6.24 (SD = 3.29, n = 33), whereas 
when Prosocial motives were present, ratings reached 4.23 (SD = 3.08, n = 53). 
Consistent with the hypothesis, a t test comparing ratings between the two groups yielded 
a statistically significant mean difference of 2.02 [0.60; 3.41], with significantly higher 
ratings in the Self protective group than the Prosocial group, t (84) = 2.88, bootstrapped p 
= .005, d = .64. 
Participants were also asked, “currently, how much does it still bother you that 
you disagreed with what the other person said or did?” Relative to the question above, 
responses to this question had a lower overall mean of 3.12 (Mdn = 2.00; SD = 2.77), 
acceptable skewness and kurtosis, and no values exceeding +/-3SD. When Self-protective 
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motives were present, mean ratings reached 4.11 (SD = 3.20; n = 38), whereas when Self-
protective motives were absent, mean ratings reached 2.96 (SD = 2.65; n = 250). Because 
the Levene’s test showed significant unequal variances, the nonparametric Mann-
Whitney U test was used, which, consistent with the hypothesis, showed significant 
differences between the two groups, U = 3847.50, Z = 2.08, p (two-tailed) = .037. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, using the dummy coded Self-protective vs. Prosocial 
motives variable revealed a similar pattern of findings, with higher distress ratings 
observed whenever Self-protective motives were present, Mann-Whitney U = 651.50, Z = 
2.11, p (two-tailed) = .035. 
Hypothesis 2.5. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would have greater confidence in self-reported judgments of 
memorial occurrence and accuracy. 
Participants’ ratings of Belief in Occurrence had an overall mean of 6.95 (Mdn = 
7.33; SD = 1.02, range 1–7.50) but skewness and kurtosis values were outside acceptable 
limits, with the distribution itself appearing severely left (negatively) skewed. When Self-
protective motives were present, mean Belief in Occurrence ratings were 7.06 (SD = 
1.10; n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean Belief in 
Occurrence ratings were 6.93 (SD = 1.01; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, the 
Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant differences between the two groups, U = 
4090.00, Z = 1.96, p (two-tailed) = .050. 
Participants’ ratings of Belief in Accuracy had an overall mean of 6.46 (Mdn = 
7.00; SD = 0.98, range 1–7) but again, the skewness and kurtosis values were outside 
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acceptable limits, with the distribution appearing severely left skewed. When Self-
protective motives were present, mean Belief in Accuracy ratings were 6.64 (SD = 0.59; 
n = 38), whereas when Self-protective motives were absent, mean Belief in Accuracy 
ratings were 6.43 (SD = 1.02; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, the Mann-Whitney U 
test revealed no significant differences in Belief in Accuracy ratings between the two 
groups, U = 4514.50, Z = 0.673, p (two-tailed) = .503. 
 The contrast variable created to test hypothesis 2.2 was then used to ascertain 
whether those endorsing Self-protective motives would have higher ratings of Belief in 
Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy than those endorsing Prosocial motives. When Self-
protective motives were present, ratings of Belief in Occurrence reached 7.02 (SD = 1.18, 
n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, ratings of Belief in Occurrence 
reached 6.78 (SD = 1.25, n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis, using a Mann-Whitney U 
test, there were no significant between-group differences in ratings, U = 704.50, Z = 1.88, 
p (two-tailed) = .060.  
When Self-protective motives were present, ratings of Belief in Accuracy reached 
6.60 (SD = 0.62, n = 33), whereas when Prosocial motives were present, ratings of Belief 
in Accuracy reached 6.11 (SD = 1.25, n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis, the Mann-
Whitney U test did not reach statistical significance, U = 718.50, Z = 1.48, p (two-tailed) 
= .139.  
Hypothesis 2.6. It was expected that relative to challenges not involving self-
discrepant autobiographical memories, challenges involving self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories would have lower Centrality of Event Scale ratings. 
Participants’ mean centrality ratings reached 2.15 (Mdn = 1.71, SD = 1.15, range 1–5). 
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Although skewness and kurtosis values were within acceptable limits and no values 
exceeded +/-3SD, the distribution of scores was right skewed. The Self-protective index 
developed above was again used here. When Self-protective motives were present, 
centrality ratings reached 2.26 (SD = 1.07; n = 38); when Self-protective motives were 
absent, centrality ratings reached 2.13 (SD = 1.16; n = 253). Contrary to the hypothesis, a 
Mann-Whitney U test did not reveal significant differences in centrality ratings between 
the two groups, U = 4313.50, Z = 1.03, p (two-tailed) = .306. When the dummy coded 
Self-protective vs. Prosocial motives variable was used, centrality ratings in the Self-
protective category reached 2.4 (SD = 1.09; n = 33), whereas centrality ratings in the 
Prosocial motives category reached 2.63 (SD = 1.29; n = 53). Contrary to the hypothesis, 
the difference in Centrality of Event Scale scores between the two groups, however, was 
not statistically significant, Mann-Whitney U = 731.50, Z = 1.28, p (two-tailed) = .204. 
Hypothesis 3.1. It was expected that individuals scoring higher on narcissism 
would be disproportionally represented among self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories. Refer to Appendix B for a diagram of the interpersonal circumplex. 
To test this hypothesis, Interpersonal Adjective Scales octant scores were 
computed and checked for normality and homogeneity of variance. In light of the 
previously reported gender differences, such as the tendency for men to receive higher 
scores than women on the Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-hearted 
octants (Wiggins, 1995), as well as the significant gender differences observed between 
men and women in the current investigation, tests were run separately for men and 
women. Given the small ns, a series of gendered Mann Whitney U tests were set up with 
the Self-protective index, originally created to test hypothesis 2.1, as the independent 
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variable, and the narcissism-related octants as the dependent variables. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, none of the tests reached statistical significance (see Table 4), although, 
among women, Self-protective challenges (n = 13) tended to be accompanied by higher 
Arrogant Calculating (p = .029, one-tailed) and Cold-Hearted scores (p = .063, one-
tailed) scores. 
 As per the Interpersonal Adjective Scales manual guidelines, a Dominance score 
and a Nurturance score were also computed. Given significant gender differences on 
Dominance, Mann Whitney U tests were conducted separately for men and women, with 
the Self-protective index used as the independent variable, and the Dominance and 
Nurturance scores used as dependent variables. Again, results did not reach statistical 
significance (see Table 4), but there was an indication from consulting the mean ranks 
that Dominance scores were higher whenever Self-protective motives were present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 85 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Self-Protective Motives and Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants 
 
 
Self-protective index U Z 
p (two-
tailed) 
p (one-
tailed) 
 Present Absent     
Variables M (SD) n M (SD) n     
Men (n = 152) 
PA  4.54 (1.28) 25 4.60 (1.36) 127 1541.50 –0.23 .821 .411 
BC  3.50 (1.09) 25 3.44 (1.68) 127 1475.50 –0.56 .580 .290 
DE  2.30 (1.02) 25 2.64 (1.41) 127 1414.50 –0.86 .392 .196 
DOM  –0.19 (1.57) 25 –0.47 (1.58) 127 1424.00 –0.81 .420 .210 
LOV –0.42 (1.25) 25 –0.85 (1.65) 127 1293.00 –1.46 .145 .072 
Women (n = 135) 
PA  4.45 (1.46) 13 4.06 (1.35) 122 672.00 –0.90 .372 .186 
BC  3.00 (1.46) 13 2.29 (1.27) 122 540.00 –1.89 .058 .029 
DE  2.59 (1.48) 13 1.96 (1.23) 122 588.00 –1.54 .125 .063 
DOM –0.60 (1.80) 13 –0.99 (1.56) 122 667.00 –0.94 .353 .177 
LOV –1.27 (2.21) 13 –0.48 (1.76) 122 608.00 –1.38 .171 .085 
Overall (N = 287) 
PA  4.51 (1.33) 38 4.33 (1.38) 249 4415.50 –0.66 .510 .255 
BC  3.33 (1.23) 38 2.88 (1.60) 249 3611.50 –2.35 .018 .009 
DE  2.40 (1.18) 38 2.31 (1.36) 249 4282.00 –0.94 .347 .173 
DOM –0.33 (1.64) 38 –0.72 (1.59) 249 4004.00 –1.53 .128 .064 
LOV –0.71 (1.66) 38 –0.67 (1.71) 249 4701.00 –0.06 .951 .475 
Note. PA = Assured-Dominant, BC = Arrogant-Calculating, DE = Cold-Hearted, DOM = Dominance, 
LOV = Nurturance. 
 
 
Post hoc Analyses. As noted earlier, although subcategories J2 and J7 arguably 
contain the most explicit instances of self-discrepant autobiographical memories, the 
other subcategories within Self-focused motives may also contain some degree of self-
discrepancy. For this reason, subcategories J1 through J7 were used to create a Self-
focused motives index. If any of the J1 through J7 codes were present in a challenge, that 
challenge was coded as containing a Self-Focused Motive and given a value of 1. If none 
of the J1 through J7 codes were present, that challenge was coded as not containing a 
Self-focused motive and given a value of 0. This index was thereafter used to test post 
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hoc hypothesis 2.1 through 2.4. 
Post hoc 2.1: A chi-square analysis revealed that challenges containing Self-
Focused Motives included proportionally more negative emotional states than challenges 
not containing Self-Focused Motives, 2 (291) = 15.73, p < .001 (two-sided), d = .48. 
Post hoc 2.2: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the 
question “during the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other 
person that you were right?” reached 8.03 (SD = 2.32; n = 144) whereas when Self-
Focused motives were absent, mean ratings on this same question reached 7.61 (SD = 
2.46; n = 144). A t test comparing mean ratings, however, did not reach statistical 
significance, mean difference = 0.42 [–0.15; 0.95], t (286) = 1.48, bootstrapped p = .141, 
d = .18.  
Post hoc 2.3: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the 
question “during the challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of 
yourself?” were 6.38 (SD = 2.87; n = 145), whereas when Self-focused motives were 
absent, mean ratings on this same question were 6.22 (SD = 2.85; n = 144). A t test 
comparing the two groups did not reach statistical significance, mean difference = 0.16 [–
0.51; 0.82], t (287) = 0.488, bootstrapped p = .626, d = .06. 
Post hoc 2.4: When Self-focused motives were present, mean ratings on the 
question “At the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other 
person said or did?” were 5.68 (SD = 3.32; n = 144), whereas when Self-focused 
motives were absent, mean ratings were 4.39 (SD = 3.18; n = 144). A t test comparing the 
two groups was statistically significant, mean difference = 1.29 [0.55; 2.03], t (286) = 
3.37, bootstrapped p = .001, d = .40. 
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When Self-Focused motives were present, mean ratings on the question 
“Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other 
person said or did?” were 3.51 (SD = 2.91; n = 144), whereas when Self-focused 
motives were absent, mean ratings were 2.72 (SD = 2.54; n = 144). A Mann-Whitney U 
test revealed statistically significant differences in ratings, U = 8903.50, Z = 2.40, p = 
.016. 
Study 1 Discussion 
This investigation sought to explore why individuals challenge another’s 
recollection of a past event that is occasionally discrepant with their self-concept, 
establish that challenges involving self-discrepant autobiographical memories are 
different from other challenges, and explore the role of narcissistic features. These 
findings are discussed in three separate sections below.  
Why Do Individuals Challenge Another’s Recollection of a Past Event? 
Based on participants’ own accounts as well as prior research, a coding frame was 
developed in order to identify and describe the motives offered for challenging another’s 
recollection of a past event. Several memorial beliefs were given as reasons for 
challenging, including, among others, believing that the challenged event happened 
differently, believing that the challenged event did not occur, and endorsing beliefs 
regarding memory integrity that were at odds with the other’s recollection. These 
memorial beliefs were primarily used to strengthen the validity of one’s own version of 
events and/or undermine the validity of the other’s version. 
Of note, the Alternate attributions category was dropped in its entirety because it 
was not reliably coded. From a theoretical perspective and consistent with the source 
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monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), this category is of 
interest because it implies that, at the time of recalling a memory, individuals evaluate 
and make attributions about how the memory was acquired (i.e., temporal, spatial, and 
social context). For example, in the current investigation, attributions were made about 
the other’s memory being influenced by or resulting from drug use (e.g., “I challenged 
because they smoke too much marijuana and now their memory is failing them”) or 
mental health states (e.g., “I challenged because they have a mental illness that impairs 
their perception of reality and memory”). Unlike in Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni 
(2015), however, Alternate attributions in this study were not applied to one’s mental 
representation. Rather, Alternate attributions were used to challenge the other’s recall. 
Furthermore, their use indicated that participants understood how the context in which a 
memory was acquired might influence its accuracy and/or interpretation. Because of this, 
Alternate attributions - Internal (D1) in the current investigation overlapped with General 
beliefs regarding memory integrity (A3), and in fact seven of the nine challenges given 
D1 codes also received A3 codes.  
Aside from Alternate attributions, Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) found 
evidence of motives similar to the ones outlined in this investigation when exploring 
reasons for reducing or relinquishing belief that a past event occurred to the self. Unlike 
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015), however, the present study focused on the 
deliverers of the challenge rather than on the recipients, and underscored the use of 
memorial beliefs in providing social feedback and even challenging others’ recollection. 
Prosocial motives emerged as yet another reason for challenging others’ 
recollection of a past event. These challenges tended to have a social focus in that they 
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centered primarily on the challenged party (rather than the challenger), with the explicit 
intention of being helpful to that challenged party. For example, some challenges were 
quasi-therapeutic in their emotional support for the challenged other, whereas others 
prioritized delivering or clarifying valuable information to the other person. Challenges 
included in this category tended to be collaborative in that challengers reported reaching 
out to the challenged party for help with piecing together a shared interpretation of the 
challenged event or reminiscing on an old memory. A minority of prosocial challenges 
involved a degree of deception, specifically lying about a past event in order to improve 
or rebuild a strained relationship. These challenges were categorized under the prosocial 
motives because of their partial or whole focus on the relationship rather than on the self, 
although the lying is arguably indirectly self-serving in making the challenger appear in a 
positive light and worthy of the relationship. Taken together, the emergence of prosocial 
motives in this investigation echoes Pillemer’s work (2001) on the social function of 
autobiographical remembering and the related notion that the sharing of memories helps 
develop, maintain, and strengthen interpersonal relationships (also Alea & Bluck, 2003; 
Bluck, 2003), as reflected in other areas of autobiographical memory work including 
Fivush’s (2012) work on parental reminiscing and Hirst and Echterhoff’s (2012) social 
sharing of memories. 
Another category that surfaced as a way of describing the dataset was self-in-
relation-to-others, which encompassed challenges resulting from participants’ internal 
models of themselves, the challenged party, and/or a third party. In the case of the self, 
participants reported challenging because doing so was consistent with their dispositional 
view of themselves. This notion that dispositional qualities may be related to motives for 
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challenging is consistent with the work of Cuc et al. (2006), as well as that of Hirst and 
Echterhoff (2012) in that a challenger’s dominance, or at least their self-view as the type 
of person who is dominant, may be one reason why they decide to challenge. 
Alternatively, participants reported challenging because what was alleged to have 
occurred in the challenged event was not consistent with whom they perceived 
themselves to be. In the case of the challenged other, participants reported challenging 
because aspects of the others’ disposition led them to question the other’s credibility. In 
the case of the third party, participants reported challenging to preserve their dispositional 
view of this individual. Of interest, this Internal Models of self and others category has 
parallels in the dispositional and situational attributions studied within social psychology.  
Finally, several self-focused motives also became apparent in coding the dataset. 
Challenges coded under this category were reportedly driven by a desire to consolidate, 
preserve, protect, and/or enhance a sense of “I” and “who I am.” As expected, challenges 
involving the self-concept and arguably dissonance were also apparent among the coding 
subcategories (e.g., Defending the self, Correcting views of me). There was substantial 
overlap in coding these two subcategories, possibly because protecting one’s positive 
self-concept (Defending the self) and making a good impression on others (Correcting 
views of self) are closely related and attempts to disentangle the two are somewhat 
artificial. For this reason, these two challenges were cumulatively referred to as involving 
Self-protective motives and were treated as a singular index. Beyond self-protection, self-
enhancement has also been advanced as a motive (see General Introduction). This desire 
to enhance oneself was possibly evident in the Seeking recognition subcategory, which is 
reminiscent of the self-enhancing nature of intentionally borrowing memories in order to 
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make oneself look better (Brown et al., 2015). Overall, most motives under the self-
focused category were reminiscent of Pillemer’s self function of autobiographical 
remembering insofar as helping maintain and consolidate a sense of self.  
Although directive motives did not materialize as a separate category, some 
arguably directive motives were evident in the subcategory Managing anticipated 
outcomes to the self, which involved challenges with a view to problem solving and 
guiding future behaviour (e.g., “I challenged because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster 
with my dad”). Another subcategory with a similarly directive undertone was Passing on 
knowledge/information (under Prosocial motives category), which may lead to solving 
problems and/or motivates change (e.g., “I challenged because I wanted to teach my 
brother responsible financial habits”; e.g., Biondolillo & Pillemer, 2015).  
How Are Challenges Involving Self-Discrepant autobiographical memories 
Different from Other Challenges? 
Consistent with the second objective, challenges stemming from self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories, as was arguably the case for challenges coded under Self 
protective motives, were different from other challenges in ways that appeared indicative 
of dissonance.  
First, challenges involving Self-protective motives were more likely to include 
negative emotional states. Based on Aronson and others’ position that self-referent 
negative emotions produce self-threat (Aronson, 1969, 1992; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; 
Pinto-Gouveia & Matos, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009), which in turn gives rise to 
dissonance, I argue that the proportionally greater presence of negative emotional states 
among Self-protective challenges as opposed to other types of challenges is indicative of 
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dissonance among Self-protective-coded challenges. In further support of this 
relationship between negative emotions and dissonance, Alicke and Sedikides (2009) 
posited that experiencing negative affect preferentially activated self-protection rather 
than self-enhancement, possibly because it signals threat to the self-concept. 
Second, challenges involving Self-protective motives had higher ratings on the 
question of importance to convince the other person they were right compared with 
challenges involving Prosocial motives. This particular question was asked to ascertain 
the extent to which the challenge was a reaction to or an attempt at protecting something 
important to the self. That importance ratings in this question were significantly higher 
among Self-protective challenges appears to suggest that there was greater dissonance 
among Self-protective challenges than among Prosocial challenges. This finding is 
aligned with Festinger’s (1957) view that the magnitude of dissonance is contingent upon 
the importance, value, and consequence of the elements involved, as well as Aronson’s 
revision of cognitive dissonance theory (1969, 1992).  
Third, challenges involving Self-protective motives also had significantly higher 
ratings on the importance of presenting oneself in a positive light relative to both the rest 
of the challenges as well as relative to Prosocial motives. This finding is consistent with 
Aronson’s view that dissonance is most powerful and most upsetting when actions 
contradict one’s positive self-concept as moral, competent, stable, and predictable 
(Aronson, 1969, 1992). When participants respond to this importance question with 
higher ratings, it arguably suggests that the response from the other individual may have 
threatened participants’ positive presentation and also possibly threatened their positive 
self-concept. 
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Fourth, challenges involving Self-protective motives were accompanied by higher 
distress at disagreeing with the challenged party both at the time the challenge occurred 
and at present. Arguably, the presence of distress or at least the acknowledgment that it is 
occurring is indicative of dissonance and further supports the argument that the Self-
protective grouping was in fact composed of self-discrepant autobiographical memories. 
Regarding the hypothesized appraisals of veridicality, neither Belief in Accuracy 
nor Belief in Occurrence showed differential ratings when Self-protective vs. nonSelf-
protective challenges were involved. Consistent with the hypothesized direction of this 
prediction, however, challenges involving Self-protective motives did have marginally 
higher ratings of Belief in Occurrence than nonSelf-protective challenges, but this 
disappeared when values were contrasted against Prosocial challenges. It would therefore 
appear that appraisals of veridicality and in particular, expected lower Belief in Accuracy 
and lower Belief in Occurrence ratings, did not materialize when Self-protective 
challenges were present. On the surface, these results appear to contradict D’Argembeau 
and Van der Linden’s (2008) findings regarding shame-inducing autobiographical 
memories receiving lower ratings of “I believe the event in my memory really occurred in 
the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not 
occur” than pride-inducing autobiographical memories. The item those researchers used, 
however, has been criticized because it tends to cross-load on various constructs, 
including belief in occurrence, accuracy, and recollection (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 
2015). In contrast to D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), the current investigation 
appears better positioned to assess belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy because it 
uses validated and multiple-item measures shown to capture each construct independently 
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(Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). 
Finally, challenges involving Self-protective motives did not have higher ratings 
of event centrality and presumably importance than challenges involving nonSelf-
protective motives. Furthermore, there were no differences in importance ratings when 
Self-protective and prosocial motives were contrasted against each other.  
Post hoc analysis with a broader Self-focused motives index revealed that 
challenges coded under this category included a higher number of negative emotions than 
expected. Such challenges, however, did not demonstrate higher ratings of importance in 
convincing the other or in presenting a positive self-image. These challenges were 
nonetheless accompanied by higher distress at disagreeing with the challenged other 
when the challenge originally occurred and at present. Based on the pattern of these 
findings, it appears that the Self-protective index more so than the Self-focused index 
isolated a subgroup of challenges that involved threat to the self-concept and dissonance, 
namely self-discrepant autobiographical memories. 
The Role of Narcissistic Features 
In limited support of my original prediction regarding the disproportionate 
presence of narcissistic features among self-discrepant autobiographical memories, 
challenges involving Self-protective motives tended to have significantly higher ratings 
on one aspect of narcissism among women, Arrogant-Calculating, but not other aspects, 
like Assured-Dominant or Cold-Hearted. Similar findings did not emerge among the male 
participants, meaning that men identifying Self-protective challenges did not endorse 
more narcissistic traits than men providing nonSelf-protective challenges. Although not 
statistically significant, there was a trend among those identifying Self-protective 
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challenges to possess higher dominance scores. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
These findings are discussed in the context of certain limitations. First, the act of 
challenging another’s recollection for a past event arguably stems from a subjective 
evaluative process. This evaluative process is likely dynamic in nature insofar as it may 
continue to evolve even after the challenging has taken place. It is therefore essential to 
point out that the motives identified in this investigation are a snapshot of this evaluative 
process and may have evolved or changed in some way since the challenge originally 
occurred. In other words, the motives reported by participants could be a reconstruction 
of the motives that originally led to the challenge. The motives presently reported by 
participants are also limited by their insightfulness into themselves and their motives, 
their’ ability to articulate their motives, their willingness to share their motives in writing, 
and the nature of the cue they were presented with.  
Another related limitation draws from the notion of double hermeneutics 
(Giddens, 1987). In the case of this investigation, concepts like denial or defenses have 
percolated through popular culture and may have become a lens through which 
participants interpret their experiences. The fact that the present study finds similar 
themes among challenges does not mean that the themes that emerge are completely 
independent from these folk psychology concepts that may have originally informed 
participants’ self-interpretations. 
Third, it is suspected that the cue used (i.e., “challenge”) pulled for situations with 
a more negative connotation, such as doubt and or suspicion regarding the other’s recall. 
It is possible that a different, less adversarial cue, such as “describe how you intervened 
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when someone was relating a past memory”, may pull for more helpful and supportive 
situations, which might in turn lead to a greater variety and frequency of prosocial 
motives emerging. Glazewski’s (2016) findings using “aided” rather than “challenged” 
provided some preliminary support for the argument that more prosocial themes might 
emerge if the cue carries a less adversarial connotation.  
The use of this particular cue and the examples offered as part of that cue may 
have also contributed to the higher prevalence of certain codes over others. For example, 
the most prevalent code belonged to challenges driven by accuracy (63%), a motive that 
was indirectly reflected in the instructions to participants (i.e., “told them something 
about their memory was wrong”). Although the cue itself may have impacted the 
prevalence of certain motives, the emergence of this and other motives, rather their 
prevalence, was of greater importance to this study because it indicated that such motives 
were part of participants’ experience and response to incompatible autobiographical 
memories. It is possible that cues worded differently may have shaped the reporting of 
more motives of a certain type, such as self-protective motives, but the aim of this study 
was to cast a wider net into incompatible memories and allow self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories to emerge in a more natural manner as a subset of 
incompatible autobiographical memories.  
 Fourth, a major limitation was the sample size used in the Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales analysis. Because of my decision to cast a wider net into why individuals 
challenge others’ recollection, only a subgroup of challenges manifested dissonance and 
self-protective motives. When this subgroup was analyzed by gender in relation to 
Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants, sample size decreased further, thus limiting 
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statistical power. In particular, the gendered findings with respect to the Arrogant-
Calculating octant of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales need to be interpreted with 
caution given the limited number of women who had identified self-protective motives as 
driving their challenges. Such results will need to be replicated in other studies before 
they are considered reliable.  
Furthermore, because this study did not use a clinical sample, even the few highly 
narcissistic individuals that might have shown the pattern expected (i.e., narcissistic traits 
were expected to be disproportionally represented among Self-protective challenges) may 
have been too few to make a substantial difference in findings. Future studies might 
selectively recruit more narcissistic individuals through a prescreening stage, and then 
ascertain whether those individuals respond differently than non-narcissistic others to 
another’s recollection. 
Finally, as a way of confirming the coding of negative emotional states, it would 
have been helpful to ask participants to fill out a state measure, like the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), upon describing the 
challenge. This could have also been used to index distress and arguably dissonance 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Introduction to Study 2 
Study 2 sought to explore how individuals experience and respond to their own 
recollection of an autobiographical memory that may be dissonant with their self–
concept, arguably because it violates their self–concept as moral, competent, and/or 
stable and predictable (Aronson, 1969, 1992). 
Study 2 takes an intrapersonal approach to answering how individuals experience 
and respond to self–discrepant autobiographical memories. Consistent with Campbell and 
Sedikides’ (1999) work on activating self–threat (see General Introduction for more 
detail), this intrapersonal approach was chosen in order to provoke greater self–threat and 
more self–discrepant based responding than was evident in Study 1. According to 
dissonance theory, the dissonance is greater when the individuals themselves are 
responsible for the inconsistency (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998; Rodriguez & Strange, 2015). 
In order to activate this more acute level of dissonance, Study 2 focused exclusively on 
autobiographical memories for perpetration of intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is 
here defined as psychological/emotional, physical or sexual violence, or threat of 
physical or sexual violence (Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon, & Shelley (2002). 
Perpetrating IPV arguably creates greater dissonance and poses greater threat to an 
individual’s current self–concept because it involves socially unacceptable and frequently 
illegal acts. The heightened discrepancy between one’s recollection and one’s self–
concept should activate cognitive dissonance, which should in turn be reduced through 
dissonance reducing mechanisms like derogating past selves, minimizing the perceived 
importance of the past IPV event, and so on. 
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Study 2 is situated within the context of IPV, as opposed to sexual offending or 
other types of transgressions, because (a) IPV is comparatively more prevalent than 
sexual offending, (b) the IPV literature has extensively documented the presence of 
dissonance–reducing appraisals among IPV perpetrators (Henning & Holdford, 2006; 
Smith, 2007; Wood, 2004), and (c) the role of shame and its related impact on the self–
concept has received some empirical attention (Dutton, van Ginkel, & Starzomski, 1995; 
Lawrence & Taft, 2013). This is not meant to be a comprehensive or representative 
review of the IPV literature but rather is intended to show that perpetrating IPV, for 
some, does induce shame and pose a threat to the self-concept.  
The first part of the literature review outlines how self–threat is tied to IPV among 
men. The second part of the review focuses on the kinds of appraisals that have been 
studied in the male-perpetrated IPV literature. A third section is dedicated to rates of IPV 
and appraisals in nonclinical samples of both men and women. This is followed by the 
presentation of the study hypotheses and design, before finally turning to the results and 
discussion.  
IPV and Self–Threat 
Within the IPV literature, four critical arguments help clarify the emergence of 
appraisals and their relationship to self–threat: (a) violence is socially undesirable and/or 
unacceptable (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Edin & Nilsson, 2014; Sugarman & Hotaling, 
1997); (b) violating social standards by engaging in an act of violence evokes feeling of 
shame (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992); (c) shame is self–threatening (Dutton et al., 1995; 
Tangney, 1991); and (d) in order to escape from the experienced shame, the perpetrator 
reappraises the violent act (e.g., by diminishing its severity, intensity, or reducing belief 
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that it genuinely occurred) with the purpose of defending the self from it and maintaining 
a positive self–concept (Smith, 2007; Wood, 2004). These arguments are evaluated in 
greater detail in the sections that follow.  
Violence is socially unacceptable. Violating moral and legal standards by 
committing a violent physical, sexual, or emotional act is often deemed unacceptable by 
the perpetrators of such acts (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992). Evidence for this argument 
comes from studies reporting high rates of socially desirable responding (Dutton & 
Hemphill, 1992; Sugarman & Hotaling, 1997) and significant underreporting of physical, 
verbal, and psychological abuse among domestic offenders (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992).  
Interestingly, although not statistically significant, the trend in Dutton and 
Hemphill’s (1992) results suggests that elevations in socially desirable responding were 
related to lower reporting of psychological and verbal aggression. In contrast, socially 
desirable responding scores showed a weaker relationship to reports of physical 
aggression. This pattern appears to suggest that IPV perpetrators lied the most (to 
themselves and others) about psychological abuse, and the least about physical abuse. 
One could speculate that, perhaps, given that physical abuse is more likely to leave 
physical evidence (e.g., doctor’s visits, bruise marks, injuries), it is more difficult to deny 
or minimize its existence to the self and/or to the victim. On the other hand, verbal and 
psychological abuse may be less visible and therefore easier to deny or minimize. 
Extending this speculation further, it may be easier to reduce the belief that the violent 
event actually occurred and/or doubt the accuracy of its recall when physical evidence 
confirming its existence is absent. It is therefore plausible that appraisals of veridicality 
may be most used in instances of verbal and psychological abuse, and least used in 
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instances of physical abuse. 
Engaging in violent acts evokes shame. The high rates of socially desirable 
responding (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Sugarman & Hotaling, 1997), in conjunction with 
the elevated rates of denial and minimization among IPV perpetrators (e.g., Henning & 
Holdford, 2006), have been used to infer that perpetrators experience shame about their 
use of violence (Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Smith, 2007; Winters, Clift, & Dutton, 2004). 
There is some basis for this inference as IPV perpetrators do in fact report feeling 
ashamed of their violence (e.g., Wood, 2004). I caution here, however, that not everyone 
who perpetrates IPV experiences shame.  
Why would the IPV act evoke shame, rather than guilt? Tangney (1991) defined 
guilt as a negative evaluation regarding a specific behaviour involving harm to someone 
or something. In contrast, she defined shame as a global, negative, and painful evaluation 
involving the whole self. Her research has helped connect the two emotions to different 
behavioural predispositions; guilt is presumably associated with reparative actions, 
whereas shame is associated with a motive to hide or escape. Despite these differences, 
the two emotions overlap greatly and may both be activated in a given situation. 
Activation of shame or guilt, however, is also contingent upon individual differences and 
how the situation is construed by that individual (Tangney, 1992). 
It is proposed that IPV acts evoke shame because of distal factors, such as 
childhood shaming experiences and considerations, which conceivably shape the 
appraisal of adult acts of domestic violence in terms of shame. To elaborate, childhood 
shaming experiences (e.g., being physically punished or scolded in the presence of 
others; random physical punishment; treated in a way as to feel ashamed) predicted more 
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frequent physical and psychological abuse perpetration in adult male IPV perpetrators 
(Dutton et al., 1995). There was also a robust positive relationship between early shaming 
experiences and borderline personality organization4 in male IPV perpetrators, suggesting 
that early shame substantially contributed to the emergence of a personality organization 
marked by intense and unstable relationships, splitting, devaluation, chronic feelings of 
emptiness, fears of abandonment, and intense anger (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993; Dutton 
et al., 1995).  
Additional personality considerations emerge out of Tangney’s work with the trait 
of shame–proneness. Across several samples (e.g., college students, at–risk youth, 
inmates), Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, and McCloskey (2010) found that shame–
prone individuals exhibited an elevated tendency to externalize blame, which in turn 
corresponded to elevations in both physical and verbal aggression. Given the fragility of 
narcissists’ egos, their unstable self–concept, and their reaction to perceived slights 
(APA, 2013), it is not surprising to find that pathological aspects of narcissism (e.g., 
exploitativeness) are related to elevations in shame–proneness (Gramzow & Tangney, 
1992).  
Taken together, it appears that male IPV perpetrators may be more vulnerable to 
experiencing shame as adults due to either early shaming experiences and/or personality 
features that sensitize them to shame and potentially promote the formation of a shame–
based sense of self. Because of this sensitivity, they are expected to appraise IPV acts as 
shameful (Tangney, 1992). Moreover, personality styles that are more vulnerable to 
shame and/or shame–proneness, like narcissism, should theoretically activate greater 
                                                        
4 This personality style differs from borderline personality disorder in that it becomes 
salient only in intimate relationships (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993). 
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shame. Therefore, one could speculate that narcissists may be more vulnerable to 
experiencing more intense shame than the average individual (Gramzow & Tangney, 
1992). 
  Shame is self–threatening. The argument that shame is self–threatening is based 
on the evaluation of oneself as globally and painfully bad (Paivio & Pascual–Leone, 
2010; Tangney, 1991), which is an affront to the positive self–concept that most 
individuals hold (Sedikides & Green, 2004). Shame, therefore, threatens a very basic 
assumption about individuals: that individuals are generally good and moral individuals. 
Tangney (1991) does not appear to differentiate between adaptive and maladaptive shame 
(cf. Paivio & Pascual–Leone, 2010), nor is there a suggestion that shame might exist 
along a continuum (cf. Lawrence & Taft, 2013). Her conceptualization of shame as an 
inherently toxic emotion, however, may be because she casts guilt as the more adaptive 
emotion that is essentially more prosocial in motivating reparative action (Tangney, 
1991). Regardless of the exact definition and distinctions, there is an underlying 
consensus that experiencing (maladaptive) shame is so painful and threatening to one’s 
sense of self that the individual seeks to avoid it or defend oneself against it (Paivio & 
Pascual–Leone, 2010; Tangney, 1991), and one such defense is externalization of 
responsibility, or blame (Stuewig et al., 2010). Other defenses have also been proposed 
and will be reviewed in the next section.  
Evidence regarding the threatening nature of shame comes primarily from clinical 
and theoretical work, which claims that anger and/or aggression are used to shut down or 
avoid shame (“shame–rage spiral”; “humiliated fury”; Paivio & Pascual–Leone, 2010; 
Stuewig et al., 2010). In addition, as the relationship between shame and externalized 
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blame implies (Stuewig et al., 2010), individuals feel the need to defend against or 
somehow protect themselves from shame.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a handful of studies conducted within the 
autobiographical memory literature further bolster the notion that shame is threatening. In 
those studies, shame–inducing autobiographical memories tend to be protected against by 
being appraised as less important and less coherent to the self than pride–inducing 
memories (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008). There has also been some 
speculation that reducing the belief that a past autobiographical event occurred to the self 
may in fact be an appraisal mechanisms activated to reduce or avoid shame (Scoboria et 
al., 2015).  
Thus, there are converging findings and theorizing across various literatures that 
shame generally constitutes a threat to the self presumably due to the painful implication 
that the self is bad. Appraisals are therefore activated to protect the self from this threat. 
In light of this research, shame is taken to index self–threat in Study 2.  
 Appraisals help protect against self–threat. Accumulating research has 
examined excuses (admission that the act was bad/wrong but perpetrator does not accept 
responsibility for it; e.g., “It was a bad thing to do, but it was not my fault”), justifications 
(admission of responsibility for the act, but denial that the act was wrong or 
inappropriate; e.g., “I did it, and I had a right to do it”), and denials (no recognition of 
responsibility or wrongfulness of the act), as ways of coping with the shamefulness of the 
IPV act that some individuals experience while simultaneously protecting the positivity 
of the current self–concept (Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Enosh & 
Buchbinder, 2005; Mullaney, 2007; Wood, 2004).  
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Most of this work has emerged out of in–depth interviews with men, which have 
identified several overarching appraisal–related themes. For example, a major theme 
from Smith’s work (2007) was the use of minimization as well as attempts at normalizing 
the abusive behaviour by referring to it as “just” an argument. Other themes included 
perceiving the IPV episode as self–defense, the latter reminiscent of the “victim position” 
some perpetrators adopt to portray their violent act as reactive (Edin & Nilsson, 2014). 
The in–depth interviews also underscored themes of entitlement (to obedience and 
respect), patriarchal views (with regards to a perceived right to be in control), and 
superiority (devaluing and demeaning the partner). Based on these themes, Smith (2007) 
concluded, as many others have also done, that the perception of threat and the manner 
with which IPV perpetrators defend themselves is partly attributable to personality 
characteristics. Specifically, she argued that male perpetrators favoring minimization 
might show features consistent with a dysphoric/borderline personality style, whereas 
male perpetrators evincing superiority and entitlement might show features more 
consistent with a narcissistic/antisocial style (see Tweed & Dutton, 1998; Holtzworth–
Munroe & Stuart, 1994, for more on this typology). It is however noted that research 
attempting to link personality disorders or typologies to IPV has yielded inconsistent 
results (Ali, Dhingra, & McGarry, 2016). 
Goodrum, Umberson, and Anderson (2001) used in–depth interviews to compare 
33 male IPV perpetrators against 25 matched nonviolent men (i.e., no history of domestic 
violence). The male IPV perpetrators tended to deny their role in the violent acts by 
denying that they were batterers because they had “only abused one woman in their life” 
or “had never really beaten her.” Another portion of those interviewed blamed their 
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partner for inciting the offense and at times accused the partner of controlling or playing 
mind games. In addition, they tended to deny or avoid the victim’s physical and 
emotional injuries. According to Goodrum and colleagues (2001), avoidance may be 
more characteristic of the dysphoric/borderline type, whereas denial may be more 
characteristic of the narcissistic/antisocial type, who is traditionally the less relationship-
oriented of the two types. Comparatively, nonviolent men had more regard for both their 
partner and their relationship. These men further evinced greater empathy towards their 
partners and viewed them as a positive influence. This comparison is informative in its 
implication that differences in self–threat may be crucial to understanding the nature and 
utility of appraisals. Although there might very well be other differences between the two 
groups, like childhood adversity, personality, substance abuse, or anger management 
problems (Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Starzomski, 1993), it is worth also considering that 
the differences in self–threat as experienced by the two groups may be part of the reason 
why one group prioritizes appraisals to protect the self whereas the other group prioritizes 
affiliation and relationship preservation.   
Wood (2004) grouped appraisals into three categories: justifications, 
dissociations, and regrets. Justifications involved taking responsibility but explaining that 
the violence was appropriate, necessary, or within the perpetrator’s right. Themes 
included under this category were “she disrespected me as a man,” “man has a right to 
control/discipline his woman,” and “she provoked me.” Dissociations reflected ways in 
which male perpetrators attempted to dissociate or disconnect the self from what they 
perceived “real abusers” to be. For example, participants explained that they were not the 
abusive types because, unlike “real abusers,” they did not enjoy hurting women. In 
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contrast to prior research, which has categorized childhood trauma, anger issues, or 
drug/alcohol abuse as “excuses,” or classified statements such as “my violence was 
limited” as minimizations, Wood (2004) argues that these appraisals may be better 
understood from the perpetrator’s perspective as attempts at separating the self from the 
violent act. That IPV perpetrators would be motivated to seek this kind of separation or 
distance from their violent act appears suggestive of their motivation to self–protect from 
the threatening implication that they might be a “real abuser.” The final category includes 
regrets, which were replete with statements of shame and guilt (e.g., “I was ashamed. I 
felt less than a man when I did those things” (Wood, 2004). The relevance of Wood’s 
work goes beyond its grouping of appraisals; the categories she proposes incorporate a 
traditional view of masculinity as dominance, which was tellingly endorsed by all 
participants. Once again then, personality appears crucial to understanding why 
appraisals emerge (e.g., in response to challenges to masculine ideals) and the form they 
take (e.g., dissociations or justifications).   
A few studies have more explicitly connected appraisals to autobiographical 
memory through the use of autobiographical narratives. In a study by Baumeister et al. 
(1990), undergraduate participants (gender composition not reported) were asked to each 
provide a narrative of a time in which they had been angered (victim narratives) and an 
account of a time in which they had angered someone else (perpetrator narratives). Not 
surprisingly, perpetrators more so than victims were more likely to deny any lasting 
negative consequences stemming from their acts. Perpetrator narratives hinted at greater 
closure by referencing “happy endings” or apologies, and also portrayed their acts as 
isolated incidents, whereas victim narratives referred to long–lasting negative 
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consequences and an ongoing sense of loss. Regarding motives, perpetrators viewed their 
actions as motivated by impulsivity, uncontrollability, or caused by external or mitigating 
causes; some even portrayed the victim as partly responsible for their actions. The current 
study is relevant not only because of its use of autobiographical narratives to essentially 
replicate the various appraisals emerging out of the IPV literature, but also because it 
crucially emphasizes how different appraisals (e.g., casting the event as an isolated 
incident with no ties to the present in order to protect oneself) may be embedded in 
autobiographical narratives. 
Dating Violence and Marital Violence  
 As stated earlier, the IPV literature reviewed here is not intended to reflect the full 
breadth of the IPV literature. Rather, the literature selected is drawn upon because IPV 
events arguably create conditions under which dissonance-reducing appraisals may 
emerge. Despite this stated purpose, it nonetheless is important to caution that the 
literature presented thus far has drawn primarily from work on marital violence and may 
not necessarily extend or apply to dating violence or to female perpetrators.  
Some similarities have been noted between dating and marital violence, including 
the notion of a continuity of violence that starts during the dating period and extends to 
the marriage period (Shorey, Cornelius, & Bell, 2008). Other have argued, however, that 
while dating violence may be a precursor to marital violence in some cases, there are also 
other cases in which this continuity hypothesis is not supported (Follingstad, Bradley, 
Laughlin, & Burke, 1999). Other similarities noted between the types of aggression 
include, among others, poor communication skills, alcohol use, and jealousy (Follingstad, 
Wright, Lloyd, & Sebastian, 1999). There are also differences between the two types of 
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violence, including the greater economic investment and emotional attachment in marital 
relationships, and the relative lack of experience and awareness of what may constitute 
violence in dating relationships (Shorey et al., 2008).  
IPV Rates  
 Similar to differences between dating and marital samples, rates of IPV often 
differ based on the type of sample (e.g., community samples of adults versus university 
student samples). Because the current study recruited participants from both the 
community and a university setting, rates from both types of studies are reviewed below.   
Community samples. Lifetime prevalence rates of perpetrating 
psychological/emotional abuse are understood to be higher than lifetime prevalence rates 
for perpetrating physical violence. Rates vary between 74% (Straus & Sweet, 1992) and 
75% in men (Stets, 1990), and between 75% (Straus & Sweet, 1992) and 80% in women 
(Stets, 1990). Other studies that have examined couples have found prevalence rates of 
psychological/emotional abuse closer to 97% (Taft et al., 2006). 
In terms of physical violence, Desmarais and colleagues (Desmarais, Reeves, 
Nicholls, Telford, & Fiebert, 2012) provided pooled prevalence estimates for studies that 
used large population samples. They found that in the past year, male-perpetrated 
physical violence reached 18.3%, whereas female-perpetrated physical violence reached 
25.8%. These numbers were comparable to the college and university samples (i.e., 
20.9% and 27.6% respectively). The prevalence rates in studies using clinical samples, 
however, were predictably higher, with past-year prevalence rates of 34.1% for male-
perpetrated physical violence and 49.5% for female-perpetrated physical violence.  
Desmarais and colleagues also provided lifetime pooled estimates of physical 
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violence. They found that male-perpetrated physical violence in college and university 
samples reached 18.4%, whereas female-perpetrated physical violence reached 30.0%. 
The prevalence rates in studies using clinical samples were again predictably higher, with 
lifetime prevalence rate of 41.6% for male-perpetrated physical violence and 42.6% for 
female-perpetrated physical violence.  
Undergraduate samples. Regarding emotional and psychological abuse, male–
on–female lifetime perpetration, as measured by the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale, was 
reported by 82% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For minor forms of 
psychological dating violence, lifetime prevalence rates for male–on–female are around 
85.7% (e.g., insulting or swearing at a partner); whereas for more severe forms, 
prevalence rates are around 30.2% (e.g., destroying something belonging to the partner; 
Cerone, Beach, & Arias, 2005. Based on the past 12 months, prevalence rates for male–
on–female perpetration show that 59% of male undergraduate students report minor 
psychological/emotional violence (as rated on the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale) and 
22% report more severe psychological/emotional violence (Scott & Straus, 2007).  
Regarding physical violence, lifetime prevalence rate for male–on–female 
perpetration was reported by 29% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For 
minor forms of physical violence (e.g., pushing a partner), the lifetime perpetration rate 
ranges between 26% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to 36% (Cercone et al., 2005;), whereas 
for more severe forms (e.g., beating up a partner), lifetime perpetration rate ranges 
between 7% (Cercone et al., 2005; Scott & Straus, 2007)) and 10.5% (Hines & Saudino, 
2003), and 11% (Scott & Strauss, 2007).  
Regarding sexual violence, male–on–female lifetime perpetration was reported by 
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15% (Scott & Straus, 2007) to 29% of male undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). 
Minor forms of male-on-female sexual coercion were reported by 15% of male 
undergraduates (Scott & Straus, 2007), whereas more severe forms of sexual coercion 
were reported by 7% of male undergraduates (Scott & Straus, 2007). 
Regarding emotional or psychological abuse, lifetime perpetration of female–on–
male was reported by 86% of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). For minor 
forms of emotional and psychological abuse, lifetime prevalence rates are around 89.3%; 
for more severe forms of emotional and psychological abuse, rates are around 26.7% 
(Cercone et al., 2005). Based on the past 12 months, prevalence rates for female–on–male 
perpetration show that 53% of female undergraduate students report minor 
psychological/emotional violence and 23% report more severe psychological/emotional 
violence (Scott & Straus, 2007). 
Regarding physical violence, lifetime female-on-male perpetration was reported 
by 13.5% of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003).  For minor forms of 
physical violence, the lifetime perpetration rate ranges from 28% (Scott & Strauss, 2007), 
to 34% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to 38.7% (Cercone et al., 2005), whereas for more 
severe forms, lifetime perpetration rate ranges between 7.5% (Hines & Saudino, 2003) to 
15.1% (Cercone et al., 2005). Prevalence rates for the past 12 months were 28% of 
female undergraduates admitting to a minor physical IPV and 15% admitting to a more 
severe physical IPV (Scott & Straus, 2007). 
Regarding sexual violence, female–on–male perpetration was reported by 13.5% 
of female undergraduates (Hines & Saudino, 2003). Comparable values were obtained by 
Scott and Straus (2007), who found a 20% prevalence rate for minor sexual coercive acts 
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and 11% prevalence rate for more severe sexual coercive acts. 
Cumulatively, these prevalence rates suggest that male and female perpetration 
rates for psychological/emotional and physical IPV are relatively comparable, although 
the context in which the violence occurred, the motive for it, and the severity of injury are 
not accounted for by these data (Miller, 2011). In fact, even though a number of studies 
in this area have found women to be significantly more likely to perpetrate physical IPV 
than men (Archer, 2000; Desmarais et al., 2012; Miller, 2011), men are significantly 
more likely to have injured their partners (Archer, 2000). Regarding sexual coercion, the 
perpetration rates demonstrate that men are significantly more likely to engage in this act 
than women.  
IPV Appraisals 
Denial, minimization, and similar appraisals have received extensive empirical 
attention among clinical/forensic samples. Much more limited attention has been 
dedicated to these appraisals among nonclinical/community/student samples.  
Miller (2011) argued that failure to admit to perpetration of IPV or identify 
oneself as a victim of IPV may be influenced by appraisals, such as denial or 
minimization. In support of this hypothesis, she found that the majority of undergraduate 
participants in her sample (a) failed to initially self–identify as perpetrators or victims 
despite later endorsing having committed and/or experienced IPV on a rating scale that 
labels specific acts as such (i.e., the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale; Straus, Hamby, 
Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996), and (b) minimized abuse by perceiving it as 
acceptable, effective, appropriate, or necessary, which was significantly linked to abuse 
perpetration in both men and women. In other words, male and female undergraduate 
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perpetrators endorsed attitudes that minimized acts of IPV. The extent to which such 
attitudes were endorsed, however, differed between men and women. In fact, men were 
more likely than women to hold beliefs that abuse was an effective, acceptable, 
appropriate, and necessary way of resolving conflict in dating relationships. 
Scott and Straus (2007) also examined appraisals in an undergraduate sample. 
They created scale items to assess blaming one’s partner for relationship difficulties (e.g., 
“My partner exaggerates negative things I have done in our relationship)”, 
minimizing/avoiding relationship difficulties (“After my partner and I fight, I try not to 
think about it”), and denial of personal contribution to relationship problems (“I have 
never said or done anything that hurt my partner.”). After controlling for social 
desirability, the authors found that male and female perpetrators of psychological and 
physical violence tended to blame their partners for relationship difficulties. They also 
found that male perpetrators of physical assault and sexual coercion tended to minimize 
relationship difficulties. In terms of gender differences and consistent with Miller’s 
(2011) findings, Scott and Straus showed that male students were more likely to deny the 
seriousness of problems in relationships than female students.  Although this study is 
informative regarding the use of appraisal among undergraduate students, these 
appraisals refer to relationship difficulties in general rather than IPV.  
Bryant and Spencer (2003) used the vignette-based Domestic Violence Blame 
Scale to assess attributions of blame to victims of domestic violence among a sample of 
university students. They found that male students were more likely to blame the victim 
for causing the domestic incident than female students. They also found that students who 
had perpetrated violence in dating relationships were more likely to blame the victim for 
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the domestic incident. The Bryant and Spencer study inches closer towards assessing 
IPV-related appraisals (i.e., victim-blaming) among undergraduates, but participants’ 
reactions and ensuing appraisals may be limited by the vignette-based nature of the scale. 
Even though there are numerous studies that have explored IPV-related appraisals among 
domestic offenders and/or treatment-seekers, few studies to date have delved into IPV-
related appraisals in undergraduate/community samples. 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
 Building on the work of Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the primary objective of 
this study is to demonstrate that increasing self–threat heightens cognitive dissonance and 
appraisal use. To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to induce different levels of self–
threat, and then observe how this manipulation impacted appraisals. Variations in self–
threat were accomplished by exposing each participant to two counterbalanced 
conditions. In the high self–threat condition, participants were instructed to describe a 
past event of them engaging in IPV. In the low self–threat condition, they were instructed 
to describe a past event of them engaging in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding act 
in a relationship context. This manipulation was modeled after the shame– and pride–
inducing conditions of D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008). 
Three appraisals of importance were measured: (a) perceived closure from event, 
(b) perceived importance of event, and (c) derogation of past selves. It was expected that 
the high self–threat condition would activate (a) greater perceived closure, (b) lower 
perceived importance scores and (c) greater derogation of past selves, relative to the low 
self–threat condition.  
Regarding appraisals of veridicality (i.e., accuracy and occurrence), consistent 
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with Scoboria et al. (2014), it was expected that the high self–threat condition would 
evoke more reduced or relinquished belief that the event genuinely occurred to the self. 
In other words, when participants were instructed to report on the likelihood that they 
personally experienced a past IPV event (for example), they were expected to produce 
lower ratings in the high self–threat condition relative to the low self–threat condition. If 
the results were consistent with this hypothesis, it would suggest that participants might 
be attempting to go beyond putting the threatening event at arms’ length to denying its 
occurrence. It also is possible that participants demonstrate lower accuracy ratings under 
conditions of high self–threat. This latter hypothesis was inspired by D’Argembeau and 
Van der Linden (2008), who found higher ratings of “I believe the event in my memory 
really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated 
anything that did not occur” in pride–inducing relative to shame–inducing memories, 
suggesting that the more threatening memories may also be defended against by reducing 
belief in occurrence and/or accuracy. Otherwise stated, when participants were instructed 
to report on whether they had any doubts about the accuracy of the past event (for 
example), they were expected to produce lower ratings in the high self–threat condition 
relative to the low self–threat condition. If confirmed, the results would imply that 
participants have more doubts about the extent to which their current recollection 
corresponds to what actually happened when cued to recall a past threatening event.  
The second objective of Study 2 was to investigate how personality variables 
affected the intensity of appraisals. Of particular interest here were individuals scoring 
high on the Assured–Dominant scale of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and those 
scoring high on shame–proneness. Both these personality styles were expected to be 
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accompanied by (a) greater perceived closure, (b) lower perceived importance, (c) greater 
derogation of past selves, (d) lower belief in occurrence scores, and (e) lower belief in 
accuracy scores.  
Study 2 hypotheses are summarized as follows: 
1. Relative to exposure to the low self–threat condition, exposure to the high self–threat 
condition would produce: (a) lower scores on perceived importance, (b) greater 
derogation of past selves, (c) higher scores on perceived closure, (d) lower scores of 
belief in occurrence, and (e) lower scores of belief in accuracy.  
2.   In the high self–threat condition, higher shame–proneness would predict (a) lower 
scores on perceived importance, (b) greater derogation of past selves, (c) higher 
scores on perceived closure, (d) lower scores of belief in occurrence, and (e) lower 
scores of belief in accuracy. 
3. In the high self–threat condition, higher Assured–Dominance would predict (a) higher 
scores on perceived closure, (b) lower scores on perceived importance, (c) greater 
derogation of past selves, (d) lower scores of belief in occurrence, and (e) lower 
scores of belief in accuracy. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants  
The first wave of recruitment was carried out online through the Psychology 
Participant Pool at the University of Windsor and yielded 60 male and 59 female 
participants. A second wave of recruitment was carried out online through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, and yielded 62 men and 58 women. The dataset originally consisted of 
239 participants (122 men, 117 women). Of those, 12 were excluded because they had 
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not provided a high–threat account, three were excluded because their account suggested 
that they had been victims rather than perpetrators, and three were excluded because they 
had responded appropriately to the situation (e.g., asked to leave the situation, there was a 
discussion but no shouting or yelling was involved). Of note, 16 of the 18 excluded cases 
involved participants from the student sample.  
The remaining 221 participants passed both validity checks; a simple math 
question and a spelling question. Their median time–to–completion was 48 minutes and 2 
seconds, with the fastest taking close to 15 minutes to complete the survey. No cases 
were excluded based on time–to–completion because of a slow and steady increase in 
times that was suggestive of normal within–subject variance.  
The overall sample was composed of 111 men and 110 women, and had a mean 
age of 27.22 (Mdn = 25, SD = 8.59, range 18– 62). The majority of participants self–
identified as White (n = 161, 72.9%), followed by Multiracial (n = 23, 10.0%), Black (n = 
14, 6.3%), East Asian (n = 9, 4.1%), South Asian (n = 5, 2.3%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 4, 
1.8%), Middle Eastern (n = 4, 1.8%), and Pacific Islander (n = 1, 0.5%). The highest 
level of education completed was Professional degree (n = 1, 5%) or Doctorate degree (n 
= 1, 5%), followed by Master’s degree (n = 16, 7.2%), Bachelor’s degree (n = 60, 
27.1%), Community college (n = 33, 14.9%) and high school or equivalent (n = 110, 
49.8%).  
In order to protect participant anonymity, geographic location tracking was 
deactivated on Fluid surveys. Prior studies using Mechanical Turk in Dr. Scoboria’s lab, 
however, have indicated that the majority of participants come from North America. 
Participants whose Mechanical Turk account was affiliated with India were excluded 
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from this study because of the large proportion of these individuals not comprehending 
similar tasks in prior projects conducted in Dr. Scoboria’s lab. 
When comparing students to MTurk participants, statistically significant 
differences emerged in age, Mann–Whitney U z = –11.65, p < .001, with students being 
on average about 10 years younger than MTurk participants.  
Measures (see Appendix G for a complete list of measures for Study 2) 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS is a 20–item self–report instrument widely used to assess two 
dominant dimensions of emotional experience: Positive Affect and Negative Affect. The 
20 items reflect 10 positive and 10 negative mood states. Participants were instructed to 
rate the extent to which they experience each mood state on a 5–point Likert–type scale 
(1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = very much). Researchers can choose the temporal 
reference they want participants to use. For the present study, the instructions directed 
participants to report the extent to which they felt a certain way "right now (that is, at the 
present moment)" (Watson et al., 1988). A Positive Affect score was computed by 
averaging across the 10 items that make up this dimension, with higher scores indicative 
of higher levels of positive affect. Similarly, a Negative Affect score was computed by 
averaging across the 10 items that make up this dimension, with higher scores indicative 
of higher levels of negative affect. Both the Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales 
have demonstrated high internal consistency, alpha = .89 and alpha = .85 respectively 
(Watson et al., 1988). In this study, the alpha for the Positive Affect scale ranged from 
.89 (high self-threat) to .91 (low self-threat). The alpha for the Negative Affect scale 
ranged from .91 (high self-threat) to .93 (low self-threat). 
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In the present investigation, the PANAS was used as a manipulation check 
administered after a target event had been described. Specifically, the high self–threat 
condition was expected to produce a higher Negative Affect score and a higher 
“ashamed” score than the low self–threat condition. Conversely, the low self–threat 
condition was expected to produce a higher Positive Affect score and a higher “proud” 
score than the high self–threat condition.  
Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). The Centrality of Event 
Scale is a 20–item self–report instrument that measures the extent to which a past event is 
appraised as central to a person’s life story and identity. Participants are asked to rate on 
a 5–point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) statements about the 
subjective impact of a past event (e.g., “This event has colored the way I think and feel 
about other experiences”). The Total Centrality score is obtained by averaging across all 
20 items, with higher scores indicative of greater importance attributions. The scale has 
demonstrated good internal consistency, alpha = .94. In the current study, the Centrality 
of Event Scale was used to gauge the degree to which participants appraise the target 
event as important to their identity and life story. Under both high self-threat and low 
self-threat condition, the alpha for the 20 Centrality of Event Scale items was .95. 
Measures of belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy. The three items used 
in Scoboria, Jackson, et al., (2014) were also used here to assess belief in the occurrence 
of an event (i.e., autobiographical belief that the event truly occurred to the self). Two of 
the times are scored on a 7–point scale, whereas the third item is scored on an 8–point 
scale. The three items are averaged (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014), with higher scores 
indicative of stronger autobiographical belief.  In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha 
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for belief in occurrence was between .77 (high self-threat) and .78 (low self-threat). 
Belief in accuracy, which broadly refers to attributions made about the degree to 
which the contents of a current mental representation correspond to the details that in fact 
occurred in the past, were captured by using three items from Scoboria et al. (2014). 
These items assess confidence in the accuracy of the memory, proportion of memory that 
is accurate, and doubts as to the accuracy of the memory, on 7–point scales. The items 
are averaged, and higher scores are indicative of greater confidence in the accuracy of 
one’s own memory. In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for belief in accuracy 
ranged between .81 (high self-threat) and .85 (low self-threat). Measures of belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence were used to capture participant’s appraisals of the 
veridicality of target events. 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). This scale 
consists of 27 personal characteristics compiled by McFarland and Alvaro (2000; see the 
General Introduction for a brief review of this study). Participants are asked to rate their 
current and pre–event selves on each personal characteristic on a 9–point Likert type 
scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). Items are averaged separately for the current and 
pre–event selves to obtain two overall scores, with higher scores indicative of more 
positive ratings of personal characteristics. McFarland and Alvaro reported good internal 
consistency for the two overall indices (alpha = .91 for current self; alpha = .89 for pre–
event self). This measure was used to index the extent to which participants devalue their 
past selves. Derogation of past selves emerges when the average pre–event self score is 
lower than the average current self score. In the current study, alpha was .96 (current self 
and pre-event self) under the high self-threat condition and .95 (current self) and .94 (pre-
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event self) respectively under the low self-threat condition. 
Sense of Closure Scale (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009). This is a 6–
item self–report scale that measures perceived psychological distance or closure. 
Participants are asked to respond to each scale item on a 7–point Likert type scale (1 = 
not at all; 7 = very much). The six items, including two that are reverse-scored, are 
averaged to produce a single score of perceived closure. Higher scores are indicative of 
greater perceived psychological closure. The total score has shown adequate internal 
consistency (alpha = .88; Beike, Adams, & Naufel, 2010.). The scale was used to index 
participants’ perceived psychological closure regarding the target event. In the current 
study, alpha was .87 in the high self-threat condition and .74 in the low self-threat 
condition. After exploring inter-item correlations, it became apparent that item 6 (“I just 
wish I could figure out why this event happened”) did not relate in predictable ways to 
the other scale items. If excluded, alpha values climbed to .90 in the high self-threat 
condition and .77 in the low self-threat condition. Because the nature of meaning making 
can be conceptually distinct from perceived psychological distance and closure (although 
there is likely overlap), item 6 was dropped, and the mean of Sense of Closure was 
calculated based on the five items that held better together. This 5-item Sense of Closure 
was referenced throughout this manuscript as Sense of Closure Scale-5 to differentiate it 
from the original scale that the participants completed.  
Test of Self–Conscious Affect–3 (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 
2000). The Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 is a well–known and widely used self–report 
instrument that uses brief scenarios to capture dispositional tendencies towards 
experiencing shame and/or guilt. It consists of 15 scenarios (10 negative, 5 positive), with 
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each scenario being followed by a set of statements rated on a 5–point Likert type scale 
(1 = not likely; 5 = very likely). A shorter 11–scenario version of the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect–3 has also been validated and was used for this study. 
Participants are instructed to read each scenario and imagine themselves in it. 
They are thereafter asked to indicate how likely they are to act in each of the ways 
described. For example, one of the scenarios is: “You are driving down the road, and you 
hit a small animal.” Participants are then asked to rate the following statements: “You 
would think the animal shouldn’t have been on the road” (scored as externalization); 
“You would think: I’m terrible” (scored as shame); “You’d feel: “Well, it was an 
accident” (scored as detached); “You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down 
on the road (scored as guilt).” Answers are summed across scenarios to yield indices of 
Shame–Proneness, Guilt–Proneness, Externalization of blame, and 
Detachment/Unconcern. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 subscales have 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (.71 for the shame subscale in Kivisto, 
Kivisto, Moore, & Rhatigan, 2011; .73 for the shame subscale in the current study). Only 
trait shame–proneness was used in the current investigation, with higher scores indicative 
of higher levels of shame.  
Physical Aggression and Psychological Aggression Scales (Kwong, 
Bartholomew, Henderson, & Trinke, 2003). The Physical Aggression Scale is a 14–
item self–report instrument modeled after the widely used Revised Conflict Tactics 
Scales. Participants are asked to report whether each of the 14 items have happened to 
them, and if so, to indicate its frequency in the past 12 months (1 = 1 incident, 2 = 2 
incidents, 3 = 3–5 incidents, 4 = 6–10 incidents, 5 = 11–20 incidents, 6 = more than 20 
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incidents). According to Kwong et al. (2003), the scale can be scored dichotomously in 
terms of ever perpetrated violence and currently perpetrating violence. It is also possible 
to compute two continuous scores; one is a variety score computed by summing the total 
number of different categories endorsed. For example, if a participant reported slapping 
their partner three times and pushing them five times, they would receive a variety score 
of two because they endorsed two different acts. The other is a weighted frequency score 
based on summing the 1–through–6 ratings across all items. The alpha for the Physical 
Aggression Scale was .94. Authors suggest that variety scores tend to perform better 
statistically than weighted frequency scores. 
The Psychological Aggression Scale is a 13–item self–report instrument based on 
the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus et al., 1996) as well as the Psychological 
Maltreatment of Women Inventory (Tolman, 1999). The instructions and scoring 
methodology for this scale are analogous to the ones used for the Physical Aggression 
Scale. The alpha for this Psychological Aggression Scale was .89. Both scales were used 
in this study to assess self–reported rates of physical and psychological aggression.  
Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales is a self–report measure that assesses interpersonal traits based on the circumplex 
model of personality, which posits that interpersonal traits can be located along two 
principal orthogonal dimensions: Dominance (which ranges from submissive to dominant 
and controlling) and Nurturance (which ranges from cold and hostile to warm and 
friendly). Participants are instructed to rate a list of 64 adjectives (e.g., “timid”) on an 8–
point Likert scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 8 = extremely likely) based on how accurately 
each adjective describes them. There are eight adjectives that contribute to each of the 
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eight octants: Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, Cold–Hearted, Aloof–
Introverted, Unassured–Submissive, Unassuming–Ingenuous, Warm–Agreeable, and 
Gregarious–Extraverted. Octant scores for each participant are computed by averaging 
across the eight adjective scores contributing to that particular octant. A Dominance score 
and a Nurturance score can also be computed for each participant based on their octant z 
scores and weights specified in the scoring manual (Wiggins, 1995). The Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties (Wiggins, 1995). In 
the present study, the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and in particular the Assured–
Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–Hearted octants were used to gauge 
narcissistic traits (Miller et al., 2012; Wiggins, 1995). A diagram of the interpersonal 
circumplex is included in Appendix B to aid in interpretation.  
Procedure 
Participant pool recruitment. Participants were screened for eligibility through 
the Psychology Participant Pool website by answering the following question: “With 
respect to your current or past partner, have you ever threatened, attempted, or completed 
any of the following: shouted, insulted, name–called, threw something at them, pushed or 
shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex” 
(see Appendix F). This wording was chosen to reflect the definition of IPV as 
psychological/emotional abuse, physical or sexual violence, or threat of physical or 
sexual violence used by Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon, and Shelley (2002). Those 
responding affirmatively to this screener were deemed eligible for participation. Only 
eligible participants saw the study advertisement on the Participant Pool website. Those 
interested in the study description clicked on an URL link, which directed them to the 
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Letter of Information on the Fluid Surveys site. Participants provided consent by 
continuing on in the online survey.  
Amazon Mechanical Turk recruitment. The study was advertised on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, which invited individuals who could think of a specific time in which 
they acted in a kind, supportive, and/or understanding way towards a past or present 
romantic partner or date AND a specific time in which they engaged in any of the 
following with a past or present romantic partner or date: shouted, insulted, name–called, 
threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, kicked, 
punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex. Those interested accessed a link that directed 
them to Turkitron, a tool that screens Turk workers for eligibility for studies and directs 
eligible workers to survey links. For the current study, eligible workers were directed to 
the landing page of the survey and presented with the Letter of Information. They 
provided consent by continuing on in the online survey. Workers deemed ineligible were 
informed that they do not meet the criteria for the study and instructed to return to Turk 
to remove themselves from the task.  
Procedure following initial recruitment. Eligible participants were randomly 
and automatically assigned to start with either the low self–threat condition or the high 
self–threat condition. The order of presentation of the two conditions was 
counterbalanced. In the high self–threat condition, participants were instructed to “Select 
a time that you expressed, enacted, perpetrated, inflicted or threatened to do any of the 
following to your partner/girlfriend/boyfriend/wife/husband/date: shouted, insulted, 
name–called, threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, 
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex. Please describe in as much detail as 
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you can this event, including (a) what you said/did, (b) why you did what you did, (c) 
how you felt at the time, and (d) how you saw yourself at the time.” In the low self–threat 
condition, participants were instructed to “Select a time that you acted in a kind, 
supportive, and/or understanding way in the context of an intimate relationship (e.g., 
surprised the other with a gift or a dinner, purchased flowers). Please describe in as much 
detail as you can this event, including: (a) what you said/did, (b) why you did what you 
did, (c) how you felt at the time, and (d) how you saw yourself at the time.”  
Although modeled after the pride– and shame–inducing conditions of 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), the prompts did not specifically reference 
“shame” because doing so might prime shame and potentially trigger defensive 
responses. Participants were instead instructed to select a past event involving IPV–
related behaviours. To make the prompts as parallel as possible, “pride” was also not 
explicitly referenced; it was instead replaced with instructions that asked about 
supportive and kind behaviours within a relationship context. The wording of the low 
self–threat prompt was inspired by Ross and Wilson (2002), who refer to a “kind act” 
when directing participants to write about an event that made them feel “quite proud 
(e.g., a special achievement or kind act)” (p. 798). Asking for specific details to be 
included in the narratives, as well as the wording itself, were taken from Wood (2004).  
After describing the first target event (either the low self–threat or the high self–
threat event), participants were instructed to complete the PANAS as a manipulation 
check, followed by the Centrality of Event Scale, measures of belief in accuracy, and 
belief in occurrence, the Personal Attributes Rating Scale, and the Sense of Closure 
Scale-5 (see Appendix H for the exact order of measures). At this point in the survey, 
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participants were presented with the prompt for the second target event, after which they 
again completed the PANAS, Centrality of Event Scale, measures of Belief in Accuracy, 
and Belief in Occurrence, the Personal Attributes Rating Scale, the Sense of Closure 
Scale-5, and demographic information. Participants completed a positive mood induction 
task right after the high self–threat event. The mood induction consisted of asking 
participants to describe a positive memory that they believe truly occurred. After being 
exposed to both conditions, participants completed the Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3, 
the Psychological and Physical Aggression Scales, and the Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales.  
At the end of the survey, participants from the Participant Pool provided their 
name and UWindsor email, which was used to award them course credit. At the end of 
the survey, participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provided their Mechanical Turk 
ID in order to receive compensation ($4.00). After completing this page, participants 
were thanked for their participation and provided with a list of resources in case the 
disclosure surrounding the high self–threat event was upsetting or distressful for them. 
This investigation was set up as a repeated measures design because neither 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), nor the few other studies that have examined 
positively and negatively–valenced memories (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011) or 
self–consistent and self–discrepant memories (e.g., Mutluturk & Tekcan, 2015) within–
subjects have reported any carryover effects. In addition, the survey was administered 
online because this method allows for larger sample sizes to be collected more efficiently. 
Furthermore, prior research has indicated that rates of disclosure regarding sensitive 
topics are higher when online methods are used (Joinson, 2001).  
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Although anonymity could not be guaranteed in this investigation, the online 
method did offer visual anonymity, meaning that the source of the information could not 
be physically detected. This component of online data collection has been proposed as an 
important consideration in facilitating self–disclosure (Joinson, 2001). Given that this 
investigation asked for instances of IPV to be described in some detail, it was especially 
important for participants to feel comfortable enough to disclose acts that may not only 
be shame–inducing for them but also potentially illegal. This level of disclosure could 
arguably be better achieved through online rather than in–person methods. There are 
certainly costs to implementing an online survey, including a limited ability to monitor 
participants’ environment and/or level of engagement. In light of the relatively sensitive 
nature of this investigation, however, the advantages appeared to outweigh the 
disadvantages of conducting the survey online. In addition, manipulation checks were 
embedded throughout the survey (e.g., simple math questions) and survey completion 
times were checked to ensure completion quality.  
In order to ensure as sincere a disclosure of IPV acts as possible, participants were 
assured of the confidentiality of their results at the informed consent stage, and notified 
that there was no legal or ethical duty to report on any admission to violent act(s) 
perpetrated within an intimate partner or dating relationship. Further, they were cautioned 
against including any identifying information in their narratives. Participants’ responses 
were safeguarded at every stage of research, from data collection to its use, 
dissemination, and retention. The security of the data itself was ensured through several 
security protocols, including storing the data on secure servers and back–up drives 
located in Canada. Although student participant name and email was initially requested to 
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ensure compensation for participation, this information was discarded as soon as the 
quality of completion was evaluated and the compensation was awarded. Turk 
participants were largely (but not completely) anonymous to the researchers. The only 
partly identifying information collected were participants’ Turk IDs (i.e., a string of 
letters and numbers), which cannot be tracked to real names/identities by researchers 
using the Turk service.  
At the consent stage and throughout the online survey, participants had the right 
to refuse to answer questions or withdraw from the study. Moreover, the principal 
investigator’s email was made available in case participants wish to contact her with 
questions regarding disclosure (or otherwise). At the post–study stage, participants were 
provided with a list of resources in case the disclosure surrounding the high self–threat 
event was upsetting or distressful for them. Importantly, past research suggests that 
participating in dating violence research, despite some mild negative reaction reported by 
the more frequent male perpetrators of psychological and physical IPV, is beneficial to 
both male and female perpetrators, who report gaining greater insight into themselves and 
their relationships (Shorey, Cornelius, & Bell, 2011). This study received clearance from 
the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board. 
Study 2 Results 
Data Analysis Plan 
All analyses were conducting using SPSS 21. Prior to any statistical analyses, data 
were checked against corresponding statistical assumptions; only violations and 
corrections are reported in the appropriate sections below. Whenever possible, 
bootstrapping with 5000 samples was used to calculate statistics of interest. In light of the 
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relatively novel and exploratory nature of this study, the alpha level was set at .05. 
Missing Data  
A missing values analysis revealed a relatively low amount of missing data (i.e., 
2.7% or lower per variable) and the items missing appeared to be distributed randomly 
(Little’s MCAR test χ2(49569) = 113.32, p = 1.00). Mean Belief in Occurrence, Mean Belief 
in Accuracy, and Mean Centrality of Event Scale were computed with the data available; 
no replacement values were used because these are average–based rather than summative 
indices.  In the case of summative indices (i.e., PANAS, Test of Self-Conscious Affect–
3), missing values were replaced using the series mean (i.e., the mean of that variable 
across the dataset). This was deemed appropriate given the low amount of data missing 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). As a check, analyses were run using either series means or 
pairwise deletion; the resulting statistics were very similar but the distribution of scores 
in the lower end was superior when using the series mean method. This method of 
replacing missing data was therefore retained and used in the analyses presented below. 
Missing values on the Interpersonal Adjective Scales were handled based on the 
recommendations from the manual (Wiggins, 1995), which are based on normed data. 
Specifically, a participant profile was deemed valid if at least six of the eight octant 
adjectives were present and fewer than five items were missing in the entire Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales. Based on these criteria, two additional cases were excluded from the 
total of 221 whenever Interpersonal Adjective Scales variables were used in the analyses.  
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the cases retained (n = 221) versus 
the cases excluded from the analyses (n = 20) revealed some predictable significant 
differences only in the high self-threat condition, including Positive and Negative Affect 
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Scale – Negative Affect, Personal Attributes Rating Scale, Belief in Accuracy, Belief in 
Occurrence, Psychological Aggression, and Physical Aggression. Analyses were 
conducted both with and without the excluded cases and the finding remained 
comparable. Only the analyses with the excluded cases are presented below.  
Manipulation Check 
 To check whether the high self–threat and low self–threat manipulation was 
successful, the PANAS administered immediately after the high self–threat condition was 
compared to the PANAS administered immediately after the low self–threat condition. 
As expected, the high self–threat condition produced significantly higher PANAS–
Negative Affect scores than the low self–threat condition, mean difference = 5.45 [95% 
CI 4.46, 6.43], t (220) = 11.17, bootstrapped p < .001. The high self–threat condition also 
produced lower PANAS–Positive Affect scores than the low self–threat condition, mean 
difference = –4.35 [–5.32, –3.40], t (220) = –8.80, bootstrapped p < .001.  
 As an additional manipulation check, the PANAS–shame and PANAS–pride 
items were also consulted across the two conditions. PANAS–shame was significantly 
higher in the high self–threat condition relative to the low self–threat condition, mean 
difference = 0.95 [0.78; 1.11], t (220) = 11.48, bootstrapped p < .001. In contrast, 
PANAS–pride was significantly lower in the high self–threat condition relative to the low 
self–threat condition, mean difference = –1.07 [–1.26; –0.89], t (220) = –11.42, 
bootstrapped p < .001. 
 To check whether gender and/or participant recruitment source was related to 
PANAS ratings, a mixed–design ANOVA [condition (within–factor, high self–threat or 
low self–threat) x gender (between–factor, male or female) x recruitment source 
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(between–factor, student or MTurk)] was conducted separately for PANAS–Negative 
Affect and PANAS–Positive Affect. For PANAS–Negative Affect, there was a 
significant main effect for recruitment source (higher ratings in undergraduates, F = 4.50, 
p = .035), and a significant main effect for condition (higher ratings in the high self–
threat condition, F = 121.64, p < .001).  For PANAS–Positive Affect, there was a 
significant condition x recruitment source interaction (F = 6.87, p = .009) and a 
significant main effect for condition (higher ratings in low self–threat condition, F = 
75.11, p < .001). Overall, scores differed in predictable ways across the high self–threat 
and low self–threat conditions. PANAS–Negative Affect scores were significantly higher 
among undergraduates across conditions. PANAS–Positive Affect scores were 
significantly higher among MTurk participants in the low self–threat condition; PANAS–
Positive Affect ratings were comparable across participants in the high self–threat 
condition.  
Order Effects 
 A series of t-tests were run to ascertain whether the order in which the conditions 
were presented had any effect on the variables of interest. The only significant mean 
differences appeared on the PANAS – Negative Affect (high self-threat condition) and on 
the Centrality of Event Scale (high self-threat condition). Regarding the PANAS – 
Negative Affect, there were significantly higher negative affect ratings in the aftermath of 
the high self-threat condition (t = –2.69, df = 219, p = 0.12) when the high self-threat 
condition was presented second (M = 21.53, SD = 9.51) than when it was presented first 
(M = 18.44, SD = 7.48). Regarding the Centrality of Event Scale, there were significantly 
higher scores in the aftermath of the high self-threat condition (t = –2.29, df = 219, p = 
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.024) when the high self-threat condition was presented second (M = 2.70, SD = 0.94) 
than when it was presented first (M = 2.41, SD = 0.93).  
Age 
Age was investigated as to whether it should be used as a control variable in the 
analyses presented below. Mean age was 23.51 (SD = 6.35, Mdn = 22) at the time of the 
high self–threat event and 24.31 (SD = 7.35, Mdn = 22) at the time of the low self–threat. 
A paired t test revealed that high self–threat events were dated as originating from an 
objectively earlier time period than low self–threat events, t (217) = –2.60, p bootstrapped 
= .013. Neither age at the time of the high self–threat event nor age at the time of the low 
self–threat event were significantly related to any appraisals (i.e., Sense of Closure-5, 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale), suggesting limited need for age to be controlled.   
A series of Pearson r correlations were used to explore whether current participant 
age was related to any key variables. Older age was significantly related to higher 
centrality ratings (Centrality of Event Scale) in the high self–threat condition (r = .21, p = 
.002), lower externalization scores (r = –.15, p = .026), and lower psychological 
aggression frequency (r = –.15, p = .027) and variety (r = –.14, p = .037) scores.  
Rates of Physical and Psychological Aggression 
Table 1 presents rates of self–reported engagement in physical and psychological 
aggression for men and women. Approximately 30.6% of men and 46.4% of women 
reported engaging in at least one kind of physical aggression. Approximately 91.9% of 
men and 97.3% of women reported engaging in at least one kind of psychological 
aggression. Relative to men, women reported engaging in a greater variety of physical 
and psychological aggression. Women also reported significantly greater weighted 
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frequency of engaging in either form of aggression.   
 
 
 
Please refer to Table 2 for rates of endorsement of at least one incident of physical 
and psychological aggression. The Excel-based program ESCI was used to estimate 
confidence intervals around the proportion difference between men and women 
(Cumming, 2012). Women reported threatening to hit, hurt, or throw something at a 
partner significantly more so than men. Women also reported pushing or shoving, 
slapping, and punching a partner significantly more so than men. Men reported twisting a 
partner’s arm or hair and grabbing a partner or holding a partner down in anger 
significantly more so than women.  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1 
 
Rates of Self–Reported Physical and Psychological Aggression by Sex 
 
 
Men (n = 111)  Women (n = 110)  
 
M (SD) Mdn M (SD) Mdn t/z 
Physical aggression variety score 1.07 (2.52) 0.00 1.55 (2.71) 0.00 –2.33*
a 
Physical aggression weighted 
frequency score 
16.65 (8.41) 14.00 17.37 (8.67) 14.00 –2.26*a 
Psychological aggression variety 
score 
4.85 (2.85) 5.00 5.79 (2.78) 6.00 –2.49* 
Psychological aggression 
weighted frequency score 
24.82 (11.05) 22.00 28.73 (12.75) 26.00 –2.44* 
Note. a Mann–Whitney U test was used instead of a t test to check for gender differences. 
*p < .05 
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Table 2 
 
Rates of Endorsement Across Scale Items     
 
Psychological Aggression Items 
Men 
(n = 111) 
Women 
(n = 110) 
Prop. difference 
[95% CI] 
 n % n % 
 
1. Shouted or yelled at a partner 88 79.28 95 86.36 .07 [–.03; .17] 
2. Ignored, shut out, or given a partner the silent 
treatment 
85 76.58 91 82.73 .06 [–.05; .17] 
3. Called a partner hurtful names 69 62.16 80 73.39 .11 [–.01; .23] 
4. Criticized or put down a partner in front of 
others 
37 33.64 47 42.73 .09 [–.04; .22] 
5. Limited a partner’s contact with others such as 
family or friends  
18 16.22 27 24.55 .08 [–.02; .19] 
6. Controlled a partner’s behavior or activities in 
any way 
37 33.33 37 33.64 .00 [–.12; .13] 
7. Acted jealous or suspicious of a partner’s other 
relationships 
57 51.35 69 62.73 .11 [–.02; .24] 
8. Insulted or sworn at a partner 79 71.82 89 80.91 .09 [–.02; .20] 
9. Intentionally destroyed something belonging to 
a partner 
16 14.41 21 19.27 .05 [–.05; .15] 
10. Threatened to hit, hurt, or throw something at 
a partner 
11 9.91 30 27.27 .17 [.07; .27] 
11. Thrown, smashed, hit, or kicked something in 
a partner’s presence 
26 23.64 31 28.18 .05 [–.07; .16] 
12. Threatened to hurt a partner if they left the 
relationship 
5 4.63 5 4.55 .00 [–.06; .06] 
13. Threatened to hurt yourself if a partner left 
the relationship 
10 9.09 15 13.64 .05 [–.04; .13] 
Physical Aggression Items n % n %  
1. Pushed or shoved a partner 20 18.02 37 33.64 .16 [.04; .27] 
2. Slapped a partner 11 10.00 27 24.55 .15 [.05; .24] 
3. Thrown something at a partner that could hurt 8 7.27 16 14.55 .07 [–.01; .16] 
4. Twisted a partner’s arm or hair 12 10.81 4 3.64 –.07 [–.15; –.002] 
5. Used a knife or gun on a partner 2 1.82 3 2.73 .01 [–.04; .06] 
6. Punched a partner 9 8.11 20 18.18 .10 [.01; .19] 
7. Hit a partner with something that could hurt 10 9.01 12 11.01 .02 [–.06; .10] 
8. Choked a partner 4 3.64 8 7.34 .04 [–.03; .11] 
9. Slammed a partner against a wall 8 7.34 7 6.36 –.01 [–.08; .06] 
10. Beaten up a partner 2 1.83 6 5.50 .04 [–.02; .10] 
11. Grabbed a partner or held a partner down in 
anger 
17 15.45 5 4.55 –.11 [–.19; –.03] 
12. Burned or scalded a partner on purpose 5 4.50 5 4.59 .001 [–.06; .06] 
13. Kicked a partner 7 6.36 10 9.09 .03 [–.05; .10] 
14. Scratched or bitten a partner during a conflict 4 3.60 9 8.18 .05 [–.02; .12] 
Note. Percentages are based on available data. N ranged from 108 to 111 for men, and 109 to 110 for women. 
 
A series of Gender x Recruitment source ANOVAs were conducted to ascertain 
whether recruitment source, gender, or a combination of the two was relevant to the 
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physical and psychological aggression rates reported. For psychological aggression 
variety scores, there was a significant main effect for gender (F = 6.48, p = .012) and a 
significant main effect for recruitment source (F = 7.10, p = .008), but no interaction (F = 
2.34, p = .127). For psychological aggression weighted frequency scores, there was a 
significant main effect for gender (F = 6.22, p = .013) and a significant main effect for 
recruitment source (F = 12.69, p < .001), but no interaction (F = 2.41, p = .122). As was 
the case for physical aggression scores, the results suggest that women reported engaging 
in significantly greater variety and significantly higher weighted frequency of 
psychological aggression than men. The findings also suggest students reported more 
psychological aggression than MTurk participants.  
Given the positively skewed distribution of the two aggression scores, gender and 
recruitment source differences were examined through Mann–Whitney U tests. Women 
reported higher rates of engaging in physical aggression (z variety score = –2.33, p = .020; z 
weighted frequency score = –2.26, p = .023). Rates of engaging in physical aggression did not 
differ significantly between recruitment sources (z variety score = –0.81, p = .420; z weighted 
frequency score = –0.76, p = 0.447).  
Descriptives  
 Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Table 3 for the 
overall sample, as well as men and women separately. A series of t tests or Mann–
Whitney U tests (in case the Levene’s test was significant) were run to check whether 
ratings differed significantly between men and women. Significant gender differences 
were observed on the Centrality of Event Scale (low self–threat condition), Sense of 
Closure Scale-5 (high self-threat and low self-threat conditions), Test of Self-Conscious 
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Affect–3 shame–proneness, Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–
Hearted.  
Given the recruitment source differences reported earlier, descriptive statistics are 
also presented by recruitment source (see Table 3). Relative to students, MTurk 
participants gave significantly higher ratings on Centrality (both high self–threat and low 
self–threat conditions), higher ratings on Personal Attributes Rating Scale (low self–
threat condition), and lower ratings on the Assured–Dominant octant.  
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Note. a Because Levene’s test was statistically significant, the non–parametric Mann–Whitney U was run instead.  
*p < .05. **p < .001.
Table 3  
 
Descriptives of Variables of Interest 
 
 
Overall (N = 221) 
  Men 
(n = 111) 
Women  
(n = 110) 
Gender 
diff. 
MTurk 
(n = 118) 
Student 
(n = 103) 
Source 
diff. 
 
M (SD) Mdn Skew Kurt. M (SD) M (SD) t/z M (SD) M (SD) t/z 
High self threat 
Centrality of Event Scale  2.56 (0.94) 2.50 0.41 –0.37 2.52 (0.95) 2.60 (0.94) –0.63 2.76 (1.00) 2.32 (0.81) –3.41**
a 
Personal Attributes Rating 
Scale (current – pre-IPV) 
1.58 (1.70) 1.22 0.91 0.67 1.62 (1.68) 1.55 (1.73) 0.31 1.73 (1.81) 1.42 (1.55) –0.80a 
Current-self 7.01 (1.14) 7.11         
Pre-IPV self 5.42 (1.71) 5.52         
Sense of Closure Scale-5  5.03 (1.65) 5.40 -0.59 -0.59 5.30 (1.48) 4.75 (1.77) –2.27*a 5.11 (1.62) 4.93 (1.69) 0.78 
Belief in Occurrence 7.02 (0.73) 7.33 –2.91 8.36 7.02 (0.71) 7.02 (0.75) 0.04 6.97 (0.81) 7.08 (0.62) –0.28a 
Belief in Accuracy 6.21 (1.05) 6.67 –1.43 1.55 6.16 (1.05) 6.27 (1.05) –0.75 6.18 (1.12) 6.25 (0.97) –0.47 
Low self threat 
Centrality of Event Scale  2.54 (0.91) 2.47 0.53 –0.21 2.70 (0.98) 2.38 (0.82) –2.38*a 2.68 (0.98) 2.39 (0.82) –2.23*a 
Personal Attributes Rating 
Scale (current – pre-IPV) 
0.19 (0.93) 0.04 1.13 5.54 0.31 (1.03) 0.07 (0.79) 1.95 0.33 (0.99) 0.02 (0.82) 2.57* 
Current-self 6.98 (1.13) 7.00         
Pre-IPV self 6.79 (1.16) 6.74         
Sense of Closure Scale-5 4.90 (1.43) 5.00 -0.50 -0.20 5.12 (1.27) 4.68 (1.56) –2.09*a 4.98 (1.37) 4.80 (1.50) 0.94 
Belief in Occurrence 7.03 (0.81) 7.33 –3.19 9.93 7.01 (0.82) 7.05 (0.81) –0.35 6.97 (0.88) 7.10 (0.72) –0.97a 
Belief in Accuracy 6.45 (0.92) 7.00 –2.12 4.46 6.41 (0.93) 6.49 (0.91) –0.67 6.43 (0.97) 6.48 (0.85) –0.45 
Test of Self-Conscious 
Affect - shame 
34.90 (7.21) 36.00 –0.47 0.11 33.33 (6.84) 36.49 (7.26) –3.33* 34.63 (7.17) 35.21 (7.29) –0.60 
Assured Dominant  4.48 (1.32) 4.50 0.07 –0.22 4.72 (1.25) 4.25 (1.34) 2.68* 4.28 (1.39) 4.71 (1.19) –2.46* 
Arrogant Calculating  3.24 (1.46) 3.00 0.51 –0.27 3.60 (1.43) 2.87 (1.39) 3.89** 3.13 (1.48) 3.36 (1.42) –1.18 
Cold Hearted  2.59 (2.13) 2.13 1.13 0.97 2.88 (1.51) 2.30 (1.23) 3.09*a 2.72 (1.46) 2.45 (1.34) 1.38 
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Main Analyses 
Hypothesis 1: Relative to exposure to the low self–threat condition, exposure to 
the high self–threat condition was expected to produce: (a) lower Centrality of Event 
Scale scores, (b) higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of 
Closure Scale scores, (d) lower Belief in Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in 
Accuracy scores.  
Prior to running the paired t tests, difference scores were checked for gender 
differences and recruitment source differences. The only significant finding involved 
male and female difference scores on Centrality. Because of the gender differences in 
Sense of Closure Scale-5 scores, results for men and women are also presented 
separately. Finally, given the leptokurtic distribution of Belief in Accuracy and Belief in 
Occurrence, difference scores for only these two variables were subjected to a 
nonparametric paired test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks.  
As expected, when exposed to the high self–threat condition (i.e., recalling 
perpetration of an IPV event), participants reported greater derogation of past selves, 
t(220) = 11.58, p < .001, d = 1.01, large effect, and lower Belief in Accuracy, z (220) = –
3.96, p < .001, d = –0.24, small effect, than when exposed to the low self–threat condition 
(see Table 4). Contrary to the hypothesis, women but not men reported higher Centrality 
scores when exposed to the high self–threat condition than when exposed to the low self–
threat condition, t (109) = 2.34, p = .022, d = –0.19, small effect. Also contrary to the 
hypothesis, the high self-threat condition was not accompanied by lower Belief in 
Occurrence or higher Sense of Closure Scale-5 scores. 
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Table 4 
 
Appraisal Comparisons Across Conditions 
 
 
High self–threat Low self–threat Bootstrapped 
 
Bootstrapped  
  M (SD) M (SD) M diff. 95% CI t/z p Cohen’s d 
Centrality of Event Scale  2.56 (0.94) 2.54 (0.91) 0.01 [–0.12, 0.15] 0.17 .865 0.02 
Men 2.52 (0.95) 2.70 (0.98) –0.19 [–0.40, 0.02] –1.72 .090 –0.19 
Women 2.60 (0.94) 2.38 (0.82) 0.21 [0.04, 0.39] 2.34* .022 0.25 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale  1.58 (1.70) 0.19 (0.93) 1.40 [1.16, 1.64] 11.58** < .001 1.01 
Sense of Closure Scale-5  5.03 (1.65) 4.90 (1.43) 0.13 [–0.13, 0.38] 0.98  .327 0.08 
Men 5.30 (1.48) 5.12 (1.27) 0.19 [–0.16; 0.54] 1.06 .285 0.13 
Women 4.75 (1.77) 4.68 (1.56) 0.07 [–0.29; 0.45] 0.36 .716 0.04 
Belief in Occurrence 7.02 (0.73) 7.03 (0.81) –0.01 [–0.11, 0.09] –1.00a .319 0.00 
Belief in Accuracy 6.21 (1.05) 6.45 (0.92) –0.24 [–0.37, –0.11] –3.96**a < .001 –0.24 
Note. a Mann–Whitney U z scores. Bootstrapping was only used when conducting parametric statistics. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
 
 
 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 141 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: In the high self–threat condition, higher shame–proneness was 
expected to predict (a) lower Centrality of Event Scale scores, (b) higher Personal 
Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of Closure scores, (d) lower Belief in 
Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in Accuracy scores. 
 Results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. Because of significant gender 
difference on Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3, Shame-Proneness (see Table 3), 
correlations were conducted separately for men and women. Given the leptokurtic 
distribution of Belief in Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy, Spearman rho correlations 
were calculated whenever these two variables were involved.  
Within the high self–threat condition, only Personal Attributes Rating Scale 
scores were significantly related to Shame-Proneness among women (r = .19, p = .042). 
In other words, as expected, under conditions of high self–threat, higher Shame–
Proneness predicted a significant small–to–medium increase in derogation of pre-IPV-
self among women, but not men. This derogation was primarily attributable to 
significantly lower pre–IPV Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.25, p = .008, 
small–to–medium effect). Contrary to the hypothesis, Shame-Proneness was not related 
to Centrality, Sense of Closure, Belief in Accuracy or Belief in Occurrence in either 
gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SELF–DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 142 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Correlations between Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 and Appraisals 
 
High self–threat condition scores Shame–proneness Externalization 
Men (n = 111)   
Centrality of Event Scale  .08  
Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
(current – pre-IPV) –.01 
 
Current-self –.13  
Pre-IPV self –.08  
Sense of Closure Scale-5 –.14  
Belief in Occurrence .09a  
Belief in Accuracy  –.06a  
Women (n = 110)   
Centrality of Event Scale  –.04  
Personal Attributes Rating Scale   
(current – pre-IPV) .19* 
 
Current-self –.10  
Pre-IPV self –.25**  
Sense of Closure Scale-5 –.07  
Belief in Occurrence .05a  
Belief in Accuracy  .04a  
Overall (N = 221)   
Centrality of Event Scale  .03 .13* 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
(current – pre-IPV) 
.09 –.18** 
Current-self –.11 –.15* 
Pre-IPV self –.16* .08 
Sense of Closure Scale-5 –.14 .03 
Belief in Occurrence .07
a –.34**a 
Belief in Accuracy  .01
a –.19**a 
Note. a Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
 
Given that Tangney and colleagues (Stuewig et al., 2010) found that shame–prone 
individuals tended to externalize blame, exploratory analyses were also conducted with 
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 Externalization subscale. Because there were no 
significant gender differences on Externalization (t = 1.45, p = .149), male and female 
scores were analyzed together.  Contrary to expectation, higher Externalization scores 
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were accompanied by higher Centrality scores (r = .13, p = .05; small effect) and lower 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.18, p = .007; small effect). Consistent with 
the shame-proneness prediction, however, Externalization scores were accompanied by 
lower Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = –.34, medium effect, p < .001) and lower Belief 
in Accuracy scores (rs = –.19, p = .004, small effect). 
Hypothesis 3: In the high self–threat condition, higher Assured–Dominance was 
expected to predict (a) lower Centrality of Event Scale scores, (b) higher Personal 
Attributes Rating Scale scores, (c) higher Sense of Closure scores, (d) lower Belief in 
Occurrence scores, and (e) lower Belief in Accuracy scores. Refer to Appendix B for a 
diagram of the interpersonal circumplex to aid with the interpretation.  
 Three octant scores corresponding to aspects of narcissism were consulted for 
these analyses: Assured–Dominant, Arrogant–Calculating, and Cold–Hearted (Miller et 
al., 2012). Because of significant gender differences on Interpersonal Adjective Scales 
octant scores, and previous research suggesting that men score significantly higher than 
women on Assured-Dominant, Arrogant-Calculating, and Cold-hearted (Wiggins, 1995), 
correlations were run separately for men and women (see Table 6). Given the positive 
skew in the distribution of Cold–Hearted scores, all correlations involving the Cold–
Hearted octant were calculated using Spearman rho. All the other correlations were 
calculated using Pearson r.   
Contrary to the hypothesis, among men with higher Assured–Dominant scores, 
there were higher Centrality scores (r = .29, p = .002, medium effect) and higher Belief in 
Accuracy scores (rs = .23, p = .018, small–to–medium effect). Consistent with the 
hypothesis, among women with higher Assured–Dominant scores there were lower 
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Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (r = –.21, p = .026, small–to–medium effect). 
Follow–up exploratory analyses revealed that among men and women with higher 
Assured–Dominant scores there were higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale–now as 
well as higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale–pre-IPV scores (see Table 6), which was 
consistent with the original prediction.  
 Among men with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores there were no significant 
relationships with measured appraisals. Among women with higher Arrogant–Calculating 
scores there were higher Centrality scores (r = .21, p = .03, small-to-medium effect), 
which was contrary to the hypothesis. Consistent with the original prediction, however, 
those women with higher Arrogant-Calculating scores had lower Personal Attributes 
Rating Scale scores (r = –.21, p = .03, small–to–medium effect), lower Belief in 
Occurrence scores (rs = –.24, p = .012, small–to–medium effect), and lower Belief in 
Accuracy scores (rs = –.23, p = .016 , small–to–medium effect).  
Among men with higher Cold–Hearted scores there were no significant 
relationships with measured appraisals. Among women with higher Cold–Hearted scores 
there were lower Personal Attributes Rating Scale scores (rs = –.34, p < .001, medium 
effect), lower Belief in Occurrence (rs = –.32, p = .001, medium effect), and lower Belief 
in Accuracy scores (rs = –.23, p = .014, small–to–medium effect), all of which were 
consistent with the original prediction.  
The results from the Arrogant–Calculating and Cold–Hearted octant scores were 
only partially supportive of the original prediction. Given the unexpected findings, 
exploratory analyses examined whether higher scoring Arrogant–Calculating and Cold–
Hearted participants were prone to shame and whether they experienced shame after 
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recalling the IPV event. As suspected, Test of Self-Conscious Affect–3 Shame–Proneness 
was not significantly related to Arrogant–Calculating scores (r = –.10 in both men and 
women) or Cold–Hearted scores (rs = .05 in men, rs = –.18 in women). The PANAS–
shame item administered after exposure to the IPV event was similarly not significantly 
related to Arrogant–Calculating (r = .01 in men, r = .11 in women) or Cold–Hearted 
scores (rs = .14 in men, rs = .07 in women). 
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Table 6 
 
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octant Scores and Appraisals 
 
High Self–Threat Condition PA  BC DE NO LM  JK HI FG  DOM LOV 
Men (n = 109) 
Centrality of Event Scale .29** .17 .17a –.07 –.04 –.03 –.11 .16 .11 –.15 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale 
(current – pre-IPV) 
.02 –.17 –.10a .04 .00 –.21* –.26** –.19* .16 .07 
Current-self  .38** –.04 –.22*a .44** .38** –.02 –.37** –.35** .44** .35** 
Pre-IPV self .23* .16 –.08a .25** .24* .20* .02 –.03 .13 .16 
Sense of Closure Scale-5 .04 .03 –.06a .02 –.06 –.27* –.16 –.05 .14 –.08 
Belief in Occurrence .13a –.09a –.07a .07a .13a .06a –.11 –.04 a .07a .11a 
Belief in Accuracy .23*a –.06a –.06a .15a .13a .02a –.14 –.10 a .16a .11a 
Women (n = 110) 
Centrality of Event Scale .03 .21* .13a .10 .06 –.09 .06 .02 .08 –.06 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale 
(current – pre-IPV) 
–.21* –.26** –.34**a .03 .27** .14 .05 –.13 –.12 .29** 
Current-self  .20* –.26** –.37**a .54** .56** .32** –.20* –.41** .25** .58** 
Pre-IPV self  .34** .08 .06a .34** .11 .07 –.19 –.15 .29** .10 
Sense of Closure Scale-5 –.03 –.18 –.10a .07 .10 .27** .06 –.03 –.09 .16 
Belief in Occurrence –.08a –.24*a –.32**a .05a .23*a .22*a –.02a –.14a –.06a .27**a 
Belief in Accuracy  –.17a –.23*a –.23*a .06a .20*a .13a –.03a –.11a –.06a .18a 
Overall (N = 221) 
Centrality of Event Scale .15* .17* .14*a .02 .01 –.05 –.03 .08 .09 –.11 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale 
(current – pre-IPV) –.10 –.20** –.22**a .03 .12 –.03 –.10 –.16* .01 .18** 
Current-self  .28** –.14* –.28**a .49** .45** .15* –.28** –.37** .34** .46** 
Pre-IPV self  .28** .11 .01a .30** .18** .13 –.09 –.09 .21** .13 
Sense of Closure Scale-5 .03 –.04 .05a .01 .00 .00 –.04 –.01 .02 .04 
Belief in Occurrence .02a –.16*a –.20**a .07a .19**a .14*a –.06a –.10a .01a .20**a 
Belief in Accuracy  .02a –.16*a –.16*a .11a .18** a .09a –.09a –.12a .05a .15*a 
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted; LM = Warm Agreeable; JK = 
Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted; Personal Attributes Rating Scale = Personal Attributes Rating 
Scale; 
a Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Post-hoc Analysis 
Dominance, affiliation vs. appraisals. As a follow-up to the octant results 
presented above, Dominance and Nurturance dimensions were also explored in relation to 
appraisals (see Table 6). Pearson r correlations revealed that, when exposed to the high 
self–threat condition, participants scoring higher on Dominance did not show any 
significant relationships with appraisals, although men did tend to perceive themselves 
more positively at the time the IPV occurred (r = .44, p < .001, moderate-to-large effect) 
than at present (r = .13, p = .185, small effect). When exposed to the high self–threat 
condition, women with higher Nurturance scores showed greater derogation of past 
selves (r = .29, p = .002, medium effect) and higher Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = .27, 
p =  .004, small–to–medium effect). A similar trend was observed with higher Belief in 
Accuracy scores, (rs = .18 , p = .06, small-to-medium-effect).  
Remaining Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants vs. appraisals. The 
remaining five Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants were also explored in relation to 
appraisals (see Table 6). In light of previous findings that men score significantly higher 
than women on Aloof-Introverted, whereas women score significantly higher than men 
on Unassured-Submissive, Unassuming-Ingenuous, Warm-Agreeable, and Gregarious-
Extraverted (Wiggins, 1995), men and women were examined separately in the current 
study. Among men and women with higher Gregarious – Extraverted scores there were 
higher Personal Attributes Rating Scale ratings both pre-IPV and at present. Although the 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale ratings were in the expected direction, derogation of 
past selves did not emerge, arguably because the gap between the two Personal Attributes 
Rating Scale ratings was insufficient to reach statistical significance. 
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Among women with higher Warm – Agreeable scores there was higher 
derogation of past-self after exposure to the high self–threat event (r = .27, p = .004, 
small–to–medium effect), higher Belief in Occurrence scores (rs = .23, p = .015, small–
to–medium effect), and higher Belief in Accuracy scores (rs = .20, p = .035, small–to–
medium effect). Among men with higher Warm-Agreeable scores there was a similar 
trend regarding their Personal Attributes Rating Scale, Belief in Accuracy, and Belief in 
Occurrence scores, but results did not reach statistical significance.  
Among men with higher Unassuming – Ingenuous scores there was significantly 
less derogation of past selves (r = –.21, p = .03, small–to–medium effect) and less Sense 
of Closure (r = –.27, p = .004, small–to–medium effect). Although among women with 
higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores there was a similar pattern of derogating past 
selves, the result was not significant. These women also had higher Sense of Closure 
Scale-5 scores (r = .26, p = .005, medium effect) and higher Belief in Occurrence scores 
(rs = 22, p = .02, small-to-medium effect).  
Among men, but not women, with higher Unassuming-Submissive scores there 
was greater derogation of current rather than pre-IPV self when exposed to the IPV event 
(r = –.26, p = .007, small-to-medium effect). Among men with higher Aloof – Introverted 
scores there was less derogation of past selves (r = –.19, p = .046, small–to–medium 
effect), and a similar trend was observed among women with higher Aloof-Introverted 
scores as well. 
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and aggression scores 
 When exploring Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octant scores in relation to self–
reported physical and psychological aggression scores, a predictable pattern emerged (see 
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Table 7). Men and women with higher Cold–Hearted scores had significantly higher 
psychological and physical aggression variety and frequency scores, all effects in the 
small–to–medium range. There were also a number of significant and positive 
correlations among men and women with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores and 
elevated psychological aggression scores, all effects in the small–to–medium range. In 
contrast, among men and women with higher Gregarious–Extravert, Warm–Agreeable, 
and Unassured–Submissive scores there was a tendency towards a negative albeit not 
statistically significant relationship with aggression scores. Predictably, among women 
with higher Unassuming–Ingenuous scores there was a negative relationship with 
psychological aggression, all effects in the small–to–medium range. Moreover, among 
men with higher Aloof–Introverted scores there were significantly higher physical and 
psychological aggression scores reported, all effects in the small–to–medium range. 
Overall, more Dominant women tended to engage in greater variety and frequency of 
psychological aggression, although the values were all in the small range and did not 
reach statistical significance. More Affiliative men and women, on the other hand, tended 
to engage in significantly less variety and frequency of psychological and physical 
aggression. 
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Table 7 
 
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants and Aggression Scores 
 
Variables PA BC DE NO LM JK HI FG DOM LOV 
Men (n = 109) 
Psychological Aggression         
Variety .11 .19* .18a –.13 –.14 –.03 .07 .22* –.03 –.22* 
Frequency .18 .24* .19*a –.16 –.12 –.06 .07 .25** –.01 –.24* 
Physical Aggression         
Variety  .12a .19a .29**a –.15a –.17a –.11a .04a .26**a –.01a –.32**a 
Frequency .13a .15a .28**a –.15a –.16a –.08a .02a .26**a –.01a –.31**a 
Women (n = 110) 
Psychological Aggression         
Variety  .20* .24* .27**a –.06 –.12 –.29** –.05 .17 .12 –.26** 
Frequency .25** .26** .21*a –.06 –.12 –.26** –.07 .16 .15 –.27** 
Physical Aggression         
Variety  .14a .17a .25**a .01a –.15a –.14a –.13a .10a .10a –.20*a 
Frequency  .13a .19*a .26**a –.01a –.16a –.15a –.10a .12a .07a –.21*a 
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted; 
LM = Warm Agreeable; JK = Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted; 
DOM = Dominance; LOV = Nurturance. a Spearman rho correlations. All other correlations are Pearson r.  
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
 
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and PANAS 
scores. Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales octants and PANAS scores 
are presented in Table 8. Men with higher Assured–Dominant scores produced higher 
Positive Affect ratings after both the high self–threat and the low self–threat condition 
(effects in the medium-to-large range), but despite a somewhat similar trend, the results 
for women were not significant. Men with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores similarly 
produced higher Positive Affect ratings after both the high self–threat and the low self–
threat condition, both effects in the small-to-medium range. They also produced higher 
Negative Affect ratings (small-to-medium effect) after the high self–threat condition. 
Among women with higher Arrogant–Calculating scores there were higher Negative 
Affect ratings (medium-to-high effects) after both the high self–threat and the low self–
threat condition. Among men and women with higher Cold–Hearted scores there were 
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higher Negative Affect ratings after both conditions, all effects in the medium or small-
to-medium range. Among men and women with higher Gregarious–Extraverted scores 
there were higher Positive Affect ratings after both conditions (medium or small-to-
medium range). A similar pattern was observed among men and women with higher 
Warm Agreeable scores, who produced higher Positive Affect scores after both 
conditions, small-to-medium range effects. Among women (but not men) with higher 
Unassuming–Ingenuous scores, there were significantly lower Negative Affect ratings 
after both conditions, small-to-medium effects. Among men with higher Unassured–
Submissive scores there were significantly higher Negative Affect scores after both 
conditions (medium effects). Among men with higher Aloof–Introverted scores there 
were significantly higher Negative Affect scores after both conditions (small-to-medium 
effects). Among women with higher Aloof-Introverted scores, however, there were 
significantly lower Positive Affect ratings after both conditions (small-to-medium 
effects).  
Men scoring higher in Dominance produced higher Positive Affect ratings and 
lower Negative Affect ratings than their lower scoring peers, all effects in the small-to-
medium range. Women scoring higher on Dominance tended to give higher Positive 
Affect and higher Negative Affect ratings, but this reached statistical significance only in 
the case of Positive Affect, low self-threat condition. Men scoring higher on Nurturance 
tended to produce lower Negative Affect ratings, although this small-to-medium effect 
only reached significance in the high self-threat condition. Women scoring higher on 
Nurturance produced significantly lower Negative Affect ratings and significantly higher 
Positive Affect ratings after both conditions, all effects closer to the medium range.
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Table 8 
 
Correlations between Interpersonal Adjective Scales Octants and PANAS Scores 
 
 
PA BC DE NO LM JK HI FG DOM LOV 
PANAS (Men) 
Negative Affect – high threat  .01 .22* .30**a –.16 –.10 .09 .34** .34** –.21* –.24* 
Positive Affect – high threat  .34** .27** .10a .35** .25* –.05 –.05 –.09 .31** .09 
Negative Affect – low threat  –.12 .17 .21*a –.05 –.03 .16 .37** .23* –.23* –.13 
Positive Affect – low threat  .43** .21* .00a .32** .26** –.08 –.16 –.11 .37** .12 
Shame – high threat –.04 .01 .14a –.17 –.09 .08 .18 .19* –.19 –.12 
Shame – low threat –.02 .18 .30**a –.06 –.07 .16 .30** .23* –.17 –.17 
PANAS (Women) 
Negative Affect – high threat  .14 .39** .28**a –.01 –.03 –.22* .10 .17 .10 –.27** 
Positive Affect – high threat  .06 –.09 –.07a .24* .17 –.02 –.15 –.23* .17 .21* 
Negative Affect – low threat  .14 .44** .30**a –.07 –.22* –.27** .03 .13 .13 –.34** 
Positive Affect – low threat  .18 –.10 –.09a .37** .32** .07 –.19* –.26** .24* .28** 
Shame – high threat –.06 .11  .07a .00 .10 –.07 .16 .09 –.05 –.05 
Shame – low threat .06 .31**  .18a –.14 –.19* –.26** –.02 .09 .08 –.25** 
Note. PA = Assured Dominant; BC = Arrogant Calculating; DE = Cold Hearted; NO = Gregarious Extraverted; LM = Warm Agreeable; JK = 
Unassuming Ingenuous; HI = Unassured Submissive; FG = Aloof Introverted; DOM = Dominance; LOV = Nurturance; a Spearman rho correlations. All 
other correlations are Pearson r.  
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 153 
 
 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
This study sought to elucidate how individuals experience and respond to their 
own recollection of an autobiographical memory that may be dissonant with their self-
concept. Two variables that arguably modulate the experience and expression of 
dissonance-reducing appraisals, self-threat and narcissism, were the primary focus of this 
study.   
To test the varying effects of self-threat on appraisals, a manipulation was 
introduced whereby participants were instructed in a counterbalanced order to describe a 
past event of them engaging in IPV and a past event of them engaging in a kind and 
supportive act within a relationship context. The manipulation, modeled after the shame- 
and pride-inducing conditions of D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008), appeared 
effective at evoking high self-threat and low self-threat, respectively. The high self-threat 
condition elicited significantly higher negative affect and more shame, as well as 
significantly lower positive affect and less pride, than the low self-threat condition. The 
current finding that recalling IPV events provokes shame is consistent with prior findings 
(i.e., Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Smith, 2007; Winters, Clift, & Dutton, 2004) and lends 
support to the notion that shame in the aftermath of IPV may be experienced by 
nonclinical and nonforensic samples, men and women alike.  
No significant concerns were noted with respected to the order the conditions 
were presented in. It is believed that the positive mood induction that followed the high 
self-threat condition helped alleviate any discomfort and/or assisted with returning 
participants to baseline while also helping limit any carryover effects.  
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The results of this investigation are discussed below in three separate sections, 
each section corresponding to one of the study hypotheses.  
Self-Threat and Appraisals Findings 
Consistent with Campbell and Sedikides’ (1999) meta-analysis, it was expected 
that increasing self-threat would heighten cognitive dissonance and ensuing appraisal use. 
In line with this prediction, after recalling an IPV event (high self-threat), participants 
derogated their pre-IPV selves to a greater extent and expressed greater doubts about the 
accuracy of the event significantly more so than after recalling a kind relationship event 
(low self-threat). 
Derogation of pre-IPV-self, which was consistent with McFarland and Alvaro’s 
(2000) findings, showed a large effect size. Use of this strategy was reflected in the 
significantly greater current-self vs. pre-event-self gap under the high self-threat 
condition than under the low self-threat condition. In other words, when recalling an IPV 
event that they themselves perpetrated, participants viewed their pre-IPV self as less kind, 
less tolerant, less open-minded, less wise, etc., than their current-selves. Participants did 
not, however, engage in derogation of their past-self when recalling a kind relationship 
event, meaning that they viewed their pre-event self and current-self in comparable terms 
(i.e., just as kind, just as tolerant, just as wise now as before).  
Belief in accuracy, but not belief in occurrence, was also significantly lower in the 
aftermath of recalling an IPV event, as compared to when participants recalled a kind 
relationship event. This is to some extent in line with D’Argembeau and Van der 
Linden’s (2008) findings of lower participant ratings of “I believe the event in my 
memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or 
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fabricated anything that did not occur” in shame–inducing relative to pride–inducing 
memories. Of note, however, this particular rating item has been criticized because it taps 
on several constructs, including belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence (Scoboria, 
Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). In contrast, the current investigation uses multiple validated 
items that uniquely tap on belief in accuracy independent from belief in occurrence. 
As was the case with derogation of past-self, it appears that subjectively lower 
accuracy ratings may also serve a protective function in defending the self from 
threatening and dissonance-inducing memories. I emphasize here that ratings of Belief in 
Accuracy are not the same as actual, objective accuracy of the recall, which cannot be 
appraised here. The lower ratings of Belief in Accuracy in the aftermath of recalling an 
IPV event represent a subjective sense that the details associated with the event are being 
recalled less accurately. 
 Contrary to prior findings (e.g., Beike & Crone, 2008), perceived psychological 
distance or closure was not significantly different between the two conditions, suggesting 
that recalling an arguably high self-threatening event, such as an instance of IPV, did not 
evoke greater desire for psychological distance than recalling a low self-threatening 
event, such as an act of kindness in the context of a relationship. Although counter to the 
original prediction, the trend was in the expected direction given that higher 
psychological distance scores were observed in the high self-threat as opposed to the low 
self-threat condition. Examination of individual item scores (see Appendix I) also 
suggested that participants rated the high self-threat event as appearing significantly more 
distant to them than the low self-threat event on three of the five scale items. They, 
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however, admitted to having significantly less closure and more “unfinished business” 
from the high self-threat event than the low self-threat event.   
One possible explanation for these results may be that the low self-threat event 
was not comparable in complexity to the high self-threat event, and participants may have 
rated the low self-threat as more closed than expected because it was more 
straightforward in nature. Another possible explanation could be that the high self-threat 
event carried greater importance or was in some way more central to understanding the 
self than the low self-threat event, and despite wanting to feel like it was more 
subjectively distant, participants may have still recognized that it was “unfinished 
business” for them. There is some support for this explanation of apparent approach and 
avoidance motivation in the form of a moderate negative relationship between closure 
scores and event centrality scores, which is discussed in greater detail below.  
Contrary to the original hypothesis, women but not men rated the importance of 
the IPV event as higher than the importance of the nonIPV event. It would therefore 
appear that women but not men perceived the IPV event as having greater importance to 
their identity and life story despite reports of lower confidence in the accuracy of their 
own memory for the IPV event, and attempts at viewing their past selves as worse than 
their present selves. This stance may reflect competing interests in acknowledging the 
importance of an event to one’s identity and the change it has brought while also 
acknowledging a desire to reappraise it in ways that do not undermine the self. 
Examination of individual Centrality of Event Scale items did in fact lend some support 
to this idea; for example, both men and women rated the item “this event tells a lot about 
who I am” significantly lower in the IPV condition than in the nonIPV condition. Both 
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men and women, however, rated the item “if this event had not happened to me, I would 
be a different person today” significantly higher in the IPV condition than in the nonIPV 
condition.  
Another possible explanation is that gender schemas have traditionally included 
aggression as part of the male schema but not female schema. According to social role 
theory, men are socialized to view toughness and aggression as part of their repertoire of 
responses, whereas women are socialized to inhibit aggression as part of their repertoire 
of responses (Eagly, 1997). It is therefore possible that women view the IPV they 
themselves perpetrate as more salient because it runs counter to the stereotypical gender 
role. Some support for this contention comes from Miller (2011), who found that male 
undergraduates were more likely than female undergraduates to view abuse as a 
necessary, acceptable, effective, and acceptable way of resolving conflict in dating 
relationships.  
Research into posttraumatic stress disorder from an autobiographical memory 
perspective has highlighted somewhat of a similar dialectical position in individuals who 
construe a stressful/traumatic event as central to their identity. For example, Boals and 
Schuettler (2011) found that event centrality correlated moderately and positively with 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms, suggesting that construing a traumatic event as 
central to one’s identity helped maintain debilitating posttraumatic stress disorder 
symptoms. Event centrality was also the strongest predictor of posttraumatic growth, 
suggesting that construing a traumatic event as central to one’s identity also helped 
individuals grow from their trauma. It would therefore appear that construing a 
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stressful/traumatic event as central to one’s identity could be both debilitating in 
maintaining posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms and conducive to growth.  
Shame-Proneness Findings 
As expected, when asked to recall an IPV event they themselves perpetrated, 
highly shame-prone women demonstrated greater derogation of past selves. In fact, the 
higher their shame-proneness, the lower their preIPV-self ratings were. This finding lends 
support to the contention that, under conditions of high self-threat (as was the case for 
IPV), those prone to experiencing shame also experienced greater dissonance, to which 
they responded to by derogating their past selves.  
Whereas gender differences in experiencing and responding to self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories were either not found or not reported in prior research, the 
current investigation did find that women experienced dissonance differently from men. 
Specifically, women had higher ratings of shame-proneness than men. It is possible that 
women more so than men experienced shame because perpetration of IPV is traditionally 
more aligned with masculine gender roles (Eagly, 1992; Miller, 2011). It is also possible 
that women more so than men reported higher shame-proneness because they are 
socialized to be more open and expressive with their emotional reactions and more likely 
to express internalizing emotions like shame relative to men (Chaplin & Aldao, 2013). 
Finally, as some have argued, it is also possible that women experience more shame than 
men (Chaplin & Aldao, 2013).  
Because shame-prone individuals tend to externalize blame (Stuewig et al., 2010), 
dispositional externalization was also explored in relation to appraisals. Unlike shame-
proneness, an increased disposition towards externalization was accompanied by a 
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significant derogation of current-self. In fact, the higher the tendency to externalize, the 
lower current-self ratings were (i.e., viewed current-self as less wise, less tolerant). It is 
possible that externalizers project blame onto others precisely because their current self-
concept and possibly self-esteem is substantially negatively affected by events such as 
IPV that cast them in a negative light. Along those lines, externalizers may be more 
sensitive to perceptions of self-threat and could respond to this through criticism of the 
current self. In fact, derogating past-self rather than current-self would appear to be the 
more adaptive of the two strategies because it preserves the present self-concept more so 
than an admission of current self as less tolerant, less wise, etc. would.  
 Dispositional externalization was also accompanied by higher importance 
attributed to the IPV event, yet also greater desire to gain psychological distance from it, 
lower belief that the IPV event truly occurred, and lower belief in the accuracy of the IPV 
event. As noted earlier and consistent with these findings, it is conceivable for individuals 
to construe a stressful/traumatic event as central to their identity yet also want to 
reappraise it in a manner that does not undermine their current self-concept.  
Circumplex Findings 
 Contrary to the original prediction, men with higher Assured-Dominant scores 
construed the IPV event as more central to their identity. Among male with Higher 
Assured-Dominant scores, somewhat surprisingly, there was also greater belief in the 
accuracy of the IPV event. Among women with higher Assured-Dominant scores there 
was a different pattern in increasingly derogating current-selves more so than preIPV-
selves. This derogation of current rather than preIPV-self differs from the shame-
proneness results reported above, possibly because the nature of narcissism captured by 
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Interpersonal Adjective Scales is the more adaptive and less pathological kind (Pincus et 
al. 2009). In fact, the adjectives that load on the Assured-Dominant octant include items 
like self-confidence, self-assuredness, firmness, and assertiveness that arguably capture 
the more adaptive aspects of narcissism.  
Among women with higher Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted scores there 
was similarly a derogation of current-selves but not preIPV-selves. These women also 
showed a reverse relationship with belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy; the more 
Arrogant-Calculating and the more Cold-Hearted they were, the lower their belief in 
accuracy and occurrence. The trend was in a similar direction for men but did not reach 
statistical significance. Exploratory analysis found that higher scoring Arrogant-
Calculating and higher-scoring Cold-Hearted participants did not appear to experience 
shame, nor did they appear to possess shame-proneness. Because of this, they may not 
feel a need to criticize past selves to protect current view of self.    
Participants with higher Cold-Hearted and Arrogant-Calculating scores also 
reported perpetrating more frequent and a greater variety of psychological and physical 
aggression. Perhaps not surprisingly, antisocial personality disorder maps primarily on 
the Arrogant-Calculating octant (Pincus & Wiggins, 1990) and the adjectives that 
comprise the Cold-Hearted octant reflect the callous and cruel traits (e.g., ruthless, cruel, 
cold-hearted) commonly encountered in psychopathy. Consequently, the notion that these 
individuals with higher Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted scores may not 
experience shame appears to fit. Their decision to criticize their current-self might reflect 
a calculated move and/or knowledge that they are supposed to articulate remorse for what 
they have done, but this remorse, as is the case for psychopathy, may be superficial.  
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The reported lower belief in accuracy and lower belief in occurrence among 
women with higher Cold-Hearted scores and higher Arrogant-Calculating scores is 
perhaps best understood when contrasted against the higher belief in accuracy and higher 
belief in occurrence among women with higher Warm-Agreeable and Unassuming-
Ingenuous scores. Whereas a higher self-reported belief in accuracy and occurrence 
appears to have an affiliative purpose, perhaps of demonstrating greater openness to 
understanding the impact of the IPV and how it affected the other, a lower self-reported 
belief in accuracy and occurrence appears to highlight a general lack of concern for the 
other. It is also possible that lower belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence may reflect 
a motivated effort to devalue the event. Another related possible explanation is that lower 
belief in occurrence could reflect denial, and in fact, as Goodrum and colleagues (2001) 
posited, denial is more characteristic of narcissistic/antisocial individuals because of their 
lack of empathy. Monitoring belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence may be a useful 
indirect way of tracking attempts at devaluing or denial.  
Exploratory analyses to elucidate other relationships between Interpersonal 
Adjective Scales octants and appraisals revealed some expected trends. The relationship 
between Warm-Agreeable, Gregarious-Extraverted, and derogation of preIPV-self was 
more in line with the original prediction, although it only reached statistical significance 
among women with higher Warm-Agreeable scores. As noted earlier, among women 
with higher Warm-Agreeable scores there was higher belief in occurrence and higher 
belief in accuracy when confronted with an IPV event. The comparable pattern between 
Warm-Agreeable and Gregarious-Extraverted becomes more evident when consulting the 
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overlapping adjectives composing each octant, including friendly, neighborly (Gregarious 
Extraverted octant), and kind, tenderhearted (Warm-Agreeable).  
Among men with higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores, there was greater 
derogation of current-self rather than preIPV-self, whereas among women with higher 
Unassuming-Ingenuous scores, there was an increased belief in occurrence. 
Cumulatively, these findings appear consistent with the deferential and obliging nature of 
individuals with higher Unassuming-Ingenuous scores. Consistent with the overarching 
patterns emerging so far, it would appear that heightened belief in occurrence may be 
serving a more affiliative purpose in pleasing others, and the derogation of current rather 
than preIPV-event self may be indicative of self-doubt, low self-esteem, and martyrdom 
to please the other. A similar tendency to derogate current-self rather than preIPV-self 
was also observed among men with higher Unassured-Submissive scores and men with 
high Aloof-Introverted scores. This appears consistent with the evolving interpretation 
that criticizing the current-self rather that the preIPV-self may be a sign of low self-
esteem and self-doubt.  
 The exploratory analyses carried out with the Dominance and Nurturance 
dimensions can help summarize some of the findings presented. It would appear that the 
more affiliative individuals are, the more likely they are to respond to a self-threatening 
event with higher belief in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence, perhaps reflecting 
their affiliative nature and relationship needs. Such individuals also appear to derogate 
their past-selves more so than their current-selves when confronted with an IPV event, 
maybe in an attempt to show that they are worthy of the relationship now because they 
have changed (i.e., they are no longer as unwise, as intolerant, as they used to be). Even 
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so, the criticism of preIPV-self appears to be relatively mild and in keeping with current 
positive self-view. Criticism of preIPV-self rather than current-self also appears more 
pronounced among the more dominant individuals, although this too was relatively mild 
and in keeping with current positive self-view. Based on how Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales octants related to derogation of self, it would seem that criticism of preIPV-self 
rather than current-self is the more adaptive strategy in preserving self-esteem.   
Sample Considerations 
As part of the current investigation, about 91.9% of men and 97.3% of women 
reported engaging in at least one kind of psychological aggression in the past 12 months. 
In the past 12 months, roughly 30.6% of men and 46.4% of women reported engaging in 
at least one kind of physical aggression. These rates are somewhat higher than those 
reported by Scott and Straus (2007) because this was a sample originally prescreened to 
have committed at least one act of IPV.  
Consistent with prior findings (Archer, 2000; Desmarais et al., 2012; Miller, 
2011) women reported a greater frequency and a greater variety of physical and 
psychological aggression than men. In terms of psychological aggression, significantly 
more women than men reported threatening to hit, hurt, or throw something at a partner. 
In terms of physical aggression, significantly more women than men reported pushing or 
shoving, slapping, and punching a partner. Significantly more men than women, 
however, reported twisting a partner’s arm or hair, grabbing a partner, or holding a 
partner down in anger. I caution that the psychological and physical aggression scales 
used did not ask participants about the extent of the injuries their partner endured as a 
result of their aggression. Whereas apparently more women than men endorsed pushing, 
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shoving, slapping or punching their partner, the force behind this act and/or the 
motivation for it (e.g., using IPV to control vs. using IPV to express anger/hurt and/or in 
self-defense) may be quite different between men and women (i.e., Cousins & Gangestad 
2007; Follingstad et al., 1991). Along those same lines, the scale does not ask about 
reciprocal abuse and whether women employed IPV as a reaction to their partner’s 
behaviour and/or in self-defense (Miller, 2011). Yet another consideration given the 
endorsement rates observed is that women may be more forthcoming than men in their 
perpetration of IPV, although it is likely that both genders underreported true perpetration 
rates (Miller, 2011).   
Limitations and Future Directions  
 The findings from the current investigation should be interpreted in the context of 
several limitations. First, the undergraduate sample in particular was younger than the 
MTurk sample and therefore had less opportunity to experience interpersonal 
relationships and conflicts. It is possible that being older and having more exposure to 
relationships, as the MTurk sample arguably did, might lead to more severe instances of 
IPV, and/or more entrenched patterns of appraising IPV in such a way as to deny or 
minimize it. In line with this argument, some studies have found that prior experience of 
abuse in dating relationships predicts future perpetration (Miller, 1999). Studies have also 
found that the likelihood of experiencing and perpetrating abuse tends to increase as 
relationship duration increases (Miller, 1999). In short, the results of the current 
investigation are limited by the youth and relative inexperience of the student sample. 
Future studies could collect a larger number of community participants and student 
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participants to compare and contrast the various ways in which the two groups might 
differ on appraisals of IPV. 
Another limitation involves the nature of an undergraduate sample as consisting 
of a certain level of socioeconomic status, intellectual functioning, etc., which could have 
influenced what these students had learned and witnessed about domestic violence while 
growing up, how they enacted their aggression, and how they appraised it. As an example 
of the potential differences between the IPV experiences of the student and MTurk 
samples, a qualitative read of the accounts appeared to suggest that the MTurk accounts 
consisted of more severe IPV events. In order to explore any potential differences, future 
studies might want to collect additional information about socioeconomic status and 
witnessing of violence while growing up in order to compare community and university 
samples.  
Yet another piece of information that limited the current study was not collecting 
information on the type of relationship that the IPV was perpetrated in. As noted earlier, 
research has shown some differences between marital violence and dating violence 
(Shorey et al., 2008). It appears that one of those differences was reflected in the current 
study as well, given that relatively more severe instances of IPV were reported by the 
MTurk sample than the undergraduate sample.   
Another related limitation is participants’ self-selection to participate in this 
study. Even though the eligibility screen was crafted without using words like “abuse” or 
“violence” and reflected a range of mild to more severe violent behaviours, it could still 
have warded off the more severe perpetrators of IPV or at least the ones that were more 
ashamed and/or unwilling to discuss their actions. This self-selection arguably biases the 
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results obtained in that the accounts provided and appraisals used may be less severe 
and/or less extreme than expected. This kind of self-selection may have also complicated 
the kind of personality styles originally expected to experience higher self-threat. For 
example, individuals with more narcissistic features may be more unwilling to endure 
IPV-based shame and/or discomfort to participate in a study of this nature. As observed 
during the recruitment process of this study, men were also less likely than women to 
acknowledge having perpetrated or threatened to perpetrate any kind of IPV. This might 
reflect a gendered unwillingness to endure discomfort or perhaps a fear of re-
experiencing past events because they are simply more severe than those perpetrated by 
women. On the other hand, participants who elected to participate in this study may have 
committed instances of IPV or nominate instances of IPV that are more resolved and/or 
less severe than others. Conducting this kind of study with clinical or correctional 
samples where collateral information is available (file review, police reports, etc.) might 
help minimize some of these concerns. 
Second, there are a number of limitations with the measures and instructions used. 
The self-report nature of the data means that the results reported here may be contingent 
on, among other things, participant insight, willingness to disclose details of the event 
and feelings of shame, personality features, and social desirability. For example, 
participants may have rated the IPV event as more important than they truly think it is 
because they might believe that denying or minimizing its importance would be a socially 
undesirable thing to do. As another example, participants with more narcissistic features, 
despite being expected to experience more shame, may be more likely to deny or not 
report this very emotion.  
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The effect of threat on appraisal use could have been diluted by the manner in 
which the IPV event was recounted. Stated differently, the very manner in which 
participants describe the IPV event could help them appraise it differently, perhaps 
without needing to rely on the appraisal mechanisms administered as part of this 
investigation. Although all participants received the same instructions, some may have 
used the “why” question to justify what happened, thus arguably decreasing the need to 
perceive the event as less important when rating it on the Centrality of Event Scale. It 
may be interesting in the future to provide differing instructions, one perhaps focused on 
details and another focused on meaning making, to ascertain any differences in emotion 
activation and/or use of measured appraisals.  
Another aspect of appraisal use is that once participants have engaged in one 
dissonance-reducing mechanism, such as criticizing their past selves, they may not need 
to engage in another mechanism to the same extent. Otherwise stated, it could be that 
dissonance is alleviated after the first or second mechanism, after which the other 
mechanisms no longer have an effect. Essentially, the order in which the mechanisms 
were measured could have resulted in less observable effects for those mechanisms 
measured second, third, or fourth. Counterbalancing the order in which dissonance-
reducing mechanisms are measured might help tease apart the utility of each mechanism 
independent of, or over and above, another mechanism.  
Another measure-based limitation was the Belief in Occurrence scale, which had 
over 75% of its scores at ceiling level and therefore left little room for variability to be 
explained by other factors. The ratings of Belief in Occurrence were particularly elevated 
because the events that participants chose to discuss were strongly believed events. This 
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is consistent with prior work, which has found that cues often result in the retrieval of 
events that are strongly believed to have occurred (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). In 
contrast, Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal (2015) attempted to cue for uncertain events, 
which resulted in the retrieval of events that were comparatively less strongly believed 
(Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015). This approach, as well as analog studies conducted in 
the lab, may be two potential avenues for managing high levels of belief in occurrence. 
Finally, findings from the Centrality of Events and Sense of Closure-5 scales 
indicated the need to parse out competing motives to make meaning and acknowledge 
how a high self-threatening event may have impacted the self while at the same time 
view the self-threatening event as not defining the self. In many ways, this distinction is 
reminiscent of the guilt vs. shame constructs proposed by Tangney (1991) in that guilt 
presumably does not involve the entire person as “bad” but rather encourages reparative 
action.   
Third, because of its novel and exploratory nature, the investigation relied on 
numerous comparisons to examine data patterns. This approach in turn increased the rate 
of Type I error. Future studies will need to target and replicate specific aspects of this 
study before any further conclusions are drawn.  
Finally, this investigation measured only certain types of appraisals and therefore 
can only report on their use to reduce dissonance. Other types of appraisals may be more 
widely used or used more effectively, and future investigations could construct checklists 
based on a qualitative exploration of the current dataset, or build other scales to measure 
appraisal use. In order to assess the effectiveness of appraisals, a measure of state self-
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esteem may also be included after participants have been directed to engage with a 
dissonance-reducing appraisal. 
Future studies could explore the nature of the IPV event described in this sample 
(physical or psychological) and then determine whether the type and extent of the 
appraisal used is related to type of IPV. This line of work may help clarify the trend 
observed in Dutton and Hemphill (1992) of IPV perpetrators lying more to themselves 
and others about psychological abuse, arguably because it is less objectively visible, than 
about physical abuse. For example, those committing an act of psychological abuse may 
show lowered belief that the IPV event occurred and/or report greater doubt about the 
accuracy of their recall than those committing an act of physical abuse.  
Future studies may also wish to look at the differential impact of shame versus 
guilt on appraisal use. Tangney (1991) defined shame as a global, negative, and painful 
evaluation of the self that was associated with a behavioural urge to hide or escape, 
whereas she defined guilt as a more adaptive emotion arising in response to a particular 
behaviour and associated with reparative action. It is possible that arousal of shame more 
so than guilt is associated with greater appraisal use, perhaps because of the more global 
and painful nature of shame. Another potential exploration also tied to Tangney’s work 
on shame is the presence of early shaming experiences. Future studies might consider 
asking about early shaming experiences in addition to memories of committing IPV to 
explore whether such experiences affect appraisal use.  
Another future project might consider the use of a clinical sample comprised of 
higher rates of narcissism. In the current study, it is likely that few participants 
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demonstrated the kind of pathological narcissism (i.e. Pincus et al. 2009) that would 
correlate with certain appraisal use.  
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CHAPTER 4 
General Discussion 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to explore how individuals 
experience and respond to autobiographical memories that contradict their self-concept as 
morally good, competent, and/or consistent, stable, and predictable (Aronson et al., 
1995). A secondary goal was to explore two potential determinants of the experience and 
response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories: self-threat and narcissistic 
features.  
Dissonance itself cannot be directly observed (Aronson, 1969, 1992; Festinger, 
1957); rather, it can be deduced from asking participants about it and from the emergence 
of dissonance-reducing mechanisms. Consistent with this, participants in Study 1 were 
instructed to select a time in which they challenged another’s recollection of a past event 
and then asked to describe why they challenged. Participants identified self-protective 
motives, among other motives, as underpinning their challenge, which were presumably 
indicative of dissonance. In Study 2, participants were instructed to recall two events of 
varying self-threat and after each event, were instructed to use rating scales meant to 
capture select dissonance reduction processes. Participants demonstrated more attempts at 
dissonance reduction after the high self-threat event than after the low self-threat event. 
This selective use of appraisals also suggested the presence of cognitive dissonance. 
Building on the theoretical and empirical basis laid out by Festinger (1957), Aronson 
(1969, 1992), and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), this dissertation lends further 
support to the notion that cognitive dissonance processes underlie the experience of self-
discrepant autobiographical memories and the ensuing responses. 
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The Experience of Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories & Self-Threat 
Building on Festinger and Aronson’s cognitive dissonance theories and consistent 
with the self-memory-system framework (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), dissonance 
in the current investigation resulted from a conflict between autobiographical memory 
retrieval of a past behaviour and the current, presumably positive self-concept (Study 1 
and Study 2). The dissonant element, meaning the autobiographical memory as recounted 
by someone else (Study 1) or as recalled by the self (Study 2), contained information that 
an individual acted or was implied to have acted in a way that made that individual feel 
and/or be perceived by the other(s) as incompetent, immoral, ashamed, or guilty. As 
shown in Study 1 and Study 2, and consistent with the meta-analytic findings of 
Campbell and Sedikides (1999), the more self-threatening the retrieved autobiographical 
memory was, the sharper the dissonance experienced. Several proxies of dissonance lend 
support to this assertion including the intensity of negative emotions and in particular, 
shame, experienced after recalling an instance of perpetrating IPV (Study 2), the 
disproportionate presence of negative emotions among the self-protective challenges 
(Study 1), and the self-reported higher levels of distress at disagreeing with the other 
among the self-protective challenges (Study 1). These findings are consistent with prior 
conceptualizations of negative self-referent emotion as threatening (Aronson, 1992; 
McFarland & Alvaro, 2000) and/or signaling threat to the self because of their negative 
implications (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Pinter et al., 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 
2004, 2009). There is also some support for the notion that this kind of threat, where 
negative emotions are involved, may preferentially activate self-protective motives, 
rather than self-enhancement motives (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). 
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In addition to negative emotions, other proxies of dissonance also emerged. 
Namely, among the self-protective challenges, there was higher self-reported motivation 
to present a positive self-image (Study 1) and higher self-reported need to convince the 
other that one is right (Study 1). The self-reported desire to present a positive self-image 
to others and convince the other that one is right may not on the surface appear 
synonymous with preserving a positive self-concept. As a result, one may wonder why 
either item is being cast as a dissonance proxy. According to Swann’s self-verification 
theory (2012), however, individuals value symmetry between how they view themselves 
and how they present themselves to others, and will seek out opportunities to re-affirm 
their perception of themselves in social contexts. Following this line of reasoning, 
presenting a positive self-image does become more synonymous with maintaining a 
positive self-concept, and consequently, threatening either might arguably result in 
dissonance. This very symmetry between individuals’ self-view and how others view 
them was to some extent evident in the overlap between Defending the self and 
Correcting views of me subcategories developed in Study 1. Taken together, the findings 
from these dissonance proxies strengthen the argument that dissonance can arise when a 
retrieved autobiographical memory comes into conflict with one’s current self-concept. 
The Response to Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories 
Across both studies, and consistent with prior theorizing, dissonance appeared to 
have been reduced and/or resolved through dissonance-reducing mechanisms, or 
appraisals. This dissonance-reduction involved confronting the source of incompatible 
feedback (Study 1), reappraising aspects of the dissonant autobiographical memory 
(Study 1 and Study 2), or reappraising aspects of the self (Study 2).  
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 In Study 1, and consistent with Swann’s work (Swann, 2012; Swann & Ely, 1984; 
Swann & Read, 1981), dissonance appeared to have been reduced by challenging the 
person providing the dissonant feedback with a view to correcting their mistaken 
impression (Correcting views of me subcategory) and/or protecting the self (Defending 
the self subcategory). In fact, when participants were themselves asked why they 
challenged, a number of them identified challenging precisely because they wanted to 
correct the other’s mistaken impression of them and/or because they wanted to defend 
themselves. The use of social transactions to reduce dissonance has parallels in 
Scoboria’s (2016) model. The model describes the social and cognitive processes 
implicated when an individual’s believed memory is challenged by disconfirmatory 
social feedback. According to this model, two types of dissonance arise when this occurs: 
intrapersonal dissonance and interpersonal dissonance. Of relevance to this discussion, 
Scoboria posits that the decision to defend one’s memory and arguably challenge the 
source of disconfirmatory social feedback is one way in which interpersonal dissonance 
can be reduced.  
 In addition to interpersonal challenges, dissonance reduction was also carried out 
through intrapersonal appraisals, which resemble the solutions proposed by Festinger 
(1957), Aronson (1969, 1992) and Conway (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Changing the dissonant element (Aronson, 1992; Festinger, 1957) or otherwise 
modifying/distorting the threatening autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) was apparent in the use of appraisals of veridicality. For example, 
participants changed the dissonant autobiographical memory by rating their confidence in 
its accuracy as lower when they experienced the autobiographical memory as conflicting 
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with their current self-concept (Study 2). A note here that ratings of Belief in Accuracy 
are not the same as objective accuracy, which cannot be appraised in this investigation. 
Rather than focus on objective accuracy, this investigation was more concerned with 
perceptions of accuracy, including correct interpretation of events from various 
perspectives, correct details of events as seen by the self and/or others, etc. 
Unlike belief in accuracy, belief in occurrence did not appear to have been as 
extensively used to reduce dissonance. This may be because reducing belief in 
occurrence involves a more extreme form of appraisal that is comparatively more 
removed from reality than belief in accuracy. One could also argue that changes of belief 
in occurrence involve an absolute rejection of self-threatening information and therefore, 
resemble denial. The continuum of ego defenses advanced by Vaillant (1994, 2011) is 
relevant here in that self-reported lower belief in occurrence may be a more psychotic or 
immature defense, whereas self-report lower belief in accuracy may be a more neurotic 
defense comparable to rationalization.  
Changing the dissonant element to reduce dissonance was also apparent in the 
criticism of past-self rather than current-self (Study 2). Specifically, when faced with 
self-discrepant information, participants revised their view of their past-selves in such a 
way as to enhance their current selves (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Ross & Wilson, 
2003). McFarland and Alvaro (2000) argue that this particular mechanism may reduce 
dissonance by creating an illusion of improvement and growth from the self-threatening 
event, which is reminiscent of the literature on post-traumatic growth. Recast in this 
manner, devaluing one’s past-self rather than one’s current-self, is better aligned with the 
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notion of increasing the number of consonant elements rather than changing the dissonant 
element.  
In the current investigation, this derogation of “old me” in favour of “current me” 
was examined in relation to the level of threat experienced; the high self-threat condition 
produced more derogation and therefore greater illusory improvement than the low self-
threat condition. These findings add to prior research into other factors that contribute to 
derogation of past self, including subjective temporal distance (the further away an 
individual feels from past self, the more unfavorably this past self is regarded; Ross & 
Wilson, 2003) and more recently implicit theories of change (individuals who believed 
that attributes were malleable were more critical of subjectively distant past selves than 
individuals who believed that attributes were stable; Ward & Wilson, 2015). 
As a dissonance-reducing appraisal, changing the importance of the dissonant 
element was a little less clear in the current investigation. Whereas in Study 1, ratings of 
event centrality and arguably importance did not appear to have been used as a way of 
reducing dissonance, in Study 2, female participants produced higher event 
centrality/importance ratings in response to self-discrepant autobiographical memories. 
These results, however, cloud the more complex patterns observed when the 
centrality/importance items were fleshed out. Namely, the rating of several individual 
scale items suggested that participants did in fact perceive the self-discrepant 
autobiographical memory as less central to themselves in certain areas, which is 
consistent with the lowering of event importance as a dissonance-reducing mechanism. 
For example, when exposed to self-discrepant autobiographical memory, there were 
significantly lower ratings of “this event tells a lot about who I am” and lower ratings of 
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“I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current relationships 
with other people”. On the other hand, and contrary to expectations, there were items 
with significantly higher importance ratings following exposure to a highly self-
threatening autobiographical memory, such as “this event has become a reference point 
for the way I understand myself” and “If this event had not happened to me, I would be a 
different person today.” Taken together, it would appear that reducing the importance of 
the dissonant autobiographical memory as a way of reducing dissonance is not 
straightforward; rather, it seems that individuals try to strike a balance between 
approaching the event to make meaning and acknowledge its impact on one’s 
development, yet also regarding the event as not defining or central to who they are. 
There are similarities between this and the way traumatic events are avoided yet regarded 
to some extent as central to one’s identity (Boals & Schuettler, 2011). Beyond that, what 
these situations appear to highlight is that dissonance processes may not comprehensively 
explain our responses to self-discrepant autobiographical memories. 
Personality  
 As most authors reviewed in this investigation have acknowledged, personality 
plays a role in how dissonance is experienced and how it is responded to. In Study 1, the 
female participants who identified self-protective motives as driving their challenge 
tended to have higher Arrogant-Calculating scores than their peers who did not identify 
any self-protective motives as driving their challenge. A similar trend, involving higher 
Cold-Hearted scores among women, was also observed. Both results appear to suggest 
that the more narcissistic women experienced greater self-threat than the less narcissistic 
women, which echoes prior research on the acute experience of self-threat among 
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narcissists (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010; Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002). Furthermore, 
consistent with Miller et al. (2012)’s mapping of grandiose narcissism between the 
Assured-Dominant and the Arrogant-Calculating octant and his mapping of vulnerable 
narcissism on the Cold-Hearted octant, one can arguably conclude that both narcissistic 
phenotypes were more sensitive to self-threat than others and challenged to protect 
themselves. The notion that narcissistic individuals may experience self-threat more 
acutely than their peers was also supported by the finding that more shame-prone women 
became more critical of their past-selves than their current-selves when faced with a self-
discrepant autobiographical memory (Study 2). More narcissistic women, as indicated by 
Arrogant-Calculating and Cold-Hearted octant scores, also responded to self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories by reporting lower belief in accuracy and lower belief in 
occurrence (Study 2).  
Beyond narcissism, the two orthogonal dimensions of dominance and nurturance 
were also explored. Surprisingly, more nurturing individuals tended to show higher belief 
in accuracy and higher belief in occurrence in response to presumed dissonance (Study 
2). In other words, instead of defending themselves by reporting lower belief in accuracy 
and/or occurrence as originally theorized, they actually reported higher belief. This 
response may be specific to the interpersonal nature of the high self-threat event (i.e., an 
instance of intimate partner violence) and the value that affiliative individuals place on 
their relationship given that they have perpetrated an act of IPV in the past. Over and 
above the IPV event, however, more nurturing individuals are probably more attuned to 
the other and to the relationship needs. Because of this attunement and likely trust within 
the relationship, such individuals may be less defensive and more open to acknowledging 
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their role in the IPV. It is possible that more nurturing individuals use belief in accuracy 
and belief in occurrence as a way of acknowledging their responsibility and empathizing 
with the other, while also ensuring that the relationship is maintained and that they are 
presenting themselves as currently worthy of the relationship (because they have 
matured, become more tolerant since the IPV). In fact, belief in accuracy and belief in 
occurrence have been proposed to be sensitive to social input in Scoboria’s (2016) model. 
Along those lines, they have also been previously discussed as changing in order to avoid 
conflict or enhance the quality of the relationship (Scoboria, Jackson, et al., 2014).  
More nurturing and more dominant individuals also appeared to criticize their 
past-self more so than their current-self to reduce dissonance (Study 2). If high levels of 
self-esteem result from achieving love (nurturance) and status (dominance) and self-
esteem measures do in fact cluster around the Assured-Dominant and Gregarious-
Extraverted octants (Zeigler-Hill, 2010), then those scoring higher on nurturance and 
higher on dominance would have higher self-esteem. Extrapolating from the present 
findings, it would appear that devaluing a past rather than current self when faced with a 
self-discrepant autobiographical memory may help not just reduce dissonance but also 
maintain self-esteem. If true, this would mean that deriding past rather than present self 
when reminded of a past self-threatening event may be encouraged in clinical or 
therapeutic context in order to build self-esteem.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A number of limitations apply to both studies summarized here. First, the 
inclusion of a state-measure such as the PANAS after each appraisal measure would have 
been helpful in understanding whether the purportedly dissonance-reducing mechanism 
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 180 
 
 
helped mitigate uncomfortable or negative feelings. Another alternative or addition 
would be to use a state measure of self-esteem, like the one employed by Beike and 
Landoll (2000), to gauge variations in self-esteem as a result of exposure to various levels 
of threat.  
Second, this study looked only at certain appraisals. Examining alternate 
appraisals, such as a feeling of subjective distance between past and present self (Ross & 
Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003), or coding the appraisals emerging naturally from 
participant accounts, may be another useful strategy to help flesh out appraisal selection 
and their use in response to dissonance. Other ways of reducing dissonance in a social 
context have also been proposed, such as ignoring, forgetting, or avoiding the source of 
dissonance information. These alternate ways of socially managing dissonant feedback 
might be the focus of future studies. 
Third, a limitation across both studies was the use of a nonclinical sample of 
narcissism. Carrying out a comparable study with a clinical sample of narcissists, which 
are regarded as aggressive, hostile, manipulative, deceptive, dominant, and antagonistic 
but also more sensitive to inconsistent feedback with the self-concept (Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001; Pincus et al., 2009) may show a more pronounced pattern of using 
appraisals when exposed to varying levels of self-threat. By the same token, the current 
sample’s use of appraisals was likely not as severe or as may be expected in a clinical 
population.  
Another issue related to narcissism was the use of the Interpersonal Adjective 
Scales, which, although being an empirically validated measure for capturing various 
aspects of personality and more adaptive narcissism, can be an inadequate measure for 
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capturing more pathological aspects of narcissism (Pincus et al., 2009). Other scales for 
assessing the more pathological aspects of narcissism, including grandiose and vulnerable 
narcissism, have been validated, such as the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (Pincus et 
al., 2009). Inclusion of such scales in future investigations should help clarify the 
contribution of pathological narcissism to the experience and response to self-discrepant 
autobiographical memories. 
Finally, this investigation assumed based on prior theory that individuals 
possessed a positive self-concept and were motivated to preserve or protect that positive 
self-concept. Clinical samples, however, may have a more negative or fragile self-
concept, as is the case for narcissism. Exploring the motives and use of appraisals with 
these possibly more severe instances of self-threat (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996) 
may be a fruitful future endeavor.  
 Based on the literature reviewed, this investigation focused primarily on self-
protection. As part of the coding frame, both self-enhancement (as part of Seeking 
recognition subcategory) and self-consistency (as part of Internal models of self and 
others category) also emerged as motives for challenging, suggesting that they might be 
relevant to the manner in which self-discrepant autobiographical memories are 
experienced and responded to. As outlined in the introduction, there is ample research 
into coherence between one’s current self-concept and one’s autobiographical memories 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the value of coherence is also highlighted in 
Aronson’s argument that we strive to maintain a consistent, stable, and predictable sense 
of self.   
Implications 
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The findings from this investigation have implications for the utility of cognitive 
dissonance processes in understanding the experience of self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories and the ensuing dissonance-reducing responses. As theorized by the self-
memory-system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the series of findings presented in 
this dissertation support the argument that autobiographical memories and the current 
self-concept work together to maintain a coherent sense of self and this coherence 
appears to be at least partially maintained through dissonance-reducing processes.  
The findings from this investigation also have clinical implications in informing 
interventions wherein self-discrepant autobiographical memories are central to or 
exacerbate a client’s clinical presentation. For example, self-discrepant autobiographical 
memories are presumably relevant to the treatment of certain moral injuries—
perpetrating acts that contradict deeply held moral beliefs. The present findings may 
inform treatment approaches in this area, perhaps by encouraging perceptions of growth 
(McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Ross & Wilson, 2003) from a pre-event self that was less 
tolerant or less wise to a current-self that is more tolerant and wiser. One way to 
encourage this perception of growth may be to borrow from Ross and Wilson’s (2015) 
manipulation of subjective distance by asking participants to discuss their past selves as 
they were “all the way back…” (versus “in the recent past…”). Yet another approach to 
promoting this perception of growth may be to foster a transition of some kind that serves 
to more clearly separate the past self from the present self, whether that is a life event 
(new job, new relationship, etc.) or a simpler physical change (new haircut, etc.; Ross & 
Wilson, 2003). 
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The current study appears to suggest that derogating one’s past-self but not 
current-self may be the healthier route because it encourages growth in self-esteem and 
discourages the development of a global shame-based sense of self. Inherent in this 
argument, however, is the assumption that once an individual has criticized their past-
self, they will maintain coherence with this new, more tolerant and wiser current-self. If 
this same individual commits a self-discrepant act again in the future,  highlighting the 
discrepancy between this discrepant act and the more tolerant and wiser self may help 
motivate change and re-establish consistency (Aronson, 1999; Biondolillo & Pillemer, 
2015). This approach is reminiscent of motivational interviewing techniques that draw 
attention to the discrepancy between the maladaptive behaviour and an individual’s 
values and goals in order to motivate change (Miller & Rollnick, 2002).  
The notion of a “new” and improved self in the aftermath of a self-discrepant act 
may be easier to achieve and maintain for individuals with a positive self-concept in a 
nonclinical sample, but may pose problems for individuals with a more negative self-
concept. Further research into negative self-concept and/or tendency towards self-
devaluation would help elucidate this issue. 
Another way in which this investigation can inform treatment is by recognizing 
the quasi-dialectical stance in wanting to approach and understand the meaning of a self-
discrepant autobiographical memory but also wanting to avoid viewing such 
autobiographical memories as defining the self. In this way, this investigation adds to the 
growing literature on how posttraumatic stress disorder may become intertwined with 
one’s autobiographical memories and one’s current self-concept.  
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 This line of work also has implications for treatment in the forensic/correctional 
domain. Because appraisals (or dissonance-reducing mechanisms) alleviate or even 
eliminate the impact of an act and/or its implications on the self (Lord & Willimot, 2004; 
Snyder & Higgins, 1988), they are generally considered valuable to coping with stress, 
maintaining self-esteem, and preserving a positive self-concept (Beike & Landoll, 2000; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McFarland & Ross, 1982; Schlenker, Pontari, & 
Christopher, 2001; Wood & Conway, 2006). Yet, this seemingly protective role of 
appraisals is not extended to all contexts. For example, forensic treatment providers 
indiscriminately target appraisals (“rationalizations”) as part of rehabilitative 
programming (Beech & Mann, 2002; Yates, 2009) despite findings of an inconsistent 
relationship between responsibility-taking and re-offending (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; 
Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005) and despite calls to better understand the meaning of 
appraisals to the self before urging offenders to abandon them (Schneider & Wright, 
2004; Yates, 2009). The current study highlights the role of appraisals in maintaining a 
positive self-concept and may help inform changes in treatment targets in 
forensic/correctional settings. Some have proposed that denial or minimization of 
responsibility be regarded as a responsivity factor to help engage participants in treatment 
rather than a risk factor that needs targeting (Marshall, Marshall, O’Brian, & Serran, 
2011). Marshall and colleagues have proposed and researched some techniques for use 
with individuals who have sexually offended, including offering face-saving excuses to 
deniers so that self-esteem is preserved while also encouraging greater understanding of 
the risk factors for offending (e.g., “what might the circumstances of your offense look 
like to another person?”), challenging in a firm but respectful manner that employs 
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motivational interviewing principles (Miller & Rollnick, 2002), and emphasizing the 
difference between a “bad act” and “a good person” in order to foster reparative action 
rather than shame (Marshall et al., 2011). 
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Appendix A 
 
Mechanical Turk 
Turk has become a widely used source for conducting Internet based research in 
the field of Psychology. Turk is not specifically a research recruitment tool; it is a crowd-
sourcing tool that users, including researchers, can access to complete any task that can 
be completed via Internet connection. It is a good tool for reaching diverse individuals, 
typically not available in traditional academic participant pools (in samples collected by 
Dr. Scoboria to date, gender ratios are about 49%, 49%, 1%; and self-identified 
race/ethnicity tend to parallel United States census data with some overrepresentation of 
Asians populations). Users post tasks to Turk, and Turk “workers” (e.g., potential 
participants) view available tasks and select the ones they wish to complete. Once a task 
is complete, the user verifies the work and pays the worker. Turk workers are identified 
in the system only by their Turk ID (a non-identifying string of letters and numbers), 
meaning that a worker’s identifying information is not available to users. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram Illustrating the Interpersonal Circumplex (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990) 
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Appendix C 
 
Recruitment Advertisement Posted to Mechanical Turk site 
Title: Challenging others’ memories 
This is a research study. The study is about times that you challenged somebody else’s 
memory.  
You are eligible for this research study if you have challenged another person’s memory. 
For example, you may have told another person that something that they remember did 
not happen to them or happened to them in a different way than they remember it. The 
study examines times that people chose to initiate or start a challenge on another person’s 
memory. In this study, you will be asked questions about a specific time that you 
challenged another person’s memory.  
Your participation will take no more than 30 minutes. You will earn $2.50 USD for your 
participation.  
 
If you are uncomfortable with answering a question, you have the right to skip it. 
However, if you decide at any time that you will not complete the survey (i.e., complete 
less than 80% of the questions), please return to Mechanical Turk to withdraw from this 
survey. Please complete the survey without consulting with other people. 
 
In order to be compensated, you must provide your Mechanical Turk ID at the end of the 
survey.  
This HIT is set to be open for 2 hours after you sign up. This is to permit plenty of time 
for you to complete the survey and return to Turk to submit the HIT. 
If you are interested in completing the study, please follow the link below. You will be 
directed to a page that will determine your eligibility. If you are not eligible for this 
study, you will receive a message indicating this and you should return to Turk and 
withdraw from the HIT. 
To access the survey, please follow this link: https://fluidsurveys.uwindsor.ca/s/cm1/ 
This study has received clearance from the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board. 
If you are interested in participating, the next page provides information about the study. 
Once you have read it, if you agree to participate you can continue to the study by 
clicking through. 
 
Thank you, 
Fiona Dyshniku 
Dr. Alan Scoboria 
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Appendix D 
 
Eligibility Screen on Fluid Surveys 
Have you ever challenged another person’s memory for a past event (e.g., disagreed with 
their memory, told them something about their memory was wrong)? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Appendix E 
Testing Package – Study 1 
 
Items marked with an asterisk (*) indicate the measures that will be used in Study 1. 
 
PART I 
*Select a time that you challenged another person’s memory for a past event (e.g., 
disagreed with their memory, told them something about their memory was wrong). 
Select a time in which you initiated/started the challenge to the other person’s memory. 
 
Basic questions regarding the challenge 
1. *Describe how you challenged this person’s memory. What did you say or do to 
challenge the memory? 
2. What was your (approximate) age when you challenged this memory? ____  
3. *Describe why you challenged the other person’s memory?  
4. Describe what happened after you challenged the other person’s memory? 
5. Please describe the nature of your relationship with this person at that time (e.g., 
friend, parent, significant other, acquaintance). 
a. Who was the person? 
b. What was your relationship to the person?  
c. What was their age at the time? 
d. What was their gender? 
 
Additional questions regarding the challenge 
1. How much did you trust your knowledge about the event at the time you challenged 
the other person’s memory? (1 = I mistrusted my knowledge completely; 10 = I 
trusted my knowledge completely) 
2. How successful do you think you were at challenging the other’s memory? (1 = 
completely unsuccessful at challenging their memory; 10 = completely successful at 
challenging their memory) 
3. How forceful were you in delivering your challenge? (1 = not at all forceful; 10 = 
very forceful) 
4. How often do you challenge this person’s memory? (1 = very rarely; 10 = 
very frequently) 
5. How often in general do you tend to challenge other people’s memories? (1 
= very rarely; 10 = very frequently) 
 
*Here is a list of potential outcomes that may have occurred following the challenge 
that you described above. Please check which one applies, or check “other” if none 
of the outcomes seems to apply: 
a) The other person defended their memory and it looked like they genuinely 
continued to believe that the event occurred as they remembered it.  
b) The other person defended their memory but it looked like their belief that the 
event occurred as they remembered it had been shaken.  
c) The other person eventually agreed with you, but it looked like they genuinely 
continued to believe that the event had occurred as they remembered it.  
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d) The other person eventually agreed with you, and it looked like their belief that the 
event occurred as they remembered it had been shaken.  
e) Other: None of these really capture what took place. 
 
Please elaborate on the outcome that you just endorsed in the question above. We 
would like any more information that you can provide about what took place to lead 
to this outcome.  
 
 
Additional questions regarding the nature of the relationship 
1. At the time that you challenged the other’s memory, in general how much did you 
trust him/her? (1 = I did not trust them at all; 10 = I trusted them completely) 
2. How much did your past experiences with the person(s) whose memory you 
challenged influence your behaviour, such as what you said or did when you 
challenged them? (1 = past experiences did not influence me at all; 10 = past 
experiences greatly influenced me) 
3. At the time, how much did it bother you that you disagreed with what the other 
person said or did? (1 = It did not bother me at all; 10 = it bothered me very much) 
4. Currently, how much does it still bother you that you disagreed with what the other 
person said or did? (1 = not at all; 10 = very much) 
5. At the time, how easy was it for you, in general, to disagree with the other person? (1 
= it was very hard to disagree with this person; 10 = it was very easy to disagree with 
this person) 
6. How important was it for you to avoid disagreeing with the other person? (1 = not at 
all important; 10 = very important) 
7. How important was your relationship with the person whose memory you challenged 
at that time? (1 = not at all important; 10 = very important) 
8. How close was your relationship with the person whose memory you challenged at 
that time? (1 = not at all close; 10 = very close) 
9. How much did the other person participate in the exchange and/or respond to your 
challenge? (1 = the other person did not at all participate in the disagreement; was 
very passive; 10 = the other person was very vocal and active in the disagreement) 
10. During the challenge, how motivated were you to maintain the relationship with the 
other person? (1 = not at all motivated to maintain the relationship; 10 = very 
motivated to maintain the relationship) 
11. *During the challenge, how motivated were you to present a positive image of 
yourself? (1 = not at all motivated to present a positive image of myself; 10 = very 
motivated to present a positive image of myself) 
12. During the challenge, how important was it for you to convince the other person that 
you were right? (1 = not at all important; 10 = extremely very? important) 
13. After the challenge, what was the quality of the relationship with the person whose 
memory you challenged? (1 = the relationship deteriorated substantially; 10 = the 
relationship improved substantially) 
14. Did you discuss the event with anybody other than the person whom you challenged 
at that time? If yes, who else did you discuss it with (what was your relationship with 
them?)  
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 214 
 
 
 
Communication Patterns Questionnaire (modified) 
 
Please rate each item on a scale of 1 (= very unlikely) to 9 (= very likely) 
 
 Very unlikely    –    Very Likely  
During the challenge… 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
1. Both you and the other person blamed, accused, 
and criticized each other 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
2. Both you and the other person expressed your 
feelings to each other 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
3. Both you and the other person threatened each 
other with negative consequences 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
4. Both you and the other person suggested possible 
solutions and compromises 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
5. You nagged and demanded while the other 
person withdrew, became silent, or refused to 
discuss the matter further 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
6. The other person nagged and demanded while 
you withdrew, became silent, or refused to discuss 
the matter further 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
7. You criticized while the other person defended 
himself/herself 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
8. The other person criticized while your defended 
yourself  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
9. You pressured the other person to take some 
action or stop some action, while the other resisted 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
10. The other person pressured you to take some 
actions or stop some action, while you resisted 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
11. You expressed feelings while the other person 
offered reasons and solutions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
12. The other person expressed feelings while you 
offered reasons and solutions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
13. You threatened negative consequences and the 
other person gave in or backed down 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
14. The other person threatened negative 
consequences and you gave in or backed down 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
15. You called the other person names, swore at 
him/her, or attacked his/her character 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
16. The other person called you names, swore at 
you, or attacked your character 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
17. You pushed, shoved, slapped, hit, or kicked the 
other person 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
18. The other person pushed, shoved, slapped, hit, 
or kicked you  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
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*Interpersonal Adjective Scales  
 
Please rate how accurately each word describes you as a person.  Judge how 
accurately each word describes you on the following scale.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
extremely very  quite slightly slightly quite very extremely 
inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate 
 
For example, consider the word “Introverted”.  How accurately does that word 
describe you as a person?  If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, 
you would select the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”.   If 
you think this word is slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would 
select the number “4”.  If it is very inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on… 
It is very important that you do not skip any.   If you are uncertain about the 
meaning of a word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets. 
 
1. Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is 
less interested in other people) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
2. Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken 
with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
3. Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
4. Unargumentative (tends to avoid arguments or 
fights) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
5. Boastful (tends to brag) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
6. Soft-hearted (tends to be easy-going or gentle with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
7. Ruthless (pursues one's own interests regardless of 
the effect on others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
8. Kind (thoughtful and caring for others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
9. Cheerful (happy, usually in good spirits) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
10. Unsparkling (not lively or entertaining with others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
11. Tricky (can be deceiving toward others in order to 
get something; able to fool others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
12. Unaggressive (tends to be mild-mannered, not 
forceful around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
13. Calculating (tends to use or manipulate others to 
your own advantage) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
14. Tender (warm and loving with others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
15. Hard-hearted (unconcerned and unfeeling toward 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
16. Unneighbourly (unfriendly, aloof toward others, 
avoid contact with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
17. Uncharitable (dislike helping others; tends to 
judge others harshly) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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18. Uncunning (not crafty or sly, tends to be 
straightforward with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
19. Extraverted (like being with others; outgoing and 
lively around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
20. Cocky (self-centred; conceited; thinks highly of 
one's own abilities) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
21. Dominant (tends to lead others, like to command, 
take charge in a group) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
22. Antisocial (dislike the company of others; behavior 
not affected by social rules) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
23. Perky (lively, energetic around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
24. Forceful (tends to take charge around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
25. Wily (crafty, cagey, or tricky) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
26. Sly (crafty, secretive, or cunning in dealing with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
27. Iron-hearted (tends to be stern or harsh with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
28. Unbold (not daring or courageous) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
29. Neighbourly (friendly; likes to get involved with 
people around you) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
30. Shy (lacking in self-confidence; tends to be 
uncomfortable around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
31. Undemanding (doesn't demand or expect much 
from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
32. Meek (timid, has trouble being assertive or 
standing up from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
33. Unwily (not tricky or crafty) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
34. Self-assured (confident, certain of oneself) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
35. Dissocial (doesn't care for the company of others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
36. Jovial (cheerful; playful around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
37. Domineering (tends to control or manipulate 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
38. Tender-hearted (easily feels love, pity or sorrow 
for others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
39. Warmthless (has no feeling of pleasure or affection 
for others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
40. Unsly (not tricky or cunning; tends to be genuine; 
sincere; trusting) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
41. Enthusiastic (enjoys active involvement with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
42. Firm (steadfast; does not give in easily; gets others 
to do things your way) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
43. Uncalculating (doesn't try to manipulate others or 
maximize one's own gain) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
44. Accommodating (obliging, tends to do favors for 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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45. Uncheery (not lively or jolly around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
46. Friendly (open, accepting, warm around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
47. Cunning (crafty, skillful at manipulating others, 
devious) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
48. Self-confident (sure of oneself around others, 
devious) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
49. Unauthoritative (doesn't try to influence others; 
goes with others' opinions) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
50. Uncrafty (not tricky or sly when dealing with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
51. Unsympathetic (not interested or concerned about 
others' feelings or problems) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
52. Charitable (generous, like to help others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
53. Coldhearted (have little warmth or feelings for 
others; unfeeling; harsh) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
54. Distant (tends to be cold toward others; tends to 
stay away from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
55. Forceless (not forceful with others; timid or weak, 
find it hard to be assertive) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
56. Gentle-hearted (warm or kind to others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
57. Outgoing (enjoy meeting other people) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
58. Sympathetic (feel interested or sensitive to the 
feelings and problems of others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
59. Boastless (don't like to brag) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
60. Persistent (doesn't give up even when others think 
you are wrong) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
61. Crafty (can mislead or manipulate others for one's 
own purposes) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
62. Unsociable (doesn't enjoy meeting people or being 
in the company of others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
63. Cruel (able to cause pain and suffering to others; 
unfeeling) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
64. Bashful (tends to shy away from public attention) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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PART II 
 What was the source or sources of information that you used to challenge the 
memory? 
 *Were you present when the original event (that you later challenged) occurred?  
If yes… 
 *Please describe in detail your memory for the event. 
 
Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current memory 
for the original event. 
 
*Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence 
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely 
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened) 
2. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a 
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever) 
3. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 = 
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)  
4. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all 
confident; 7 = completely confident) 
5. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8 
= clear and complete memory for the event) 
6. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you 
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong 
belief) 
7. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7 
= 100% accurate)  
8. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing 
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)  
9. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)  
10. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at 
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible) 
 
Items 1, 6, 9 assess Belief in Occurrence 
Items 2, 4, 7, assess Belief in Accuracy 
Items 3, 5, 8 assess Recollection   
Item 10 is a stand-alone plausibility item.  
 
Recollective phenomenology 
1. When I think about this event its overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid) 
2. When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
3. When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
4. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague, 
7 = clear/distinct) 
5. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 = 
vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
6. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my 
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memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
7. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) 
8. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened. 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
 
Coherence & Connectedness 
9. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story 
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much) 
10. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) 
 
*Centrality of Event Scale – 7 items 
1. I feel that this event has become part of my identity. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally 
agree) 
2. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the 
world. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) 
3. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story. (1 = totally disagree; 5 
= totally agree) 
4. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences. (1 = totally 
disagree; 5 = totally agree) 
5. This event permanently changed my life. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) 
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future. (1 = totally disagree; 
5 = totally agree) 
7. This event was a turning point in my life. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree) 
 
  
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 220 
 
 
*PART III - Demographics 
Age: 
 
Sex: 
 
Ethnicity (please select): 
__ Black/African/Caribbean 
__ Chinese 
__ Filipino 
__ First Nations 
__ Japanese 
__ Latin American 
__ Mixed 
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan) 
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian) 
__ White 
__ Other: ______________________________________________ 
 
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest 
degree you have received: 
__ No formal education 
__ Elementary school 
__ High school or equivalent (GED) 
__ Community college 
__ Bachelor’s degree 
__ Master’s degree 
__ Professional degree 
__ Doctorate degree 
 
Is English your first language? 
Yes  No  If No, please indicate how long you’ve been speaking English for:  
 
 
Please enter your Mechanical Turk ID in order to be compensated.  
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Appendix F 
 
Screening Question for the Participant Pool – Study 2 
 
With respect to your current or past partner/girlfriend/boyfriend/wife/husband, have you 
ever threatened, attempted, or completed any of the following: shouted, insulted, name-
called, threw something at them, pushed or shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, 
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or forced sex? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Appendix G 
Testing Package – Study 2 
 
 
Qualitative Questions 
 
Version A: High Self-Threat condition 
presented first 
Version B: Low Self-Threat condition 
presented first 
Select a time that you have done any of the 
following to a past or present romantic 
partner or date: shouted, insulted, name-
called, threw something at them, pushed or 
shoved them, slapped or grabbed them, 
kicked, punched, or insisted on sex or 
forced sex. 
 
Select a time that you acted in a kind, 
supportive, and/or understanding way 
towards a past or present romantic partner 
or date (e.g., surprised the other with a gift 
or a dinner, purchased flowers). 
 
Please describe in as much detail as you 
can this event, including:  
1. what you said/did 
2. why you did what you did,  
3. how you felt at the time 
4. how you saw yourself at the time. 
Please describe in as much detail as you 
can this event, including:  
1. what you said/did 
2. why you did what you did,  
3. how you felt at the time 
4. how you saw yourself at the time. 
What was your (approximate) age when 
this occurred? 
What was your (approximate) age when 
this occurred? 
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The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. Indicate 
to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the 
following scale to record your answers. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
 
    
___ Interested ___ Irritable 
___ Distressed ___ Alert 
___ Excited ___ Ashamed 
___ Upset ___ Inspired 
___ Strong ___ Nervous 
___ Guilty ___ Determined 
___ Scared ___ Attentive 
___ Hostile ___ Jittery 
___ Enthusiastic ___ Active  
___ Proud ___ Afraid 
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Centrality of Event Scale 
 
Please think back upon ______ and answer the following questions in an honest and 
sincere way, by circling a number from 1 to 5. 
 
 Totally 
Disagree 
   Totally 
Agree 
1. This event has become a reference point for the way 
I understand new experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I automatically see connections and similarities 
between this event and experiences in my present life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of 
important themes in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. This event is making my life different from the life 
of most other people.  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way 
I understand myself and the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this 
type of event think differently than I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. This event tells a lot about who I am. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I often see connections and similarities between this 
event and my current relationships with other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of 
my life story. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this 
type of event, have a different way of looking upon 
themselves than I have. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. This event has colored the way I think and feel 
about other experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way 
I look upon my future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event 
would be in the middle with threads going out to many 
other experiences.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. My life story can be divided into two main 
chapters: one is before and one is after this event 
happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. This event permanently changed my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I often think about the effects this event will have 
on my future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. This event was a turning point in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a 
different person today. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to 
this event. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current 
memory for the original event. 
 
Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence 
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely 
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened) 
2. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a 
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever) 
3. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 = 
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)  
4. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all 
confident; 7 = completely confident) 
5. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8 
= clear and complete memory for the event) 
6. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you 
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong 
belief) 
7. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7 
= 100% accurate)  
8. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing 
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)  
9. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)  
10. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at 
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible) 
 
Recollective phenomenology 
1. When I think about this event it the overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid) 
2. When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
3. When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
4. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague, 
7 = clear/distinct) 
5. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 = 
vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
6. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my 
memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
7. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) 
8. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened. 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
9. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story 
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much) 
10. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) 
 
  
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 226 
 
 
Personal Attributes Rating Scale 
 
Rate the following adjectives on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
 
 YOUR STANDING OVER 
THE PAST YEAR 
YOUR STANDING 
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 
THE EVENT 
 Not 
at 
all 
 Extre
mely 
Not 
at 
all 
 Extre
mely 
1. Kind  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
2. Tolerant  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
3. Good-natured  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
4. Open-minded  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
5. Appreciative of 
others  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
6. Unselfish 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
7. Knowledgeable  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
8. Courageous  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
9. Experienced  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
10. Strong coping 
skills  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
11. Self-confident  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
12. Wise  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
13. Strong sense of 
inner strength  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
14. Ability to cope 
with change  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
15. Intelligent 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
16. Insightful about 
oneself  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
17. Insightful about 
other people  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
18. Strong desire to 
take better care of 
oneself  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
19. Appreciative of 
what I have  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
20. Good sense of my 
abilities and 
limitations  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
21. Good sense of 
priorities in life  
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
22. Mature 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
23. Honest  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
24. Reliable  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
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25. Tidy 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
26. Happy about life  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
27. Healthy 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
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Sense of Closure Scale  
 
 Not 
at all 
 Very 
much 
1. I have complete closure on this event 1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
2. The event seems like ancient history to me. 1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
3. The event is a ‘closed book’ to me. 1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
4. The event is “unfinished business” for me.  1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
5. I have put the event behind me completely. 1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
6. I just wish I could figure out why this event happened.* 1 2   3   4   5   6 7 
 
Note. *Item 6 was dropped from the Sense of Closure Scale.  
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Test of Self-Conscious Affect, Version 3S 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by 
several common reactions to those situations. 
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how 
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all 
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or 
they may react different ways at different times.  
For example: 
A. You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside 
 
 Not 
likel
y 
   Very 
likely 
a. You would telephone a friend to catch up on news 1 2 3 4 5 
b. You would take the extra time to read the paper. 1             2 3 4 5 
c. You would feel disappointed that it’s raining 1            2 3 4 5 
d. You would wonder why you woke up so early 1                        2 3 4 5 
 
In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled “1” for 
answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday 
morning— so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b) 
because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I 
circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would be 
disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t—it would depend on what I had 
planned. And I circled a “4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had 
awakened so early.  
 
Please do not skip any items—rate all responses 
 
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At five o’clock, you realize you have 
stood your friend up. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think, “I’m inconsiderate.” 1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think: "Well, my friend will understand."   1 2     3     4 5 
c. You’d think you should make it up to your friend as 
soon as possible 
1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would think, “My boss distracted me just before 
lunch.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think, “This is making me anxious. I need 
to either fix it or get someone else to.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think about quitting. 1 2     3     4 5 
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c. You would think, “A lot of things aren’t made very 
well these days.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would think: "It was only an accident."           1 2     3     4 5 
 
3. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would feel incompetent. 1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think, “There are never enough hours in the 
day.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would feel, “I deserve to be reprimanded for 
mismanaging the project.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would think: "What's done is done."               1 2     3     4 5 
 
4. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think the company did not like the co-
worker. 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think: "Life is not fair."                  1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker. 1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the 
situation 
1 2     3     4 5 
 
5. While playing around, you throw a ball, and it hits your friend in the face. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a 
ball 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think maybe your friend needs more 
practice at catching. 
1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would think: "It was just an accident."           1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would apologize and make sure your friend feels 
better. 
1 2     3     4 5 
 
6. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think the animal shouldn’t have been on 
the road. 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think, “I’m terrible.” 1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."           1 2     3     4 5 
d.. You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert [while] 
driving down the road 
1 2     3     4 5 
 
7. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well; then you find out you 
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did poorly. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think: "Well, it's just a test."            1 2     3     4 5 
a. You would think, “The instructor doesn’t like me.” 1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think, “I should have studied harder.” 1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would feel stupid. 1 2     3     4 5 
 
8. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless." 1 2     3     4 5 
a. You would feel small . . . like a rat. 1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think that perhaps that friend should have 
been there to defend himself/herself. 
1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would apologize and talk about that person’s good 
points. 
1 2     3     4 5 
 
9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending 
on you, and your boss criticizes you. 
 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think your boss should have been more 
clear about what was expected of you. 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would feel as though you want to hide. 1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would think, “I should have recognized the 
problem and done a better job.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."            1 2     3     4 5 
 
10.  You are taking care of your friend’s dog while she is on vacation and the dog 
runs away. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You would think, “I am irresponsible and 
incompetent.” 
1 2     3     4 5 
b. You would think your friend must not take very good 
care of her dog or it wouldn’t have run away. 
1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would vow to be more careful next time. 1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would think your friend could just get a new dog. 1 2     3     4 5 
 
11. You attend your co-worker’s housewarming party, and you spill red wine on a 
new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
 Not 
Likely 
 Very 
Likely 
a. You think your co-worker should have expected some 1 2     3     4 5 
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 232 
 
 
accidents at such a big party.              
b. You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the 
party. 
1 2     3     4 5 
c. You would wish you were anywhere but at the party. 1 2     3     4 5 
d. You would wonder why your co-worker chose to serve 
red wine with the new light carpet. 
1 2     3     4 5 
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Psychological Aggression Scale  
 
 
Have you ever: Circle your answer 
1. Shouted or yelled at a partner 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
2. Ignored, shut out, or given a partner the 
silent treatment?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
3. Called a partner hurtful names?  
(If yes) In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
4. Criticized or put down a partner in front of 
others?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
5. Limited a partner’s contact with others such 
as family or friends?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
6. Controlled a partner’s behavior or activities 
in any way?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
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5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
7. Acted jealous or suspicious of a partner’s 
other relationships?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
8. Insulted or sworn at a partner?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
9. Intentionally destroyed something belonging 
to a partner?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
10. Threatened to hit, hurt, or throw something 
at a partner?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
11. Thrown, smashed, hit, or kicked something 
in a partner’s presence?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
12. Threatened to hurt a partner if they left the 
relationship?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 235 
 
 
13. Threatened to hurt yourself if a partner left 
the relationship?  
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
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Physical Aggression Scale  
 
 
Have you ever: Circle your answer 
1. Pushed or shoved a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
2. Slapped a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
3. Thrown something at a partner that could 
hurt? 
(If yes) In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
4. Twisted a partner’s arm or hair? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
5. Used a knife or gun on a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
6. Punched a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
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7. Hit a partner with something that could 
hurt? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
8. Choked a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
9. Slammed a partner against a wall? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
10. Beaten up a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
11. Grabbed a partner or held a partner down 
in anger? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
12. Burned or scalded a partner on purpose? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
13. Kicked a partner? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
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4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
14. Scratched or bitten a partner during a 
conflict? 
(If yes): In the past 12 months, how often have 
you done this? 
Yes       No 
1 = 1 incident 
2 = 2 incidents 
3 = 3-5 incidents 
4 = 6-10 incidents 
5 = 11-20 incidents 
6 = More than 20 times incidents 
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Interpersonal Adjective Scales 
 
Please rate how accurately each word describes you as a person.  Judge how 
accurately each word describes you on the following scale.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
extremely very  quite slightly slightly quite very extremely 
inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate 
 
For example, consider the word “Introverted”.  How accurately does that word 
describe you as a person?  If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, 
you would select the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”.   If 
you think this word is slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would 
select the number “4”.  If it is very inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on… 
It is very important that you do not skip any.   If you are uncertain about the 
meaning of a word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets. 
 
1. Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; 
is less interested in other people) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
2. Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken 
with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
3. Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable 
around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
4. Unargumentative (tends to avoid arguments or 
fights) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
5. Boastful (tends to brag) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
6. Soft-hearted (tends to be easy-going or gentle 
with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
7. Ruthless (pursues one's own interests regardless 
of the effect on others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
8. Kind (thoughtful and caring for others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
9. Cheerful (happy, usually in good spirits) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
10. Unsparkling (not lively or entertaining with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
11. Tricky (can be deceiving toward others in order 
to get something; able to fool others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
12. Unaggressive (tends to be mild-mannered, not 
forceful around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
13. Calculating (tends to use or manipulate others to 
your own advantage) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
14. Tender (warm and loving with others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
15. Hard-hearted (unconcerned and unfeeling 
toward others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
16. Unneighbourly (unfriendly, aloof toward others, 
avoid contact with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
17. Uncharitable (dislike helping others; tends to 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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judge others harshly) 
18. Uncunning (not crafty or sly, tends to be 
straightforward with others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
19. Extraverted (like being with others; outgoing 
and lively around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
20. Cocky (self-centred; conceited; thinks highly of 
one's own abilities) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
21. Dominant (tends to lead others, like to 
command, take charge in a group) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
22. Antisocial (dislike the company of others; 
behavior not affected by social rules) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
23. Perky (lively, energetic around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
24. Forceful (tends to take charge around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
25. Wily (crafty, cagey, or tricky) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
26. Sly (crafty, secretive, or cunning in dealing with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
27. Iron-hearted (tends to be stern or harsh with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
28. Unbold (not daring or courageous) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
29. Neighbourly (friendly; likes to get involved with 
people around you) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
30. Shy (lacking in self-confidence; tends to be 
uncomfortable around others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
31. Undemanding (doesn't demand or expect much 
from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
32. Meek (timid, has trouble being assertive or 
standing up from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
33. Unwily (not tricky or crafty) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
34. Self-assured (confident, certain of oneself) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
35. Dissocial (doesn't care for the company of 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
36. Jovial (cheerful; playful around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
37. Domineering (tends to control or manipulate 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
38. Tender-hearted (easily feels love, pity or 
sorrow for others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
39. Warmthless (has no feeling of pleasure or 
affection for others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
40. Unsly (not tricky or cunning; tends to be 
genuine; sincere; trusting) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
41. Enthusiastic (enjoys active involvement with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
42. Firm (steadfast; does not give in easily; gets 
others to do things your way) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
43. Uncalculating (doesn't try to manipulate others 
or maximize one's own gain) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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44. Accommodating (obliging, tends to do favors 
for others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
45. Uncheery (not lively or jolly around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
46. Friendly (open, accepting, warm around others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
47. Cunning (crafty, skillful at manipulating others, 
devious) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
48. Self-confident (sure of oneself around others, 
devious) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
49. Unauthoritative (doesn't try to influence others; 
goes with others' opinions) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
50. Uncrafty (not tricky or sly when dealing with 
others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
51. Unsympathetic (not interested or concerned 
about others' feelings or problems) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
52. Charitable (generous, like to help others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
53. Coldhearted (have little warmth or feelings for 
others; unfeeling; harsh) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
54. Distant (tends to be cold toward others; tends to 
stay away from others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
55. Forceless (not forceful with others; timid or 
weak, find it hard to be assertive) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
56. Gentle-hearted (warm or kind to others) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
57. Outgoing (enjoy meeting other people) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
58. Sympathetic (feel interested or sensitive to the 
feelings and problems of others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
59. Boastless (don't like to brag) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
60. Persistent (doesn't give up even when others 
think you are wrong) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
61. Crafty (can mislead or manipulate others for 
one's own purposes) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
62. Unsociable (doesn't enjoy meeting people or 
being in the company of others) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
63. Cruel (able to cause pain and suffering to others; 
unfeeling) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
64. Bashful (tends to shy away from public 
attention) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
 
 
  
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 242 
 
 
Positive Mood Induction 
Please select a positive memory that you still believe truly occurred. Please answer the 
following questions as you reflect on this believed memory. 
Please briefly describe the event: 
What was your (approximate) age when this event took place? 
 
Please answer the following questions as you reflect specifically on your current 
memory for the original event. 
 
Recollection, belief in accuracy, and belief in occurrence 
11. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? (1 = definitely 
did not happen; 8 = definitely happened) 
12. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event? (1 = a 
great deal of doubts; 7 = no doubts whatsoever) 
13. How strong is your memory for this event? (1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 = 
moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)  
14. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all 
confident; 7 = completely confident) 
15. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? (1 = no memory of event at all; 8 
= clear and complete memory for the event) 
16. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you 
remember the event)? (1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong 
belief) 
17. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate? (1 = not at all accurate; 7 
= 100% accurate)  
18. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing 
that it occurred? (1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)  
19. It is true that this event occurred. (1 = not at all true; 7 = completely true)  
20. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event? (1 = not at 
all plausible; 8 = extremely plausible) 
 
Recollective phenomenology 
11. When I think about this event it the overall vividness is (1 = vague; 7 = very vivid) 
12. When I think about this event it involves visual details. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
13. When I think about this event it involves sound. (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
14. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is: (1 = vague, 
7 = clear/distinct) 
15. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects is: (1 = 
vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
16. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of people in my 
memory is: (1 = vague, 7 = clear/distinct) 
17. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living it. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
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much) 
18. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened. 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
19. As I think about the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story 
or episode and not as isolated scenes, facts or thoughts: not at all, coherent story. (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much) 
20. As I think about the event, it is connected with other events. (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much) 
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Demographics 
 
Age: 
 
Sex: 
 
Ethnicity (please select): 
__ Black/African/Caribbean 
__ Chinese 
__ Filipino 
__ First Nations 
__ Japanese 
__ Latin American 
__ Mixed 
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan) 
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian) 
__ White 
__ Other: ______________________________________________ 
 
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest 
degree you have received: 
__ No formal education 
__ Elementary school 
__ High school or equivalent (GED) 
__ Community college 
__ Bachelor’s degree 
__ Master’s degree 
__ Professional degree 
__ Doctorate degree 
 
Is English your first language? 
Yes  No  If No, please indicate how long you’ve been speaking English for:  
 
Please enter your UWindsor name and email address in order to receive participant pool 
credit for your participation: _____________ 
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Appendix H 
Order of Measures – Study 2 
 
Version A 
1. Letter of Information 
2. High self-threat prompt 
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
b. Appraisals: 
i. Centrality of Event Scale 
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
iii. Recollective phenomenology 
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
v. Sense of Closure Scale 
3. Low self-threat prompt 
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
b. Appraisals: 
i. Centrality of Event Scale 
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
iii. Recollective phenomenology 
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
v. Sense of Closure Scale 
4. Other variables: 
a. Test of Self Conscious Affect – Version 3 (short version) 
b. Psychological Aggression scale; Physical Aggression Scale 
c. Interpersonal Adjective Scales 
5. Positive mood induction 
a. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
b. Recollective phenomenology 
6. Demographics 
7. Resource sheet  
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Version B 
1. Letter of Information 
2. Low self-threat prompt 
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
b. Appraisals: 
i. Centrality of Event Scale 
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
iii. Recollective phenomenology 
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
v. Sense of Closure Scale 
3. High self-threat prompt 
a. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
b. Appraisals: 
i. Centrality of Event Scale 
ii. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
iii. Recollective phenomenology 
iv. Personal Attributes Rating Scale  
v. Sense of Closure Scale 
4. Other variables: 
a. Test of Self Conscious Affect – Version 3 (short version) 
b. Psychological Aggression scale; Physical Aggression Scale 
c. Interpersonal Adjective Scales 
5. Positive mood induction 
a. Measures of belief in accuracy, occurrence, recollection.  
b. Recollective phenomenology 
6. Demographics 
7. Resource sheet  
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Appendix I 
Item-by-item Analyses 
 
Table 1 
 
Item-by-item Analysis of Sense of Closure Scale-5 Items 
 
  
Men Women 
Sense of Closure items Condition M N SD 
High vs. low 
self-threat  
95%CI M N SD 
High vs. low 
self-threat 
95%CI 
1. I have complete closure on this event 
High self-threat 5.55 111 1.81 –0.93 –0.13 5.08 108 1.90 –1.20 –0.30 
Low self-threat 6.08 111 1.42 
  
5.83 108 1.90 
  2. The event seems like ancient history 
to me. 
High self-threat 4.65 110 1.93 0.30 1.23 4.46 110 2.06 0.40 1.42 
Low self-threat 3.89 110 2.09 
  
3.55 110 2.23 
  
3. The event is a 'closed book' to me. 
High self-threat 5.49 108 1.71 –0.01 0.99 4.83 109 2.05 –0.22 0.76 
Low self-threat 5.00 108 2.04 
  
4.57 109 2.19 
  4. The event is “unfinished business” 
for me. (Reverse coded) 
High self-threat 5.64 109 1.77 –0.81 0.09 4.80 110 2.07 –1.14 –0.19 
Low self-threat 6.00 109 1.75 
  
5.46 110 1.90 
  5. I have put the event behind me 
completely. 
High self-threat 5.22 109 1.86 0.13 1.12 4.60 109 2.06 0.11 1.08 
Low self-threat 4.60 109 2.02 
  
4.00 109 2.27 
  Note. The values in bold are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Table 2 
 
Item-by-item Analysis of Sense of Closure Scale Items 
 
  Men 
High vs. low 
self-threat Women 
High vs. low 
self-threat 
Centrality of Event Scale items Condition M SD N 95% CI Mean SD N 95% CI 
1. This event has become a reference point 
for the way I understand new experiences. 
High self-threat 3.17 1.22 111 
–0.11 0.45 
3.17 1.23 108 
0.36 0.88 Low self-threat 3.00 1.19 111 2.55 1.22 108 
2. I automatically see connections and 
similarities between this event and 
experiences in my present life.  
High self-threat 2.84 1.30 109 
–0.57 0.11 
2.77 1.24 109 
–0.57 0.05 Low self-threat 3.07 1.22 109 3.03 1.23 109 
3. I feel that this event has become part of 
my identity. 
High self-threat 2.37 1.26 111 
–0.75 –0.13 
2.38 1.31 110 
–0.33 0.26 Low self-threat 2.81 1.29 111 2.42 1.24 110 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or 
mark of important themes in my life. 
High self-threat 2.61 1.34 111 
-0.95 -0.35 
2.65 1.41 109 
–0.27 0.32 Low self-threat 3.26 1.25 111 2.62 1.18 109 
5. This event is making my life different 
from the life of most other people. 
High self-threat 2.26 1.33 111 
–0.47 0.12 
2.22 1.23 110 
–0.24 0.22 Low self-threat 2.43 1.28 111 2.23 1.13 110 
6. This event has become a reference point 
for the way I understand myself and the 
world. 
High self-threat 2.61 1.29 111 
–0.46 0.14 
2.81 1.26 108 
0.03 0.58 Low self-threat 2.77 1.26 111 2.50 1.23 108 
7. I believe that people who haven’t 
experienced this type of event think 
differently than I do. 
High self-threat 2.92 1.38 110 
-0.22 0.44 
2.86 1.31 109 
0.12 0.70 Low self-threat 2.81 1.22 110 2.45 1.21 109 
8. This event tells a lot about who I am. 
High self-threat 2.39 1.27 111 
–1.44 –0.83 
2.73 1.20 108 
–1.15 –0.54 Low self-threat 3.52 1.16 111 3.57 1.19 108 
9. I often see connections and similarities 
between this event and my current 
relationships with other people. 
High self-threat 2.47 1.31 110 
–0.77 –0.07 
2.63 1.28 110 
–0.82 –0.21 Low self-threat 2.89 1.21 110 3.15 1.22 110 
10. I feel that this event has become a 
central part of my life story. 
High self-threat 2.15 1.30 111 
–0.66 –0.09 
2.23 1.24 110 
–0.10 0.42 Low self-threat 2.53 1.31 111 2.06 1.20 110 
11. I believe that people who haven’t 
experienced this type of event, have a 
different way of looking upon themselves 
High self-threat 2.76 1.41 110 
–0.29 0.32 
2.81 1.30 110 
0.14 0.68 Low self-threat 2.75 1.21 110 2.40 1.17 110 
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 249 
 
 
than I have. 
12. This event has colored the way I think 
and feel about other experiences. 
High self-threat 2.77 1.30 109 
–0.38 0.21 
2.88 1.25 109 
0.11 0.65 Low self-threat 2.85 1.22 109 2.50 1.28 109 
13. This event has become a reference point 
for the way I look upon my future. 
High self-threat 2.59 1.37 111 
–0.54 0.09 
2.63 1.36 110 
–0.10 0.46 Low self-threat 2.82 1.34 111 2.45 1.21 110 
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, 
this event would be in the middle with 
threads going out to many other 
experiences. 
High self-threat 1.99 1.23 109 
–0.62 -0.11 
2.16 1.23 107 
–0.05 0.44 Low self-threat 2.36 1.32 109 1.96 1.16 107 
15. My life story can be divided into two 
main chapters: one is before and one is after 
this event happened. 
High self-threat 2.11 1.30 110 
–0.32 0.30 
2.32 1.48 109 
0.27 0.87 Low self-threat 2.12 1.40 110 1.75 1.14 109 
16. This event permanently changed my 
life. 
High self-threat 2.58 1.43 110 
–0.08 0.59 
2.49 1.41 110 
0.27 0.88 Low self-threat 2.33 1.42 110 1.92 1.15 110 
17. I often think about the effects this event 
will have on my future. 
High self-threat 2.23 1.22 111 
–0.41 0.12 
2.33 1.23 105 
–0.02 0.56 Low self-threat 2.38 1.36 111 2.07 1.23 105 
18. This event was a turning point in my 
life. 
High self-threat 2.54 1.35 109 
–0.12 0.54 
2.66 1.42 108 
0.40 1.01 Low self-threat 2.33 1.39 109 1.95 1.17 108 
19. If this event had not happened to me, I 
would be a different person today. 
High self-threat 2.79 1.44 111 
0.01 0.65 
2.71 1.36 109 
0.43 1.04 Low self-threat 2.46 1.46 111 1.97 1.23 109 
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often 
think back to this event. 
High self-threat 2.18 1.17 111 
–0.58 –0.02 
2.45 1.32 110 
0.09 0.65 Low self-threat 2.48 1.31 111 2.08 1.17 110 
Note. The values in bold are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Coding Frame: Motives For Challenging Others’ Memories 
 
 
 
Fiona Dyshniku 
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PURPOSE OF THIS CODING MANUAL 
 
 In this study, participants were asked to write about a time in which they 
challenged someone else’s account of a past event. The instructions specifically 
asked them to describe: 
o How they challenged the other. 
o Why they challenged the other. 
 
 Use this manual to code the reasons participants themselves identify as motivating 
their challenge. In other words, although you may detect numerous reasons for 
initiating a challenge, you are being asked to code ONLY those reason(s) the 
participant himself/herself explicitly identifies in his/her writing.  
 
 In every account, you will find at least 2 players: 
o The challenger = the participant in this study.  
o The challenged party (the challengee) = the other 
 Some accounts may involve the following additional players: 
o A third party other = a person who was absent when the challenge 
occurred but may have been present when the challenged event occurred. 
 
 Throughout this coding manual, the labels “participant(s)” and “challenger(s)” are 
equivalent; they denote the same individual.  
 
 Throughout this coding manual, the words “reason(s)” and “motive(s)” are used 
interchangeably.  
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GENERAL CODING GUIDELINES 
 
 Read this document entirely before you begin coding. Be sure that you understand 
the definitions for the major categories and are able to distinguish amongst them. 
 
 Always code from the perspective of the challenger. 
 
 Do not infer beyond what is explicitly stated by the participant as motive for 
challenging, unless directed otherwise. Code ONLY what the participant says and 
do not put forth your own opinion while coding.  
 
 The coding categories devised here are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. A 
single statement can be coded under multiple categories. 
 
 In every participant’s narrative, attempt to assess which is the focal event. For 
consistency in coding, pick the broadest grain size (e.g., if participant speaks 
about a fight in which she was hit, and she said that her partner denied the hitting 
[but not the fight], see the overall fight as the focal event, not the hitting). 
 
 In most cases, you will be able to identify the focal event from reading the 
participant’s response to “Describe how you challenged this person’s memory. 
What did you say or do to challenge the memory?” For further context or clarity, 
it is helpful to consult the participant’s response to “Describe your memory for the 
event that you chose to challenge.” 
 
 In every participant’s response to “why” they challenged, it will be helpful to 
segment and paraphrase their reasons without any embellishments or repetitive 
words. Paraphrasing involves identifying the logical proposition or statement 
being made independent of any filler or embellished words. 
 
o One reason for challenging = one unit of coding. 
o One unit of coding can receive multiple category codes, but only one 
subcategory code within any one category. 
 
 Do NOT use the response to the following question to code motive: “Describe 
your memory for the event that you chose to challenge”. This should only serve as 
context and help clarify the recalled event. 
 
 Do not discuss your coding strategies or tendencies with other coders until the 
entire data set is complete and you are instructed to do so. 
 
 Note categories or concepts you find confusing or difficult to distinguish from 
other categories. 
 
 If you have any questions, ideas, comments, please contact Fiona at 
dyshnik@uwindsor.ca 
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STRATEGY FOR CODING MOTIVES 
 
FIRST STEP, read the participant’s response to the question “Describe why you 
challenged the other person’s memory?”  
 Segment and paraphrase the reasons for challenging (see General Coding 
Guidelines for this). One reason for challenging = one coding unit. 
 Code mostly everything here as motive.  
 At times, there may be extraneous information included in this answer that does 
not relate to motive. Extraneous information will usually be obvious from the 
context. If in doubt, code as motive. 
o Example: “I was absolutely sure that I was right and he was wrong. I made the 
effort to not say a bad word. It doesn't always work, but this time I am 
positive it did work.” 
 “I was absolutely sure that I was right and he was wrong” = Motive. 
The participant is stating that they challenged because they were 
confident they were right and the other was wrong. 
 “I made the effort to not say a bad word. It doesn't always work, but 
this time I am positive it did work” = Extraneous info. Although 
revealing about the participant himself/herself, these two sentences do 
not speak to motive for challenging.   
 
SECOND STEP, read the participant’s response to the question “Describe how you 
challenged this person’s memory. What did you say or do to challenge the memory?” 
 Be selective about what you code here as motive. There may be extraneous 
information included in this answer that does not relate to motive.  
 If a participant hints at a motive (however implicitly) when answering “why”, and 
then elaborates explicitly on that same motive when answering “how”, you can 
code that particular “how” content as a motive. If, however, a participant 
discusses or hints at a motive while answering “how” that is not mentioned in any 
way while answering “why”, do not code as motive.  
o REMEMBER: Prioritize “why” answers at all times! Statements inside 
“how” response are only coded if they are contained, discussed, or hinted 
at in “why” response.  
 As a very general guide, it is safe to use “how” if you see the following in the 
“why” responses: 
o Vague stand-alone statements like “X was wrong” (e.g., “I challenged 
because) I thought some of the things he was talking about were 
completely wrong, or slightly wrong”. The use of vague statements like “x 
was wrong” open the door to looking into the “how” answer to better 
determine what the participant means by “wrong”. 
o Words that imply inaccuracies, like “liar”, “lying”, “embellishing” and 
their synonyms (e.g., “I challenged because she had a way of embellishing 
things to make them sound worse than they really are”). On their own, 
such statements hint at accuracy concerns, and looking at “how” response 
might help narrow down the type of accuracy concern. 
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o Statements about participant’s own memory ability (e.g., I challenged 
because I have an excellent memory”; “I challenged because I thought I 
was right”; “I challenged because I have first-hand knowledge of the 
situation”). The participant here is strongly suggesting that their version of 
events differs from the others. Consult the “how” response for clarification 
and further evidence of this accuracy motive. 
 As a very general guide, it is safe to use “how” if you see the following in the 
“how” responses: 
o Dispositional statements about others (e.g., about the challenged other, 
about a third party person). These will usually take the form of “X is 
always…” or “Y has a tendency to…”). These are clearly not “how” 
answers and would be more appropriately categorized as motives for 
challenging.  
o Dispositional statements about oneself. These are also clearly not “how” 
answers and would be more appropriately categorized as motives for 
challenging.  
 The logic behind this selective coding of the “how” question is to strike a delicate 
balance among 1) comprehensively coding motives, 2) staying as close as 
possible to what the participant is explicitly stating as motivating the challenge, 
and 3) being mindful of the difference between “how” the challenge was carried 
out and “why” it was carried out. 
 
Examples of when to use “why” and when to consult “how” responses: 
 
Example 1:  
 FIRST STEP: Response to “why”: “his details were wrong, and that memory 
was very important to me. It was a traumatic event for me, and I wanted to make 
sure that he knew exactly how it happened.”  
o At least 3 motives/reasons here segmented and paraphrased: #1 Because 
his details were wrong, #2 Because the memory was important to me, #3 
Because I wanted to ensure he knew how it happened.  
 SECOND STEP: Response to “how”: “I had to stop him midway through, 
because his facts were wrong. I told him that it's not how it happened. I 
remembered the incident very clearly since it was a somewhat traumatic event for 
me, and I corrected him immediately. He got some minor details wrong, but it 
was understandable, since the event happened many years ago. I, however, still 
remember it vividly and I can recall every single detail about it, including the 
colors and the outfit I was wearing that day.”  
o “I had to stop him midway through, because his facts were wrong. I told 
him that it's not how it happened. I remembered the incident very clearly 
since it was a somewhat traumatic event for me”  Participant elaborates 
on the previously identified motive #1 (i.e., “his details were wrong”) by 
adding that the other was wrong because he himself remembers “the 
incident very clearly”. This elaboration would receive a code for Internal 
Features.   
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o  “I remember the incident…as it was somewhat traumatic event for me” 
 This phrase can arguably be considered an elaboration of motive #2 
above and would receive a code for Memory Integrity. 
o “He got some minor details wrong, but it was understandable, since the 
event happened many years ago”  This is another elaboration on motive 
#1 above. Here, the participant demonstrates a Belief in Accuracy “…he 
got some minor details wrong” and a Belief about Age and Memory 
(…since the event happened many years ago”). 
o “…still remember it vividly and I can recall every single detail about it, 
including the colors and the outfit I was wearing that day”  More 
elaboration of motive #1, which would receive a code for Internal 
Features. 
 
Example 2: 
 FIRST STEP  Response to “why”: “Because they weren't in fact with me at 
the event.” 
o One motive/reason segmented and paraphrased here: Because they were 
absent from the event [Accuracy] 
 SECOND STEP  Response to “how”:  “A friend tried to invoke the memories 
of a concert that they claimed they went to with me.  I challenged them and said 
they weren't there.  They were surprised but when they thought back, they 
realized I was right and that they in fact had simply heard so much about the story 
that they assumed they were there, as they regularly hang out with our mutual 
friend group.” 
o The participant here demonstrates an understanding of general meta-
memory beliefs, specifically Memory Integrity (i.e., they had… heard so 
much…that they assumed they were there). This is not, however, 
identified explicitly as a reason for challenging, nor is it a direct 
elaboration of the motive identified when answering “why”. No statements 
inside this “how” response will receive any motive codes. 
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HOW TO USE THE CODING TEMPLATE 
 
 If a category/subcategory is present, enter ‘1’ in the appropriate cell. 
 
 If a category/subcategory is absent, enter ‘0’ in the appropriate cell. 
 
 The Excel spreadsheet is organized such that each MAJOR CATEGORY 
corresponds to the same letter of the alphabet as the one used in this document 
(“A” denotes “General Meta-Memory Beliefs”, “B” denotes “Internal Features”, 
etc.).  
 
 Within each MAJOR CATEOGRY there are one or more subcategories. Each 
SUBCATEGORY corresponds to a number. The numbers used in the Excel 
spreadsheet correspond to the numbers used in this document.  
 
 Within each MAJOR CATEGORY, there is a “Notes” column to include any 
relevant information pertaining to that category. 
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(A) GENERAL META-MEMORY BELIEFS 
 
General Notes:  
 General beliefs regarding memory and ability are meta-memory attributions about 
the operations of memory in general (e.g., how memory works); they are NOT 
event-specific.  
 They tend to be learned at school, through conversations with others, through 
personal experience with remembering, etc. 
 General beliefs may be derived through others. For example, one’s reasoning that 
they were “told by another person that memories before a certain age cannot 
occur,” would still be regarded as a general belief.  
 
 
A1. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY & AGE  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was 
motivated by the assumption(s) that: 
o Memories before a certain age cannot occur 
o One was too young to remember  
o Childhood memories are illogical or unreliable 
o Memory declines with age 
o Other memories should be present at age of particular memory assessed 
 Specific Codes: 
o Code 1a if comparative = the motive provided includes a statement that 
compares the ages of the challenger and the person whom they challenged 
(e.g., “I challenged his memory because I was older than him and I know 
the event didn't happen.”)  
o Code 1b if absolute = the motive provided includes an absolute statement 
regarding age, with no comparison evoked (e.g., “Young people don’t 
remember well”; “I had to question it because I was sure this was a detail 
of the story I would've remembered, even though I was too young to 
remember the original memory”) 
o It is possible to code both 1a and 1b if the participant makes a 
comparative statement in one part of their account, and then makes an 
absolute statement in another part of their account. To assess whether two 
separate sentences are intended as a comparative statement, use the 
proximity of the sentences to each other and any context that indicates 
links between the two as guide. Sentences that follow one-another and/or 
use connecting links (“and”, “so”) are to be coded as comparative. 
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged because] I was concerned with her memory as she is getting 
quite old.” [coded as 1b] 
o “I challenged her memory because… I can understand that she may not 
fully remember her past since she was only a child back then [when 9/11 
happened]…[coded as 1b] 
o “There is no way I could remember something that happened when I was 
just 2 years old. My teacher said that people can’t have memories before 
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the age of 3 or 4” or “Children have such wild imaginations,” or “I should 
have other memories from that age but I don’t”. 
 
 
A2. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY ABILITY  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was 
motivated by assumptions regarding their own general ability to accurately recall 
events, AND/OR the other’s general ability to accurately recall events. For 
example, the challenger may believe that their memory is superior to the other’s, 
or that the other’s memory ability is quite poor. 
 Specific Codes: 
o Code A2a if comparative = the motive provided includes a statement that 
compares the general memory ability of the challenger against the other’s 
general memory ability (e.g., I challenged because my memory is good 
and their memory is horrible).  
o Code A2b if absolute = the motive provided includes a statement that 
mentions the challenger’s own general memory ability (e.g., “I challenged 
because my memory is excellent”.); OR that mentions the other’s general 
memory ability (e.g., “I challenged because their memory is awful”).  
o It is possible to code both A2a and A2b if the participant makes a 
comparative statement in one part of their account, and they make an 
absolute statement in another part of their account. To infer whether two 
separate sentences are intended as a comparative statement, use the 
proximity of the sentences to each other and any context that indicates 
links between the two as guide. Sentences that follow one-another and/or 
use connecting links (“and”, “so”) are to be coded as comparative. 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] I have very, very good memory so I clearly know 
she said it,”  (coded as A2b). 
o “[I challenged] because I have a pretty good memory and rarely forget 
things. So, I was sure that she had forgotten because she always does.” 
(note in this case that an initially absolute statement is closely followed by 
a statement about the other’s memory. The proximity, as well as the link 
“so” between the two statements, warrants a A2a code) 
o “[I challenged] because I pride myself on my good memory and 
recollection skill and his side of the story was flawed and untrue from my 
perspective.”  (coded as A2a) 
 
 
A3. GENERAL BELIEFS REGARDING MEMORY INTEGRITY  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was 
motivated by the assumption that: 
o Memories can be false or reconstructed 
o The telling of (or hearing of) someone else’s memory (or another event) 
can become one’s own memory 
o Memories can result from expectations (or prior beliefs) 
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o “Important” (serious, dangerous, life threatening, etc.) events should be 
more memorable 
o Memories can be intentionally or unintentionally borrowed from others. 
 Code this subcategory when the participant states that the other’s memory or 
features of their memory were wrong OR the participant’s memory or features of 
their memory are right; do not give this code if the participant states that the other 
“is/was wrong” or they “I am right” because there is insufficient information here 
to determine whether memory integrity is being challenged.   
 Examples:  
o “I challenged their memory because the order in which things took place 
along with the outcomes from this event were being misconstrued by the 
false recollection.” 
o “If my sister really did do something that serious, I think I would 
remember it better” or “I think I have this memory because of hearing 
similar stories from other people but I don’t think it really happened to 
me,” 
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(B) INTERNAL FEATURES OF EVENT REPRESENTATION 
 
General Notes:  
 Internal features of event representation refer to the subjective representation of 
the event in the participant’s mind and the characteristics therein. Examples of 
internal features or memory characteristics include people, objects, sights, sounds, 
smells, clarity or vividness, location, narrative coherence (i.e., whether the pieces 
of the story appear to fit together), imagery perspective (i.e., first person/field or 
third person/observer), and other thoughts and feelings experienced when 
recalling the event.  
o For example, the challenger/participant might state they are challenging 
because their memory for the event feels especially vivid/strong.  
 Internal features refer to the participant’s assessment of how and/or whether the 
event, or parts of the event, are remembered along with specific sensory, 
contextual, and emotional characteristics of the memory itself. It is a person’s 
image of the event in the mind’s eye. 
 
 
B1. INTERNAL FEATURES/MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge to the other’s memory was 
motivated by something that:  
o Was/is odd or unusual about their own memory representation, and may 
align with the following: 
 Internal features present but disorganized (unusual, unfamiliar, not 
logically consistent) 
 Internal features present but not clear (faded, weak, vague) 
 Internal features absent (missing, unable to retrieve key episodic 
details) 
 The event no longer seems/feels real 
 The memory seems different compared to other memories 
o Was/is odd or unusual about the other’s memory representation, and may 
align with the following: 
 Internal features present but disorganized (unusual, unfamiliar, not 
logically consistent) 
 Internal features present but not clear (faded, weak, vague) 
 Internal features absent (missing, unable to retrieve key episodic 
details) 
 The event no longer seems/feels real 
 The memory seems different compared to other memories 
o Was/is clear, vivid, and interconnected with the participant’s other 
memories, and may align with the following:   
 Internal features are present and clear (vivid, strong, clear) 
 Internal features are organized or linked in some logically 
consistent manner.  
 The memory seems different compared to other memories 
 Examples: 
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o “[I challenged because] I remember it clearly” 
o “[I challenged] because it was so clear in my memory what he said” 
o “There were certain things that transpired during that visit to Goodwill 
that link my memory together” 
o “I can’t remember the details well and everything seems blurry,” or, “It 
just doesn’t feel real anymore,” or “There are certain parts of my memory 
that just don’t make sense,” etc. 
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(C) EXTERNAL EVIDENCE 
 
General Notes:  
 A participant’s challenge is motivated by possessing external evidence or lack of 
thereof. Do not infer lack of external evidence; only code lack of external 
evidence if the participant explicitly states they could not locate any external 
evidence.  
 External evidence in this category refers to anything that is concrete and/or 
tangible, such as photos, receipts, videos, other documentation, etc. Emails and 
letters are also considered external evidence. 
 Using logic to discount the plausibility of an event is not coded under this 
category. Similarly, talking to others or trying to find information or 
corroboration from others does not constitute external evidence as defined in this 
category.  
 
 
C1. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE PRESENT  
 The participant explicitly states their challenge to the other’s account was 
motivated by their possession of external evidence that undermines or threatens 
the validity of the other’s account.  
 Example: “[I challenged because] I had evidence to the contrary, an email” 
 
 
C2. LACK OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE  
 The participant explicitly states their challenge to the other’s account was 
motivated by the conspicuous absence of external evidence, which undermines or 
threatens the validity of the other’s account.  
 Example: “[I challenged because…] if he had rode the merry-go-round, there 
would have been pictures because I had my camera all ready to take them.”  
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(D) ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTIONS 
 
General Notes:  
 Alternate attributions refer to sources that affect the event-specific memory or 
parts of it. 
 These sources can be “internal” (from my fantasy) or “external” (from a movie). 
 Regardless of the source, the participant states that they are challenging because 
they know or believe that the other’s account has resulted from OR has been 
spoiled or modified in some way by internal or external sources. 
 Do not code here if the “source” for the alternate attribution is social interaction.  
 
 
D1. INTERNAL ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief or 
knowledge that the other’s account or features of it may have resulted from or 
were influenced by an alternate internal source, such as imagination, fantasy, 
nightmare, etc., to the point of being confused with reality. 
 Specific Codes: 
o Code 7a. Imagination/ Confabulation/ Exaggeration/ Simplification/ 
Fantasy/ Daydream = The participant explicitly states that their challenge 
to the other’s account was motivated by their knowledge or belief that the 
other’s account resulted from or was influenced by an alternate internal 
state, such as imagination, confabulation, exaggeration, simplification, 
fantasy and/or daydream, etc. and it is implied this source was confused 
with reality.  
 Examples: “[I challenged because…] their version is made up,”  
OR “[I challenged because…] he/she probably just imagined it” 
o Code 7b. Dream/ Nightmare = The participant explicitly states that their 
challenge to the other’s account was motivated by their knowledge or 
belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by a dream 
or nightmare, and is implied this source was confused with reality.  
 Example: “[I challenged because] they dreamt it all up,” etc. 
 
 
D2. EXTERNAL ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their 
knowledge or belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by 
an external source such as a movie, television show, book/magazine, etc. and it is 
implied this source was confused with reality.  
 Example: “[I challenged their account because] they probably saw that in a 
movie/on television”. 
 
 
D3. OTHER ALTERNATE ATTRIBUTION (INTERNAL AND/OR EXTERNAL)  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their 
knowledge or belief that the other’s account resulted from or was influenced by 
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an alternate internal or external source other than the abovementioned categories 
and it is implied this source was confused with reality. These internal or external 
sources might include: 
o Déjà vu 
o Confusion/ misunderstanding 
o Hallucination/ delusion 
o Mental health issues (includes depression, Alzheimer’s etc.) 
o Substance use (alcohol, or other “recreational” substances) 
o Medication  
o Feeling tired/ sleepy/ sleeping 
o Meditation 
o Hypnotism 
o Otherwise lack of alertness 
 Examples: 
o “I challenged my friend's memory because they have a mental illness that 
impairs their perception of reality and memory.”  
o “I challenged this person because they smoke too much [marijuana] and 
now there memory is failing them”  
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(E) PLAUSIBILITY  
 
General Notes:  
 Refers to an assessment of whether the event could have actually occurred; it is an 
appraisal based on one’s knowledge of the world. For reasons involving 
plausibility, the participant assesses the reality status of the event and decides that 
it is either impossible (i.e., it could not have occurred), implausible (i.e., it is not 
likely to have occurred), or illogical (i.e., it simply does not make sense) for 
themselves or for another person.  
 Plausibility is an assessment of “could this have happened?”, not “did this 
happen?” 
 It is possible for a challenged event to be deemed plausible (and be coded under 
Plausibility), yet NOT deemed to have occurred (and therefore not coded under 
Belief in Occurrence).  
 
 
E1. SUBJECTIVE PLAUSIBILITY  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge was motivated by their own 
assessment that the event was impossible, implausible and/or illogical for reasons 
that are subjective in nature (i.e., they are based on personal feelings, tastes, or 
opinions) and may align with the following:   
 Given age in event  
o Given it was an isolated event/ given frequency of event  
o Relative to anchoring/other life events  
o Given changes in imagery perspective  
o Given people/characters/objects/animals present in memory  
o Given actions in memory  
o Given aesthetics of memory 
o Given one’s location in memory  
o Given time the event occurred  
o Given duration of event 
o Given condition in memory  
o Given outcome in memory 
o Given knowledge of other events/ conditions in memory  
o Given characteristics of people/characters/objects/animals/surroundings in 
memory (size, color, location, condition, etc.) 
o Given inability to remember details in memory 
 Examples:  
o “I told her that it didn't make much sense. A) At age three, I'm fairly 
certain if I had fallen and gotten hurt I would have cried and alerted my 
parents. B) Considering my cousin was two and a half at the time I doubt 
she could actually remember that far back. C) Even if she could have 
remembered and even if I fell out of my crib, how in the world would a 
little three year old with a dislocated elbow climb back into the crib?”  
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o “[I challenged] because I thought the thing she said happened was absurd. 
I don't even think we have the same blood type, plus she lives out of the 
country!” 
o “I don’t think the roads could have been that icy in the spring, so it’s not 
likely that that’s what caused our accident,” or, “It just doesn’t make any 
sense. Why would I be wearing winter clothes in the summer?” or, “A car 
flipped on it’s side like that? It’s impossible!” 
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(F) BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE 
 
General Notes:  
 Belief in Occurrence refers to an assessment of whether a past event actually 
occurred.  
 It differs from Plausibility by focusing on “did this event in fact happen to me?”, 
not “could this event have happened?” 
 As a general rule, all the categories in this section involve a participant who 
claims to challenge BECAUSE they doubt the occurrence of the event for one 
reason or another.  
 
 
F1. THE EVENT DID NOT OCCUR  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
belief/knowledge that the event did not occur. OR the participant states that they 
challenged because the other or others deny the occurrence of the event or 
provide an alternate explanation or state attribution (e.g., dream) for it. 
 This category may overlap with subcategories 13 and 14 below depending on the 
context provided by the participant. 
 Examples:  
o  “[I challenged because] I'm quite sure that this never happened”; “I 
mentioned that when growing up she spanked me and she stated that she 
never did.” 
o “My uncle told me it didn’t happen,” or, “I spoke to my grandfather about 
it and he denied it ever happening,” etc. 
 
 
F2. THE EVENT COULD NOT OCCUR (I.E., IS IMPOSSIBLE)  
 The participant explicitly states that his/her challenge was motivated by the 
belief/knowledge that there is no way the event could have occurred (i.e., it is 
impossible).  
 Examples: 
o Examples from Fiona’s dataset: “I challenged it because I never 
remembered having gone fishing ever when growing up. This isn't 
something your mind can make up...you either have done something like 
that or not. So unless I blocked it out of my memory, I never went fishing 
on my 10th birthday with my sister.” 
o Chantal’s examples from  coding:  “My mom told me that there is no way 
she would have forgotten my birthday,” or, “My brother said that there 
was no such amusement park near our grandparent’s house,” 
 
 
F3. THE EVENT IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED (I.E., IS 
IMPLAUSIBLE)  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
belief/knowledge that the event could have occurred but it is unlikely (i.e., it is 
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implausible). In other words, the participant challenges the other because they 
themselves doubt the occurrence of the event, but they do not actually state that 
the event did not occur.   
 Examples: Chantal’s examples from NBM coding: “My mother told me she 
didn’t think that I would have been allowed in the water at that age without a life 
jacket,” or, “My dad said my grade 4 teacher probably wouldn’t have told me that 
I did a horrible job on my science fair project,” etc. 
 
 
F4. LACK OF CORROBORATION FROM ANOTHER  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
belief/knowledge that others cannot confirm the memory. Otherwise stated, the 
participant challenges the other’s account because others have told the participant 
that they do not remember the event (or cannot confirm the event). Note that the 
participant is not actually stating that the event did not occur; they are only stating 
that the event cannot be confirmed by a third party. 
 Example: Chantal’s examples from NBM coding: No body else remembers it but 
me,” or, “My friend who I thought was with me does not remember it at all,” 
 
 
F5. THE EVENT WAS NOT WITNESSED  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
belief/knowledge that they themselves and/or others did not witness the event. 
Note that the participant is not stating that the event did not occur; the participant 
is only expressing a reason for the inability to witness the event.  
 Specific codes: 
o F5a: The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by 
the belief/knowledge that they themselves were not present (physically or 
mentally) to witness the event (e.g., I didn’t see it).  
o F5b: The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated 
by the belief/knowledge that the other person (i.e., the challenged person) 
was not actually present to witness the event (e.g., You weren’t there). 
o Code F5 if either F5a or F5b, or both, are present. 
 Example: Chantal’s examples from NBM: “I was told I wasn’t even there,” or, “I 
was told I was too drunk to see it,” or “I was told I was sleeping at the time,” 
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(G) BELIEF IN ACCURACY 
 
General Notes:  
 Belief in Accuracy refers to an assessment of whether the details of a recalled 
event are accurate. 
 As a general rule, all the categories in this section involve a participant who 
claims to challenge BECAUSE they doubt the accuracy of the event for one 
reason or another.  
 Whereas Belief in Occurrence focuses on whether the entire event occurred or 
not, Belief in Accuracy focuses on whether the details recalled within the event 
are correct or not. For example, “You did not wear a blue jacket, you wore a 
green sweater” is a challenge to Belief in Accuracy.  
 The challenger may agree that the event occurred, but challenge one or more 
details about the memory for the event. 
 The challenger may challenge both occurrence and accuracy; for example “You 
were not there when that event happened [occurrence], and so are wrong that he 
did not wear the blue jacket, he was wearing the green sweater [accuracy] .” 
 It is possible to challenge occurrence without challenging accuracy, “That event 
did not happen to you, it happened to me; but everything you describe is exactly 
right because I told you the story.”  
 
 
G1. THE EVENT HAPPENED DIFFERENTLY  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief 
that feature(s) of the event, as recounted by the other, are inaccurate, wrong, or 
happened differently.  
 This challenge does not necessarily invalidate the occurrence of the event; it 
merely offers alternate suggestions regarding content components of the event.  
 The stated reason might include the following:  
o Occurred to someone else (other than the participant) 
o Occurred at a different age 
o Occurred at a different place 
o Occurred at a different time  
o Occurred over a different length of time  
o Occurred in a different context 
o Involved different objects  
o Involved different actions 
o Involved a different outcome 
o Did not include certain features that were reported 
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged because] his details were wrong” 
o “I challenged his memory because his recollection of the event was not 
exactly how it had unfolded in reality,”  
o “[I challenged because] her perception of how many cigarettes she had 
was wrong. My mother claimed that I stole a large portion of her cigarettes 
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from her pack. I immediately let her know I only took one and she insisted 
there were MANY missing.” 
 
(H) PROSOCIAL MOTIVES 
 
General Notes:  
 Prosocial Motives refers to challenges intended to develop, maintain, and/or 
nurture closeness in social relationships. This takes a number of forms, including 
being helpful in some way, illustrating a point or giving advice in order to teach 
and inform others (e.g., pass on valuable life lessons or information), making the 
conversation more enjoyable, collaboratively co-constructing memories with 
others present at the original event so as to produce more complete memories, and 
providing empathy to others.  
 Challenges prompted by prosocial motives will tend to show all of the following 
characteristics: 
o Consist primarily of an external, social focus; 
o Are accompanied by the participant’s explicit expression of helpful and/or 
positive intentions; 
o Focus more on a specific person other than OR in addition to oneself.  
 Subcategories inspired by Alea & Bluck (2003); Bluck et al., 2005; Webster, 
2003; Pasupathi et al., 2002. 
 At all times, prioritize the coding of the “why” responses over the “how” 
responses. 
 
 
H1. SEEKING CONFIRMATION  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to 
seek out, verify, or confirm details about a past event and/or negotiate a shared 
interpretation of a past event. In all these instances, participants enlist the other’s 
assistance with the explicit purpose of co-constructing memories in order to 
produce more complete memories. 
 Coding aid: 
o The participant will typically admit OR strongly hint at having doubts 
about their own recollection and/or interpretation of the challenged event. 
This doubt motivates their asking the other for help. 
o The tone of these narratives will typically be benign in nature, reflecting a 
genuine collaborative attempt at trying to make sense of a past event.   
o Participant’s use of words like “verify” or “confirm” (or their synonyms) 
will typically suggest a Seek Confirmation motive. 
o If in doubt, prioritize coding the “why” response over the “how” response. 
 Examples:  
o “I challenged her memory because I thought it was different from mine 
and I figured between the two of us we could iron out the parts that were 
incorrect on both sides.” 
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o “The reason why I challenged the person's memory was to verify a bet to 
ensure that the loser of the previous set of games would go on to cover the 
winner's games.”  
o “We challenge each other because we value accuracy in memories and 
love one another. We want to make sure we are both right. It is not a 
matter of keeping tabs to see who has the better memory.” 
o “I was unsure about my recollection of the event that happened and 
wanted to see if I was just being crazy.”  
 
 
H2. PROVIDING EMOTIONAL SUPPORT  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to 
offer empathy, care, understanding, and/or emotional support to the other. There 
will often be a quasi-therapeutic tone to these challenges as participants attempt to 
cheer the other up, instil confidence, show that they care for the other, or alleviate 
the other’s stress.  
 Expressions of concern about a loved one’s memory should be coded under this 
category.  
 Examples:  
o “I challenged this person's memory because I wanted to instil confidence 
in them so that they would succeed. Whether true or not, I wanted them to 
see the events that happened as positive rather than negative” 
o “I wanted my partner to remember this event that way he would feel more 
at ease about the delivery” 
 
 
H3. PASSING ON KNOWLEDGE/INFORMATION  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to 
pass on valuable life lessons or information.   
 The value/importance of the information needs to be recognized implicitly or 
explicitly by both the challenger and the challenged party in order to be coded 
here. If the participant states that the challenged account was important or 
valuable to them, but there is no indication of importance to the other, do not code 
the account under his category.  
 Coding aid: 
o The participant is motivated by their own belief and/or knowledge that the 
information they are passing on by challenging the other’s account is 
valuable or important to the other. 
o This belief/knowledge can be explicitly stated (e.g., “I thought it was 
important to x”) OR strongly implied by the context (e.g., themes of 
safety, security, love/belonging, financial lessons, health, happiness, self-
esteem, confidence, achievement, etc. are strongly indicative of 
importance/value to the other).  
 Examples:  
o “I wanted to teach my brother responsible financial habits” 
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o “I did so partly because I wanted to inform her of something she actually 
had that she believes she never had”  
o “I felt that she should know where she was at that time [when 9/11 
happened] so that she does not live life thinking she was somewhere else 
when that happened.” 
o “I challenged the memory because I thought it was important for my 
mother to realize that the reason my dad was making more money was 
because his boss wasn't managing the company correctly.” 
 
 
H4. REMINISCING 
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to 
indulge in the enjoyable recollection of a past event.  
 Coding aid: 
o Participants will often (but not always) refer to positive emotions and 
actions like “happy”, “funny”, or “laugh”. 
o Participants will also typically (but not always) use neutral or positive 
labels to refer to the act of the challenge itself, like “conversation” or 
“reminiscing”, rather than “disagreement” or “fight”. 
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged] to reminisce on the good times. To take us back to a happy 
time.” 
o “This is why I brought it up, pretty much for the laughs from the rest of 
our friends.” 
o “It was just a conversation about our childhood.” 
 
 
H5. RELATIONSHIP MAINTENANCE [H5] 
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their desire 
to rebuild or maintain the relationship with another person, either the challenged 
party or another third party. In order to receive this code, the participant must 
explicitly state that relationship maintenance is partially or entirely at the root of 
their motive for challenging (e.g., “I have hope of recreating our friendship”). 
 Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background 
information provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to your coding 
of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information, prioritize “why” over 
“how” responses.  
 Specific Codes: 
o Code H5a if relationship maintenance is done through manipulation 
and/or deception. For example, the participant might lie, omit, or even 
blame the challenged party about the event or features of the event in 
order to rebuild, maintain, or strengthen the relationship with the 
challenged person. 
o Code H5b if relationship maintenance is done through any other means 
aside from the ones described in H5a. Please make a note of this in the 
Excel file.  
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 Example:  
o “[I challenged because] I have hope of re-creating our friendship” 
[Example of H5b] 
o “How” response: “When I was younger, I borrowed a game from a friend. 
I played and highly enjoyed it. Before I could return it the friend moved 
and I kept it. Several years later we reconnected with each other. We got 
on the topic of the game ad he stated vaguely remembering lending it to 
me. I said that it was great and that I returned it right before he moved out 
of the state. He shrugged and said “oh, that’s right” and that was it. I’ve 
still got the disc sitting in a case on my shelf. “Why” response: “It was 
easier to just say that I returned it and continue with the friendship rather 
than potentially starting an argument about if I was being a thief.” 
[Example of H5a] 
 
 
(I) INTERNAL MODELS OF SELF & OTHERS 
 
General Notes: 
 Internal Models of Self & Others refers to challenges resulting from the 
participant’s internal model(s) of themselves/the challenged party/a third party in 
terms of qualities, values, characteristics, personality traits, typical behaviors, 
preferences, social category, etc. 
 Unless otherwise indicated, any mention of “internal models” when coding this 
category is always referring to internal models held by the participant 
himself/herself. 
 As a reminder, in every account, you will find at least 2 players: 
o The challenger = the participant.  
o The challenged party (aka, the challengee) = the other 
 Some accounts may involve the following additional players: 
o A third party other = a person who was absent when the challenge took 
place but may have been present when the challenged event occurred. 
 Challenges prompted by internal models will tend to have an implicit or explicit 
assessment of the compatibility between the participant’s internal models and/or 
the challenged event (or features of the event). Challenges may involve: 
o Disputing the other’s account because the other is deemed to possess 
personality traits/tendencies that the participant believes would undermine 
the credibility of the challenged event (or features of the event).  
o Disputing the other’s account because they are deemed to undermine the 
credibility of the challenged event (or features of the event; e.g., by lying, 
being in denial, or omitting the truth) only in the context of this challenge.  
o Disputing the other’s account and/or perception of a third party person 
because it differs substantially from the challenger’s own perception of 
this same third party person. 
o Disputing the other’s account because doing so is compatible with the 
participant’s perception of their own personality characteristics, values, 
qualities, preferences, etc. 
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o Disputing the other’s account because what the other alleges about the 
challenged event (or features of the event) is deemed incompatible with 
the participant’s self-concept and their sense of continuity between past 
and present self-concepts.   
 
 
I1. DISPOSITIONAL VIEW OF OTHER  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
knowledge or belief that the other’s disposition (e.g., their qualities, 
characteristics, personality traits/tendencies) undermines their credibility.  
 There is an implicit sense in these accounts that the participant has formed an 
internal model of the other (i.e., as a “drama queen”) from prior knowledge and is 
relying on this model and its associated expectations to now evaluate the 
credibility of the other’s account.  
 Coding aid:  
o Look for statements that refer to tendencies (e.g., “she always …”; he has 
a way of…”; “x is a drama queen”) or blanket/sweeping dispositional 
statements (e.g., “he is a liar”.) 
o Look for dispositional attributes that speak to notions of credibility, 
honesty and dishonesty. (e.g., synonyms of: “liar”, “denial”, “exaggerate”, 
“drama queen”). 
o Participant’s use of present tense verbs to describe the other might also be 
indicative of dispositional attributions. Use the context to determine if this 
is the case. 
o Consult “how” answers and code under this subcategory if dispositional 
attributes are found there. 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] she also had a way of embellishing trifling things 
to make them sound more worse than they really are” 
o “[I challenged because he is a liar and is constantly full of shit regarding 
his stories and memories.” 
o “My husband is overly optimistic, and is innocent to a fault.”  Note that 
the appraisals are not always negative in nature. 
 
 
I2. SITUATIONAL VIEW OF OTHER [12] 
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the 
knowledge or belief that the challenged other is lying, in denial, or untruthful 
specifically with regards to the challenged event. In other words, the participant 
makes dispositional claims about the challenged other (e.g., x is dishonest, a liar, 
in denial…) only in the context of the challenged account.  
 There is a sense in these accounts that the participant may be challenging because 
the other’s dishonesty in this situation is incompatible with the participant’s own 
internal model of the other. Alternatively, or additionally, the challenge may be 
rooted in the incompatibility between the participant’s own values of honesty, 
truth, etc., vs. the other’s values of honesty, truth, etc.  
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 Incompatibility between internal models may at times be evident through 
expressions of frustration (e.g., “it bothered me that…” or “it was aggravating 
that…”). 
 Examples: 
o “I had to bring this event up because it always bothered me why he lied to 
me about what he paid for the car” 
o “[I challenged because] it was aggravating that she denied [saying that she 
was barely making it on a 30k salary when I was complaining of being in 
a large amount of student debt yet still managing through it] in that latest 
argument.” 
 
 
I3. DISCREPANT VIEWS OF OTHER  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by the belief or 
knowledge that their view of another person (either the challenged party or a third 
party) is incompatible with the challenged other’s view. The incompatibility may 
be around the challenged other’s OR the third party’s behavior(s), thought(s), 
reaction(s), characteristic(s) and/or trait(s).  
 Specific Codes: 
o Code I3a if discrepant view of 3rd party other = the challenger and 
challenged other disagree on view of a 3rd party person. In some but not all 
cases, the participant may believe that their own internal model of this 
third party person is more accurate than the other’s. In some but not all 
cases, the participant may perceive the other’s view of this third party 
person as distorted or unfair. 
o Code I3Bb if discrepant view of challenged other = the challenger and 
challenged other disagree on their views of the challenged other. Look for 
challenger statements that are directed at the challenged other and take the 
form or the spirit of “you are acting differently from what I know of you” 
or “you have changed”. 
o Code the column labelled I3 as well as I3a OR I3b. If it is not clear, code 
only I3. 
 Examples:  
o I3a: “[I challenged because] I didn't think it was right for her to continue 
to blame her sister for things [her sister] was not at fault for” 
o I3a: “[I challenged because] she created a memory in her mind that was 
not fair to our mother” 
o I3a and I3b: “He remembers not being abusive at all to our mother when I 
witnessed his emotional and sometimes physical abuse first hand. He now 
wants me and everyone else to believe his stories because the truth of the 
facts would make him look bad. I feel it is almost my obligation to remind 
him that as long as I am around, his lies and version of the truth will 
continually be challenged.]…He made some bad things try to disappear by 
not admitting what he really did to our Mom…. I don't like the fact that he 
tries to sweep all of this negative action under the carpet now that the 
person he did it to [Mom] passed away.” 
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I4. DISPOSITIONAL VIEW OF SELF [14] 
 Participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their perception 
of their own dispositional tendencies (e.g., their values, qualities, characteristics, 
personality traits and tendencies, preferences, behavior), likes, and/or dislikes. 
There is an implicit sense that through the challenge, the participant is reaffirming 
or upholding aspects of who they believe they are.  
 Participants may claim to challenge because they perceive themselves as: 
o Being the kind of person who challenges, argues, disputes or starts fights;  
o Being the kind of person who speaks up (or does not back down); 
o Being the kind of person who needs to be is right 
o Being the kind of person who likes Y or hates X 
 This subcategory differs from subcategory #30 below in that participants are NOT 
evaluating the compatibility between their past self-concept (as currently 
perceived) and their current self-concept (as currently perceived). Rather, their 
dispositional statements are expressed as absolute truths about them, with no 
explicit evaluative overtones.  
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged because] I can't stand when something is incorrect. Besides 
that, I always feel the need to be right.”  
o “[I challenged] because I don't like to be misunderstood, but most 
importantly I don't like being lied on.”  
o “[I challenged] because I like to argue…”  
o “[I challenged because] I generally don't like to back down when I think 
I’m right.” 
 
 
I5. CHANGING VIEW OF SELF [15] 
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their desire 
to break away from own dispositional tendencies and habits (e.g., their values, 
qualities, characteristics, personality traits and tendencies, preferences, behavior).  
 There will typically be a clear sense in these accounts that, by challenging, the 
participant is behaving differently in this situation from what they typically do.  
 Specific Codes 
o Code 27a if participant deviates from own dispositional tendencies this 
one time = the participant acknowledges that they have always been the 
kind of person who X (e.g., does not challenge, does not argue, fights, 
does not speak up, speaks up, gets annoyed, likes Y, hates A), but not this 
time; this time, they are doing something different.  
o Code 27b if participant deviates from own disposition tendencies from 
now on = the participant acknowledges that they have always been the 
kind of person who X (e.g., does not challenge, does not argue, fights, 
does not speak up, speaks up, gets annoyed, hates A), but not anymore; 
now on, they will be acting differently.  
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o Code the column labelled 27 as well as 27a OR 27b if the participant 
states that the change is specific to the challenged event or whether they 
intend to act differently now on. If it is not clear whether the change is 
temporary or perpetual, code only 27. 
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged because] on that day I got tired of playing along and not 
wanting to rock the boat with her.” 
o “[I challenged because] I felt like I was standing up for myself by holding 
her accountable because I've witnessed others correct her when she does 
this and I notice that I have a tendency to just go along with what she says 
just to keep the peace.”  
 
 
I6. CONSISTENT VIEW OF SELF OVER TIME [16] 
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their belief 
or knowledge that the event or features of the event are inconsistent with how they 
currently view themselves. Participant appears to base this belief or knowledge on 
an implicit assessment of compatibility & continuity between their past and 
present self-concept.  
o In other words, participant’s internal models of “past self” and “present 
self” do not match. 
 For example, the participant might dispute the other’s account by arguing that “it 
is unlike me to do X” or “it is not in my character to do Y”. 
 Coding aid:  
o All challenges coded under this category will include a strongly implied or 
explicit assessment of past self & present self.  
o Look for statements that explicitly or implicitly refer to: “I’m not like 
that!”, “I would never…” or “It is not like me to do/think x…” 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] I wouldn't have gotten rid of myself because they 
had sentimental value to me. “ 
o “[I challenged because] my husband claimed I had said something that I 
didn't. I tried to tell him I would never say something of the sort and told 
him why I wouldn't have.”  
o “My girlfriend claimed that I had previously agreed to wait until we 
owned our own home to buy another car to work on. I [challenged] 
because I would never enter into this agreement.” 
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(J) SELF-FOCUSED MOTIVES 
 
General Notes: 
 Self-focused motives refer to challenges intended to consolidate, preserve, 
protect, and/or enhance a sense of “I” and “who I am”. 
 These challenges will tend to show all of the following characteristics: 
o Consist primarily of an internal, self focus; 
o Focus more on the self rather than OR in addition to others. 
 If unsure about a code, err towards coding conservatively. 
 
 
J1. CORRECTING THE EVENT INTERPRETATION  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a desire to 
correct, clear up, or clarify the other’s interpretation of a past event. Stated 
otherwise, the participant deems the others’ interpretation of a past event to be 
erroneous; the challenge is intended to rectify this interpretation.  
 Regardless of how the other is affected by the challenge, it is the participant’s 
stated intention to correct the other’s interpretation that matters. 
 These challenges differ from subcategory “Correcting Views of Me” below in 
that: 
o The participant is not explicitly reflecting upon the impression they are 
making on the other 
o The participant is not explicitly concerned about whether they are being 
perceived in a positive light. Rather, their overarching concern is the 
stated desire to correct/rectify/clarify the other’s interpretation, not restore 
their positive self-image. 
 Coding aid:  
o Consider both “how” and “why” responses because context and 
background information will be crucial to your coding of this subcategory.  
o Participant’s use of words like “correct”, “clarify” and/or “clear up” in the 
context of interpretations might suggest a Correcting the Event 
Interpretation motive. 
 Examples: 
o “How” response: “When my sister came home for winter break in 2014, 
we found a stuffed pink rabbit in the garage along with the other junk. 
When I was little I used to cherish this rabbit and hugged and slept with it 
every night. My sister thought I just outgrew the rabbit when I stopped 
caring about it, but I told her she was the one who made me stopped caring 
about the rabbit. I told her that she told me a scary story about stuffed 
animals coming to life and killing their owners, and that I got scared and 
locked my rabbit in the closet. I even told her the TV show that inspired 
her story. My sister said she did not remember telling that scary story at 
all, and the look on her face was one of denial.] “Why” response: When 
we found the rabbit, the subject about me outgrowing it came up, but I 
wanted to correct my sister that that was not the case.” 
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o “How” response: “My mom believes I think she is stupid. I don't, but she 
will put words in my mouth whenever she tells her friends about our 
disagreements. I found out that she had been drinking heavily and was 
involved in an affair with a married man, and we got into an argument 
over it. After a few weeks, she started to say I had called her "stupid" and 
"a whore". I hadn't, and I disagreed with her. My brother was there during 
the argument and told me I was right. I didn't say those things. “Why” 
response: I wanted to make it very clear that I didn't say that to my 
mother. I didn't mention the drinking and cheating to call her stupid or a 
whore. I wanted to make it clear that I was just worried about her 
behavior.” 
 
 
J2. CORRECTING VIEWS OF ME  
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was 
motivated by a desire to correct an unfavourable self-presentation and/or to 
establish a favourable self-presentation. In such instances, the participant deems 
the other’s recollection to reflect unfavourably upon them; the challenge is 
intended to shape the other’s impression of the challenger in more 
positive/favourable terms. 
 These challenges differ from the coding subcategory “Correcting the Event 
Interpretation” in that the participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states being 
concerned with how unfavourably or negatively they are being perceived or risk 
being perceived by others.  
 Coding Aid:  
o Strong suggestions of concern regarding one’s self presentation may take 
the form of the challenger trying to distance themselves from socially 
undesirable qualities, like stupid/ignorant, violent, liar, etc.  
o It is possible to code both this and subcategory “Correcting Event 
Interpretation” if the participant explicitly articulates both (a) a desire to 
correct the other’s interpretation (regardless of how that correction makes 
them look), coded under the subcategory above and b) a desire to project a 
more favourable self-presentation, coded under this category.  
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because the event as told by the other] made me look a little 
more violent than I had been.” 
o “[I challenged because] it bothered me that she thought of me as a heavy 
drinker when I was younger.” 
o “[I challenged because] if the incorrect details about me were assumed to 
be true, it would be a poor reflection on my character and my personality.” 
o “[I challenged because] I didn't want people thinking me and my brother 
fight MMA style over stupid things” 
 
 
J3. PERSONAL NEED TO CORRECT THIS EVENT  
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 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by a personal 
need for accuracy for the event itself. These challenges will typically involve all 
of the following: 
o Participant values accuracy regarding the event itself (or event features). 
Look for evidence of the participant acknowledging their need for 
accuracy through statements like: “I wanted to set the record straight”. 
o Participant believes that their own recollection regarding the challenged 
event is accurate. This may be implicit or explicit. 
o Ensuring that the event is recollected accurately primarily benefits the 
participant (i.e., satisfies their need for accuracy).  
 Coding Aid:  
o Look for tell-tale expressions like: “I wanted to set the record straight”, “I 
just had to help her remember”, “I wanted to clarify xyz”, “I wanted to 
correct him”, “I wanted to let her know she was wrong”, “I wanted the 
memory to be correct” to identify a personal need for accuracy.  
o Accounts that receive a code under this subcategory could also be coded 
under Belief in Accuracy. Only code as “Personal Need to Correct this 
Event” instances when the participant strongly implies or explicitly 
articulates their own desire/need for an event (or event features) to be 
recalled accurately.  
o Participant’s statement that they always need to be right or are the kind of 
people that like to be right are captured by subcategory “Dispositional 
View of Self” and should NOT be coded here. 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] I wanted to make sure the story that I was 
listening to was accurate” 
o “[I challenged because] but I couldn't justify letting her continue to believe 
that my hair was long just for the sake of some laughs. I never had long 
hair.” 
o [I challenged because] I just had to help her remember.” 
 
 
J4. SEEKING VALIDATION  
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was 
motivated by a desire to elicit empathy and/or validation of a past experience. 
Specifically, participants challenge because they want the other to: 
o Acknowledge and/or take responsibility/admit guilt/wrongdoing regarding 
the challenged event.  
o Understand the emotional consequences of what happened in the past.  
 Coding Aid:  
o Look for statements or synonyms of “I wanted X person to understand” or 
“I wanted Y person to admit the truth…”  
o Challenges involving past trauma and/or abuse will typically be coded 
under this subcategory, unless there is good reason not to. Other 
challenges (i.e., not involving some kind of trauma or abuse) may also be 
coded under this subcategory.  
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o Consider both “how” and “why” responses because context and 
background information will be crucial to determining the nature of the 
challenged event. 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] her version was so far off that it functioned as a 
violent denial of the pain we children had experienced at various points in 
our childhoods”  Although not explicit, there is a strong implicit 
suggestion that the participant challenged because she felt invalidated and 
wanted the other to admit [not deny] what happened. The “pain us 
children…” here is also strongly suggestive of the desire this participant 
demonstrates to be understood at an emotional level. 
o “I challenged his memory of it because I just wanted him to admit the 
truth,” 
 
 
J5. SEEKING RECOGNITION  
 The participant strongly suggests OR explicitly states that their challenge was 
motivated by a desire to be recognized/acknowledged for their role in something 
deemed positive, valuable, and/or helpful by both the challenger and the 
challenged party.  
 In these instances, the participant will typically claim that the other attributed the 
challenger’s helpful advice to someone else (e.g., a third party other, the 
challenged other). The challenge is intended to rectify this role misattribution and 
reinstate the participant as the source of the positive contribution.  
 Examples: 
o “I challenged the other person's memory because she wanted to claim all 
the glory for herself and wasn't giving me any glory that I deserve [for 
helping her win money on a scratch card]” 
o [“I challenged because] I was upset that he did not [give me] credit for 
playing a part in his eventual marriage.”  
 
 
J6. MANAGING ANTICIPATED OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE SELF  
 The participant explicitly states that the challenge was motivated by a desire to 
prevent a negative, unfavourable, or unwanted situation from occurring to them 
and/or ensure that a positive, favourable, or wanted situation does occur to them.  
o Note that it is the participant who decides what is negative, unfavourable, 
or unwanted. For example, here’s an instance when ice cream, a 
favourable outcome for most people, is nonetheless not considered 
wanted: “I challenged it because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster with 
my dad. This was the bargain I had been promised, not the ice cream!”  
 Examples:  
o “I challenged it because I wanted to go on that rollercoaster with my dad. 
This was the bargain I had been promised, not the ice cream!”  
SELF-DISCREPANT AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
 283 
 
 
o “[I challenged because] I wanted her to keep her promise to me to do 
something for me, so when she told me she didn't want to do the thing I 
wanted her to do, I was quite upset. I wanted her to fulfill her promise.” 
o “[I challenged because] I didn't want to watch the same movie I had 
already seen.” 
 
 
J7. DEFENDING THE SELF  
 The participant explicitly states that the challenge was motivated by a need to 
protect oneself in response to a strongly implied or explicit threat to the self. In 
other words, participants will claim to challenge in self-defence.  
 All challenges coded under this subcategory involve an explicit or strongly 
suggested threat that has either already occurred or is anticipated to occur. Threats 
may be of an emotional or physical nature, or both.   
o Emotional threat may involve: feeling or anticipating fear, dread, pain, 
hurt, shame 
o Physical threat may involve: actual or threatened serious injury or violence 
 Most (but not all) challenges coded under this category will contain an explicit 
acknowledgment that the challenge itself is a form of self-defence (e.g., “I 
defended myself…”). 
 Examples:  
o “[I challenged because I wanted] to avoid being emotionally and verbally 
abused by her.”  
o “I challenged the person's memory because they were trying to intimidate 
me in the litigation” 
o “[I challenged because] I was defending myself” 
o “I challenged this particular memory because it is one of the most painful 
experiences that I have ever had to endure” 
 
 
J8. SOCIAL MISCHIEF  
 Participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their own 
pursuit of fun, thrill, or amusement within an interpersonal relationship. Whether 
the challenge itself was viewed as fun or amusing by the challenged other is 
irrelevant to this code; only the participant needs to explicitly view the challenge 
as fun or amusing in order to receive this code. 
 Coding Aid: 
o Synonyms of “fun”, “amusing”, and expressions of thrill (e.g., “I want to 
see if I could do it”; “just for the thrill of it”, “just for the heck of it”) can 
all be used as coding cues. 
o Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background 
information (e.g., as to whether something was done for amusement only, 
for example) provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to 
your coding of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information, 
prioritize “why” over “how” responses. 
 Examples: 
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o “[I challenged because] I wanted to have some fun challenging my sister's 
memory because she prides herself in her memory” 
o “How” response: “I told my friend he forgot to give me back the 100 
dollars I gave him. “Why” response: “[Even though he actually returned 
the money owed to me 2 weeks ago, I challenged him about not returning 
the money because] I wanted to see if I could do it.” 
 
 
J9. SOCIAL COMPARISON  
 Participant states that their challenge was motivated by one-upmanship – wanting 
to show superiority or dominance in a particular area relative to another person. 
To receive this code, participants need to explicitly state OR strongly imply that 
they are attempting to overly influence or take control of the conversation about 
the event itself or event features in order to demonstrate superiority or 
dominance. 
 Consult both “how” and “why” responses because context and background 
information provided primarily in “how” responses will be crucial to your coding 
of this subcategory. If there is contradictory information, prioritize “why” over 
“how” responses. 
 Examples: 
o “[I challenged because] I wanted to be able to say I knew more then him, 
about the house that we lived in.”  
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(K) EMOTIONAL STATES 
 
General Notes: 
 Emotional States refers to challenges stemming from participants experiencing 
certain emotional states.  
 Only code an emotional state that is explicitly stated in the “why” answer. You 
may consult the “how” answer for context purposes only. 
 If unsure about a code, err towards coding conservatively. 
 
 
K1. EMOTIONAL STATES  
 The participant explicitly states that their challenge was motivated by their 
experience of a particular emotional state. Sometimes (but not always) 
participants will elaborate on the intensity and/or distress associated with the 
emotion state; this provides further evidence of their view that the challenge was 
motivated by emotions (e.g., it was the most painful, I had all this anger pent up).    
 Code this subcategory anytime an emotional state is used to partly OR entirely 
explain the motivation for challenging.  
 Coding Aid: 
o Only code the participant’s emotions. Do not code how others may be 
feeling. 
o Sometimes, participants do not take ownerships of their feelings but will 
instead speak in third person (e.g., “this friend…has a way of making 
people feel bad.” OR “It irritated me that…”). Using the “how” answer as 
context, you can code this as a feeling the participant themselves is 
experiencing. 
o Note the emotional state in the NOTES column in Excel for quick 
reference.  
o Figure 1 (below) is a non-exhaustive list of adjectives used to describe 
commonly encountered emotional states. You may come across adjectives 
that are not represented in Figure 1 below.  
 Specific Codes.  
 Code 38a for Negative Affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to 
states of sadness, upset, guilt, disgust, shame, anger, hostility, fear, or anxiety.   
 Code 38b for Positive Affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to 
states of interest, confidence (“I’m sure…”), excitement, 
strength/empowerment, enthusiasm, inspiration, happiness, surprise, love, 
hope, joy, pride, etc. 
 Code 38c for Neutral affect/Emotion: This includes but is not confined to 
states of indifference, not caring, etc. (“I was indifferent”; “I didn't care”). 
o NB: Code 38 if 38a, 38b or 38c are present. If it is not clear, code only 38.   
o NB: Code “I’m sure…” under 38b as a synonym to “I’m confident” 
(Positive Affect). DO NOT CODE “I knew/know” as an emotional state. 
 Examples: 
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o “I challenged because it is one of the most painful experiences that I have 
ever had to endure.”  Notice the identification of an emotional state, 
“painful”, as motivating this challenge. Code under 38a. 
o “[I challenged because] I was trying to be honest about what happened in 
the past and come clean about something that I had felt guilt over when I 
was younger.”  Notice the identification of two emotional states: 
“honesty” and “guilt”. The participant feels guilty. By challenging, he 
wants to reveal the truth and be honest, but he is not there yet. Code this 
under 38a for guilt. 
o “[I challenged because] I had all this pent up frustration and anger even 
years later and I just finally felt mature enough to call my mom out on it” 
 Note the identification of frustration and anger. Code under 38b. 
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